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Rights Under a Collective Bargaining Non­
Agreement: The Question of Monetary 
Compensation for a Refusal to Bargain 
l'\l.I R. IL\ll·R* 
/ �V/e ha1'£' lu deal in nn1· 11·cns H'ith 1he s ubjecl of 
nwking legal precepts efj'ective. We must study 1he li111i1s of 
e!fc'clii·e legal aclion . .. We 111us1 e.\·amine our armory of 
legal weapons . appraise th<:' value of C:'ach for the tasks of 
/(){lay, and ask wha1 new ones 111ay be devi.1·C:'d and what we 
111a_r expect reasonably to accomplish by !hem when devised. 
-Roscoe Pound 
INTRODUCTION 
Admittedly, the universe of rights and correlative duties which 
exists in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement is very large 
indeed. And one may naturally inquire what the non-existence of a 
collective bargaining agreement has to do with any enumeration of 
Hohfeldian pairs. The writer must confess an ulterior motive,1 but 
certainly the expression "rights under a collective bargaining non­
agreement" has meaning enough for those ignorant of any Hohfeldian 
* A.B. 1966 University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1969 Harvard. 
I. A bit of academic sport the writer could not resist. S<'<' Cox, Rights L'nder a l.abor 
lgre('ll/£'111, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956). 
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legalese.2 The experience of two representatives of that happy class 
demonstrates the point. Fortunately, their experience also eliminates 
the ever uncomfortable problem of where to be gin. We begin in 
the beginning. 
The beginning is dated September 27, 1935. One Warren C. 
Evans, business agent for the Marine Engineers' Beneficial 
Association No. 13, approached a Mr. L.H. Garrison, general 
manager of the Delaware-Ne� Jersey Ferry Co., presented him with 
some signed cards and demanded that Mr. Garrison recognize and 
bargain collectively with Beneficial Association No. 13. This was all 
very confusing to Mr. Garrison. In the past he had always negotiated 
with his employees individually and he so informed Evans. Evans 
replied that under the National Labor Relations Act one representing 
a majority of employee groups was authorized to negotiate on their 
behalf. Mr. Garrison's response was c lassic. He expressed a lack of 
familiarity with the Act and a desire to have a copy of it. Evans 
imm ediately f ur nished a copy and the episode conc luded with 
Garrison's refusal to recognize the Association.3 
It is to Warren Evans' probable i nterpretation of the expression 
"rights under a collective bargaining n on-agreement" that this article 
is addressed. The concern here is with the same right relied upon by 
Evans in his confrontation with Garrison-the right o f  the New 
Jersey Ferry Company's engineers and the right of all employees "to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. "4 
The subject is that of making the right to bargain collectively and its 
correlative duty meaningful and effective. Our concern i s  also with 
remedies. The task is to examine the armory of weapons used in the 
past to secure the right to bargain collectively and to appraise those 
suggested for use in the future. The question is whether monetary 
compensation should issue to redress a refusal to bargain.5 
EVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT-THE NEED FOR RE-EXAMINATION OF 
THE REMEDIAL ARSENAL 
Th� agency charged with enforcement of the duty to bargain is 
the National Labor Relations Board. I ts power to redress refusals to 
2·. Their position is enviable. For legal buffs who are likewise ignorant of the Hohfeldian analysis l have but condemnation d · · 
,9 y 
. 1 1 3 
an 3 cttatton. See Corbin, Legal AnalvsiI and Ter111i110/ogr. 
� .\II- .. J 6 (1919). . 
J. Delaware-New Jersey rerryCo., I N.L.R.B. 85, 91 (1935). -4. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 7 29 
5. Section 8(a)(5) o f  the NLRA . . : 
U.S.C. § 157 (1964). . . 
employer 10 refuse to b· 
. 
. 
11 . 
pro�ides, It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
· argain co ect1vely wnh the . ·· 19 
l! S.C � 15K(a)(5) (1%4). . 8 b 
representatives of his employees . . . . -. section ( )(3)ofthe NLRA 2 9  USC h the same duty upon labor organizations. • . .
. § 158(b)(3) attac es 
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bargain derives from section lO(c) of the NLRA,6 which authorizes the 
Board to order an adamant employer, for instance, to cease and desist 
any unlawful refusal to bargain. Just such action was taken by the 
Board to redress the Evans-Garrison incident, the first reported 
violation of section 8(a)(5).7 A year later the Board recast its remedial 
order in cases of unlawful refusals to bargain and commanded: 
Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds 
will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Enter ... into 
negotiations in good faith with the United Textile Workers of 
America ... with the object of making an agreement 
covering wages, hours and working conditions.8 
Rather than ordering the guilty party to refrain from inaction, the 
Board now required an employer to do something affirmative, to enter 
into negotiations in good faith.9 However, the change in remedial 
process was little more than an avoidance of grammatical error, the 
double negative. The new order offered little assistance to union 
organizational efforts10 and "serve[d] only to represent formal 
6. If upon a preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion 
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair 
labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause 
to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such 
unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of 
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act. ... 29 
U . S MC . § 160(c) (1964). 
7. Then Section 8(5) of the original N LRA, 49 Stat. 453 (1935). The Board commanded 
'"that respondent Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Company ... cease and desist from refusing to 
hJrgain collectively with Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association No. 13 as the exclusive 
rcprcsentati ve of the licensed engineers employed in such a capacity by respondent in respect to 
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment." Delaware-Ne w  
Jersey Ferry Co., I N.L.R.B. 85, 96 (1935). 
8. Baer Co., I N.L.R.B. 159, 163 (1936). 
9. The changes in remedies should not be confused with the change in the substantive scope 
or the duty to bargain in good faith. For the origins of the duty to bargain see Smith, The 
/mfutio11 oj'1he '"Duty to Bargain" Concepl in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1941). 
lor changes in its substantive dimensions see Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. 
L R1°v. 1401 (1958). While there is no dispute as to the relief available after the event of a refusal 
lo bargain, there remains at present considerable debate as to the appropriate role of the NLRB 
in determining whether an employer has met the standard of good faith. Compare Cox, supra at .1419 (['I-or the Board to appraise the employer's bargaining position with respect to some major 
issue as a mean s  of ascertaining his good faith would involve passing judgment upon the 
reasonableness of his proposals and thus would apply pressure to make concessions. ") with Gross, 
( ulkn & Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labo; Negotialions: Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 
1009. 1020 (1968) ("If section 8(a)(5) ... is to impose 'any substantial obligation at all,' then 
the NLR B can and even must make an assessment of the reasonableness of the parties' 
substantive positions."). 
_ 
I 0. "It is also true that union attempts at organization are not always assisted by a mere 
linding of an unfair labor practice, an order to cease and desist, and a posting of the order." 
Retail Store Union v. NLR B, 385 F.2d 301, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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acknowledgement of the law. "11 For the ensuing t hree decades the 
Board's remedial armory in cases o f  refusal to bargain has remained 
unaltered. As in 1936, the stand a rd order remains that the respondent 
cease and desist from refusing to  bargain and, affirmatively, that he 
bargain in good faith. 
At first g lance the effectiveness of the Board's remedies appears 
disputed. Fra nk McCulloch, cha i r m a n  o f  the NLRB, reported in 1962 
that the major objective of the N LRA -- "effective collective 
bargaining''-had been and incre asingly was being achieved. He stated 
that the "most salient" feature of the Board's administration of the 
Act was "the h i g h  degree of c o m pli ance w i t h, a n d  successful 
operation of, our law."12 On the other hand, one practitioner has 
blasted the Board's ineptitude: 
It i s  safe to say that if Lord Mansfield had been a s  t i morous 
and unimaginative in developing rules for effective e nforcement 
of com mercial obligations as the Board has been in  adopting 
equitable doctrines and remedies to  enforcement o f  the duty 
to bargain, the commercial l a w  would have atrophied.u 
The conflict,  h o wever, is no m o re than a di v e r ge n ce in focal 
awareness; the parties are add ress ing di fferent problems.  Most 
observers would agree that the remedies available i n  cases of refusal 
to bargain a re sufficient, for the very good reason that, in general, 
voluntary compliance with the law obviates any need for remedial 
process.14 At t he same time, those same observers15 w ould agree that, 
11. Mon tgomery Ward & Co. v. N L R B, 339 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1965). 
12. Address by Frank W. McCulloch, American Bar Association's Labor Relat ions Law 
Section, San Francisco, Aug. 6-8, 1962, in SO L.R.R.M. 36, 37 (1962). Chairman McCulloch's 
remarks were based upon the findings of Professor Philip Rose. See P. Ross, THE GOVERNMENT 
AS A SOURCE OF UNION POWER 242 (1965). Professor Ross has published later fi ndings in THE 
LABOR LAW IN A CTION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS UNDER THE TAff· 
HARTLEY ACT (1966) (Hereinafter cited as "Ross"). Professor Ross' study covered the years 
1957-62 and is based upon the 7,866 § 8(a)(5) charges filed and the I.008 § 8(a)(5) complaints 
issued during the period. Table I at 39. Professor Ross noted: 'The legal standards of bargaining 
have been extremely pervasive and have influenced employer behavior in a manner that, in general 
and on the whole, has ben consistent with the Congressional mandate. Employers, by and large, take their obligations in this area seriously and most of them have accepted Board policies and procedures in their dealings with unions." at 2. 
!3. Hearings on Congressional Oversigh t of Administra/ive Agencies !National Lab
or 
Relat'.ons Board I Before the Subco111111. on Separa;ion of Powers of the Senate Co111111. on the Judicwry, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968) (Hereinafter "Ervin Hearings") (Statement of Moz.art Ratner at 214). 
1.4· And, it should be noted that such remedies as do exist may very well have nothing to do with. the observed complian ce. "There is reason to believe that economic considerauons, economic strength, and not the processes of the NLRB, ultimately will resolve almost every labor­management quarrel 
· · · ·" Graham, How Effective Is The National Labor Relations Board. 48 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1046 (1964). 
. . 
15. See Ross, supra note 12, at 2, ("The major shortcoming of the NLRB lies in its fa ilure 
1969) 
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when attention focuses upon cases of violation of the law, the 
standard order "is something akin to an exercise in futility."16 
The Board itself has noted1i that most concern over the adequacy 
of its remedial scheme centers upon violation of the law rather than 
compliance; the numerous, successfully established bargaining 
relationships often are unmentioned. And the concern is universal. It 
has produced scholarship18 and a host of congressional hearings.19 
The writer would go t oo far, no doubt, were he to draw any 
implication from a failure in the "literature of inadequacy" to discuss 
success stories; like the news, those who gain attention in this field are 
those who are able to cause the most trouble. But the point of general 
success should be made explicit. Although the author agrees with 
Professor Lesnick that "the simple notion of doing over again what 
has worked badly once is hardly a reassuring method of undoing the 
effects of the abortive attempt, "20 I would question any general 
application of his rationale for the adoption of new forms of relief: 
"[l]t is impossible to defend a refusal to impose [a form of relief] 
unless one is willing to defend the adequacy of the particular remedies 
in fact applied .... "21 A cease and desist order and an affirmative 
order to bargain may be wholly inadequate to remedy a refusal to 
bargain; however, inadequacy and need cannot alone justify the 
imposition of new forms of relief. The suggestion here is for monetary 
lo adopt adequate and realistic remedies in those cases where the employer has unmistakably 
demonstrated a continuing intent to frustrate the Act."); McCulloch, Past. Present and Future 
Remedies UnderSection81aJl5)of the NLRA. 19 LAB. L.J. 131, 133-35 (1968). 
16. Hearings on H.R. 667. H.R. 976. H.R. 1134. H.R. !54R, H.R. :!03R. H.R. 3355. H.R. 
4271!. H.R. 5918. H.R. 601!0 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. o n  
Education & Labor, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.  (1966 )  (Supplemental Statement of Representative 
Thompson, at 77) . 
. 
17· "The agency notes, as it has in the past, that while attention may focus on those cases 
of violation of the law, it is still true that both management and labor, by large majority, 
voluntarily observe their duties and obligations under the Act." THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 8oARD 1-2 (1968) . 
. 
18· Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Efections Under the Natwnaf Labor Relarions Act 78 HARV L REV 38 (1964)· Note The .'Veed for Creative Orders Under · . ' ·· · · ' ' · SeClion !Ole) of the .Varional Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PENN. L. REV. 69 (1963). 
19· See note 16 supra; Hearings on Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act by rhe NLRB Before the S u bcomm. on National Labor Relations &Jard of the House 
�011
;11· on Education & Labor, 87th Cong., tst Sess. (1961); Hearings on H.R. 11725 Be.fore 
�s. 
P
�;
at �ubcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education & Labo�, 90th Cong., 1st 
S . 
( 67). YatJOnal Labor Relations A ct Remedies: The Unfu!jiffed Pronuse. Report of the 
(
�mat Subco111111. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 68) (Comm. Print). 
L R 
20
· Lesnick, Esrablishment of Bargaining Rights Wi thout an .V LR B Election. 65 MICH . . EV.851,862(1967). 
. 
21. Id. 
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compens atio n  in ca ses of refus a l to bargain. In reviewing the 
appropriateness of one monetary award, Mr. .Justice B lack has stated: 
The statute c ommands that the Board 111ust order "back 
pay" if the pol icy of the Act will thereby be effectuated. At 
least two persons are immediatdy in volved in "back pay," 
as used here; one who pays and one who receives. The 
propriety of a "back pay" order as an inst rum enta lity for 
effectuating the Act ' s policies, must therefore be determined 
by the manner in which it in tluen ces the pay or and payee, 
one, or both .22 
In evaluating the suggested new re medy, one mus t  also analyze "the 
manner in which it inOuences" the effects it may reasonably be 
expected to have on th e immediate parties involved; and, going a step 
beyond Mr. Justice B lack , the effects of the re 1 11 edy on the conduct of 
unions and employers not i mmediate ly invol ved . 
The author joins thos e who have disc erned a need for 
improvement. His quarrel is with the sugg ested form of im provement. 
We have seen where the Board has been. The words of trial 
examiner Ow sley Vose provide an indication of where the Board may 
be going. 
Take the following affirmative action which it is found will 
effectuate the policies of the Act: (b) Com pensate , in the 
manner set forth in  the section hereof ent i t l ed "The 
Remedy," each of its emp l oyees for the monetary value of 
the minimum additional benefits, if any, including wages, 
which it is reasonable to conclude that the Union would have 
been able to obtain thr ough col lective ba rgaining with the 
Respondent, for the period commencing .with the date of 
Respondent's formal refusal to bargain collective ly ... and 
continuing until paid.2:1 
· 
Certain ly, here there is more than an avoidance of grammatical error. 
THE PROPOSAL-MONETARY COMPENSATION FOR A REFUSAL TO 
BARGAIN 
"Take some more tea," the March Hare said to Alice, 
very earnestly. 
''I've had nothing yet," replied Alice in an offended 
tone: "so I can't take more. "-Alice's A dve ntures in 
Wonderland 
22. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 14 (1940) (dissenting opinion). 23· Ex-Cell-O Corp., Case No. 25-CA-2377 (N.L.R. B. Trial Examiner's Decision (TXD) 80-67 at 17-18, Mar. 7, 1967). 
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Unions and Alice have very little in common. But the quarrel 
which has developed bet ween labor and managemen t ove r the 
suggested remedy is, like Alice's adventures, filled with much 
delightful nonsense. The issue is surrounded with emotionalism; like 
Alice, management has responded in an offended tone: "Upon what 
meat doth this Caesar feed? "2� The riddle of language is also involved. 
Indeed, the question of the Board's power to order the proposed relief 
is cast in terms of a "punitive-remedial" conundrum. 
In Ex-Cell-O Corp.2" the UAW won a Board-conducted election 
on October 22, 1964 by a vote of 102-93. The company immediately 
filed objections to conduct affecting the results of the election, alleging 
union misrepresentation which prevented its employees from exercising 
a free choice of representatives. The objections were overruled and the 
Board on October 28, 1965 affirmed the certification of the union. 
The next day the company advised the union: "As you know, the only 
way the Labor Board's decision in this case can be reviewed is  
through a technical refusal to bargain, and consequently we are 
unable to meet with you and bargain until the review procedure is 
carried out. "26 A complaint issued charging a violation of section 
8(a)(5). The company defended on the ground that the B o ar d's 
certification was invalid. 
At the hearing before trial examiner Owsley Vose the UAW 
announced that it was seeking in the case, in addition to the usual 
remedy afforded by the Board in ref us al to bargain cases, a monetary 
award in favor of the e mployees to make them whole for their losses 
resulting from the respondent's failure to comply with its duty to 
bargain collectively, and the union adduced evidence which it asserted 
justified the monetary relief. The company presented no rebuttal 
evidence on the question of compensation, relying instead upon the 
Board's rejection in prior decisions of similar demands.2; Examiner 
Vose characterized the action as one involving: 
24. J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 304 (2d Cir. 1967). The company's inquiry 
was addressed to an exercise o f  the Board's remedial authority in a case involving unlawful 
coercion and discrimination. However, management's response to the specific proposed remedy 
is no less colorful. "Thus, in effect, the Labor Board [would] become a crystal ball gazer to 
d
_
etermine what the bargaining results might have been had there been any results:" Labor Law 
Study Committee (U.S. Chamber of Commerce), The Need for Labor Law Ref"or111 26 (unpub. 
mem. undated). The union's position is no less emotional. "[T)he usual boiler place remedy is 
like trying to cure cancer with aspirin instead of radium or surgery." Charging Party's Brief to 
the Trial Examiner at 4, Ex-Cell�O Corp., Case No. 25-CA 2377 (N.L.R.B. TXD-80-67, Mar. 
7· 1967. Like the Second Circuit, see J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 8 96, n.8 at 904 (2d 
Cir. 1967). the writer approaches the problem "somewhat less emotionally" than do the parties . 
.25. Case No. 25-CA-2377 (N.L.R.B. TXD-80-67, Mar. 7, 1967). 
26. Id. at 3 . 
.27 · The company rdied principally upon Preston Prods. Co., 158 N.L.R. B. 32.2 ( 1966) 
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simply a technical refusal  to bargain in order to obtain court 
review of the Boa r d's d e te r m ina t i o n that th e 
Respondent 's Objections to Conduct A ffecting the Results of 
the Election were without merit, and that the Union should 
be certified . . . .  A fi nding o f  a r efusal to barg ain 
collectively with the Unio n  i n  violation of Section 8(a)(5) and 
( 1) o f  the Act necessarily fol lows. 2s 
Since i t  was examiner Vos e ' s  opinion that "the Board's ex isting 
remedies are ineffectual" and that "some additional form of relief 
should be adopted, "29 his recom mended order111 provided monetary 
compensation for the refusa l  t o  bargain. 
Ex-Cell-O, together with three other cases,31 i s  currently pending 
where the Board in response to a like remedial demand stated: "[W)e find that the remedial order 
requested by the Charging Party is without merit." n. I at 323. Trial examiner Vose was not 
impressed by the citation. "The Board's summary statement contains not one word of explanation 
of its reasons for its action in denying the requested relief. The remedial issue before the Board 
in the Preston case is not one, in my opinion, which is susceptible of suc h summary disposition, 
without any articulation of the reasons for its decision." TXD-80-67 at 10. The trial examiner's 
position appears sound. The Board itself has, on occasion, adopted new forms of relief when "the 
sole and, in our view, unpersuasive reason given (for the Board's own prior denial of a particular 
form of relief) . . .  does not bear analysis." APW Prods. Co., Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 25, 29 (1962). 
Where no reasons at all are given for the denial of a form of relief, it would seem, a .fortiori, 
that the denial should not bar a well-reasoned demand for such relief. 
28. Case No. 25-CA 2377 (N.L.R.B. TXD-80-67 at 8, Mar. 6, 1967). 
29. /d.at 12. 
30. See text accompanying note 2 3  supra. 
31. Rasco Olympia, Inc., Case No. 19-CA-3187 (N.L. R. B. TXD, Dec. 9, 1966); Zinke's 
Foods, Inc., Case No. 30-CA-372 (N. L. R. B. TXD-662-66, Dec.  18. 1966); Herman Wilson 
Lumber Co., Case No. 26-CA-2536 (N. L.R. B. TXD-757-66, Dec. 29, 1966). 
Zinke's Foods presented a typical Joy Silk situation. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 
1263 (1949), enforced in percinent part, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 34 1 U.S. 
914 (1951). The employer rejected a demand for recognition based upon a majority card show 
and thereafter engaged in an anti-union campaign designed to undermine the union. 
The employer's campaign involved unlawful coercive interrogation of employees, unlawful 
threats of loss of employment, and constructive discharge of the leading employee organizer. The 
u�ion lost a
. subsequent election. The trial examiner rejected the employer's assertion 
of a good 
faith doubt m the validity of the claimed card majority and held that the company had violated 
its duty to bargain. The trial examiner's recommended order was that the employer should: 
"Make its employees in the appropriate unit . .. whole for any Joss or damage they may have 
suffered as a result of Respondent's refusal to bargain collectively with the Union. ·" TXD-
662-66 at 23. 
In Herman Wilson Lu111ber Co. the Board had certified the Union after it won an election 
by a vote of
.62-57 · The employer refused the union's demand for bargaining, advising the 
union 
of Its intention to exha t · d' · I · 
· 
· db.II had . us JU 1c1a remedies. The company asserted that a uni on han 1 misrepresented and omitt d t · I f h t ·al . e ma eria acts, thereby vitiating t h e  election. Although t e n examiner found that the employer had refused to bargain in violation of § 8(a}(5), he refused to recommend as requested b th · · · sc 
h 
· 
. 
Y e union, monetary relief. "I do not perceive in the present ca. 
d
�w an
d 
a
b
ppropnate remedy of the kind sought by the Charging Party can be fashioned. 1 a
rn 
cterre Y the absence in th· f h the 
I . . 
is case o any objective criteria by which it may be decided t at cmp oyccs did 1n fact los t · I be - . . .  
. Id be 
e ma ena nefits by the Respondent's actions or if so. how these losse
s 
cou . · · · measured." TXD-757-66 at 5. ' 
fhc Ra<co decision did t · I · . 
. 
. · no mvo ve 101t1al contract negotiations; rather, the trial examin
er 
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before the Board.32 More than two years have elapsed since the oral 
argument, July 13, 1967; and. although the Board has. by implication. 
denied such relief in prior decisions,33 it is apparent that the question is 
found that the employer had refused tu bargain in good faith during negot iations for a renewal 
contract. Upon oral argument before the Board. the participating unions dropped the issue of a 
compensatory remedy for refusals-to-bargain over the terms of a renewal contract. The Board 
was requested to defer the issue for decision in the light of future experience. Hupe was expressed, 
however, that if the Board adopted a compensatory remedy for first contract cases, it would 
likewise apply the compensatory remedy to renewal cases. Official Report of Proceedings Before 
the NLRB. Docket No. 25-C A-2377 ct al .. oral argu mcnt,July IJ. I 96 7. at 156-258. 
32. The Board, by notice of hearing dated May �6. 1967. invited the participating parties 
to consider the following questions: I. Whether the Board has the authority to order an employer 
to reimburse his employees for the loss of wages and fringe hcnelits that they would have obtained 
through collective bargaining if the employer had not refused to bargain in good faith; 2. By what 
objective standard, or standards, could the Board calculate the amount of benefits lost by 
employees as a result of the employer's refusal to bargain; 3.  If  reimbursement of employee losses 
should be ordered, what period should it cover; 4. Assuming reimbursement is proper, for what 
losses might employees be compensated; 5. If an expanded remedy be adopted, should the Board 
distinguish refusals to bargain based upon a desire to obtain judicial review of a certification from 
refusals lo bargain in good faith accompanied by flagrant violations of other sections of the Act, 
and grant an order for reimbursement only in the latter; 6 .  If it should become relevant, to what 
extent and al what stage of an unfair labor practice proceeding should the parties litigate whether 
a loss occurred and/or the method to be used to measure the loss of benefits in the particular 
case; 7. Whether there are available alternative or additional methods of returning the employees 
to the status quo ante. NLRB Notice of Hearing (May 26, 1967). 
33. The first attempt to secure relief akin to that requested in l:);-Cdl-0 was made on 
petition to review United Ins. Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 38 (1965). The Ins. Workers petitioned the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for review of the decision, basing their aggrieved 
status on the contention that "the Board's order should have compelled United to accept and to 
abide by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement which . . . would have been entered into 
if United had bargained in good faith with the Union." Ins. Workers lnt'l Union v. NLRB, 360 
F.2d 823, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court reje c t e d  the c ontention stating: "So inherently 
speculative a proposition suggests that the Board would have lacked the power to 'compel 
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining 
agreements."' at 827 (citing NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
In UAW v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 671 (0.C. Cir. 1967), on the union's petition to review the 
Board's denial of compensatory relief, see Preston Prods. Co., 158 NLRB 322 (1966) and note 
27 supra, the District of Columbia Circuit, in effect, reversed its earlier . position and held that 
the union was aggreived by the denial, "[W]e cannot say either that the Union's claim is frivolous 
or that it is not genuinely aggrieved." at 673-74. And, although the court recognized "that the 
Union's claim may raise troublesome questions under Section 8(d) of the Act," it was not 
prepared lo decide the issue on a preliminary motion. n. 7 al 674. Subsequently, the Board itself 
petitioned the court and requested that it remand that part of the Board's order which had denied 
the compensatory relief, urging that it was the Board's intention to re-evaluate the requested relief. 
The court then enforced the Board's order that Preston bargain in good faith, except for that 
portion of the order which had denied the union's request for compensatory relief which was 
remanded to the Board. UAW v. NLRB, 392 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In UAW v. NLRB, 57 
LC 12, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1968) the court noted, per curiam, that "In enforcing the order otherwise, 
we did not intend to compel the company to bargain on the union's request for compensatory 
relief. As to that issue the company may await the further order of the Board." at 20, 890. 
In United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1967), enforcing Northwest Eng'r 
Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 624 (1966), the court said that it was not an abuse of discretion for the Board 
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receiving complete review. The participating unions have requested that 
the Board "articulate the n ecessary conditions for the remedy and the 
standards for determining the measure of damages. "31 
The unions have also made their own suggestions as to the 
remedy and its administration. It is the position of the unions that the 
Board should adopt a compensatory remedy in a l l cases of unlawful 
refusals to bargain in initial contract situations_:s,; The remedy s hould 
apply both in cases of employer refusal to bargain following a post­
certification deman d for bargaining and in Joy Silk cases:16-those in 
to refuse to grant the union's request that it "award to the employees ... the benefits they would 
most likely have achieved had bargaining occurred. ."at 772. 
In the following cases trial exam i ners rejected requests for compt:nsatory relief and the 
decisions were adopted by the Board without comment. United Ins. Co . . 162 N.L.R.B. No. 33. 
1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 20. 993, 64 L .R.R.M. 1072 (1966); Kawneer Co .. 164 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 
1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 21.413, 65 L . R.R.M. 1320 (1967) : Monroe Auto Equip. Co .. 164 
N.L.R.B. No. 144, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 21.403. 65 L.R.R.M. 1255 (1967): King Radio Corp., 
166 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 21,627. 65 L .R RM 1646 (1967); LTV 
Electrosystems, Inc., 166 N.L.H.B. No. 81, 1967 CCH N L.RB Dec. 21,647, 65 L.R.R.M. 1590 
(1967); Triangle Ylastics, Inc., 166 .L.R.B. No. 86, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 21.650, 65 
L.R.R.M . 1658 (1967); General Automation Mfg. Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 66, 1968-1 CCH 
NLRB Dec. 21,775, 66 L.R.R.M. 1084 (1967); Boyle 's Famous Corned Beef Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 
No. 46, 1968 CCH NLRB Dec. 21,918, 67 L.R.R.M. 1030 (1967): Bush Hog. Inc .. 173 N.L.R.B. 
No. 74, 1 968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 20,276, 69 L.R.R.M. 2218 (1968). 
In decisions subsequent to oral argument in fx·Cell-0. the Board has likewise refused 
compensatory relief. See Tildee Prods., Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 103. 1969 CCH , LRB Dec. 
20,564 (1969). In Waycross Sport swear, Inc .. 170 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 1968 CCH NLRB Dec. 
22,342, 68 L. R.R. M. 1107 (1968), a decision postdating argument in Ex-Cell-O, the Board 
refused t o  adopt the trial examiner's recommended compensatory remedy: "We deem it 
inappropriate in this case to depart from our existing policy with respect to remedial orders in 
cases involving violations of Section 8(a)(5), and therefore do not adopt the Trial Examiner's 
recommended make-whole remedy." 68 L.R.R.M. at 11. No reasons were given for the Board's 
action. 
34. Brief for Local 140 I, Retail Clerks at 12, Before the NLRB, Ex-Cell-O Corp .. Case 
No. 25-CA 2377 er al. (Hereafter a citation to a brief without identification of the case indicates 
that the brief was submitted to the Board in Ex-Cell-O and consolidated cases}. 
35. As distinguished from refusals to bargain arising during negotiations ror a renewal 
contract. See note 3 I supra. 
36. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), e11/i1rced in perr inenr par!, 185 F.2d 7.ll 
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cm. dt'ni<'d, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). The Joi- Silk doctrine di ctates that when an 
employer is presented with authorization cards purportedly 
.
signed b y  a majority of his employees 
in wh
_
at the union considers an appropriate bargaining unit, the employer must recognize a_
nd 
bargain with the union as n:presentative of his employees, unless the employer has a goodfaith 
doubt that a majority of his employees have designated the union as their representative. S<'<' 
g<'neral!y, Lesnick, Fs111h/ish111<'11I of Bargaining Rif!hls Wirhour an SLR B Fi<'crio11. 65 Micll. 
L. Rr.v. 851 ( 1967). 
. 
Should an employer reruse a card demand for recognition the union can immediatdy fik a 9 8
,
(a)(S} charge or proceed to an election, and a subsequent e lection loss does not bar _the unions claim that the employer wrongfully repudiated the card demand. Berne! Foam Prods. C.o .. 146 N.L.R.B. 1 .177 (1964). At the hearing on the § 8(a}(5 } charge the General Counsd has th_
c 
burden °1 proving. that the union had in ract procured authorizations from a majority or unal 
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which an employer, without a good-faith doubt, refuses to accede to a 
union 's demand for recogni tion based upon a m ajority card show. Nor 
should any distinction b e  d rawn between a refusal to bargain based 
upon an e mployer 's desire to p rocure judicial review of Board action37 
and refusals accompanied by flagrant violations of other sections of 
the Act.38 
In Ex-Cell-O. exam iner Vose was i m press ed by the fact that 
s ince the original certification of the Union the employees of 
R es p o ndent's Elw ood, Indiana,  plant, the plant here 
involved, have not enjoyed all the e mployment benefits which 
the Respondent provides for its em ployees at its plants in the 
adjoining states of Ohio and Mich igan, who are covered by 
collective-bargai ning contracts with the Union, and there do 
not appear to be compensating advantages accruing to the 
Elwood employees .39 
The exa miner was co m menting on the evidence presented b y  the 
UA W in support of its contention that the "employer's refusal to 
bargain . . . imposes actual and serious financial injury upon the 
em p loyees . "�0 The U A W had in trod u c e d  c ollective bargai n i n g  
contracts which it had s uccessfully negotiated with respondent Ex-Cell­
o at plants in Michigan and Ohio. As a measure of the employee 
loss, the UAW suggested a comparison of the wage and fringe levels 
it had negotiated with respondent Ex-Cell-O at the Michigan a n d  
Ohio plants with t h e  level of economic benefits at Elwood s ince 
certification. As an alternati ve yardstick, contracts which the UAW 
had negotiated at General Motors and Chrysler plants in the Elwood 
area were introd u c e d-t h e  m easure of relief  to be l ikew i s e  t h e  
difference i n  wage and fri nge levels.41 Both of these sugg e s t e d  
employees and that the employer acted i n  bad faith. Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); H. 
& H. Const. Co., 161N.L.R.B.852, (1966). 
Zinke's Foods, one of the currently pending cases, presented a Joy Silk situation. See note 
31 supra. 
37. In both Ex-Cell-O and Herman Wilson Lumber Co. the employers had refused to 
bargain in order to obtain judicial review of the Board's action in overruling their objections to 
uni on conduct which, it was alleged, vitiated the union election victories. Only by refusing to 
ba�gain could the employers obtain such review, as the Board's post-election certification of the 
uni?ns was a non-reviewable order. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U,S. 473 (1964). For the 
various kinds of employer contentions which can be rai sed on review of the representation 
proceedings by way of a refusal to bargain, see NLRB v. Air Control Prods., Inc., 335 F.2d 245 
(Sth Cir. 1964) (challenges to union conduct, unit determination, "employee" status, and denial 
of hearings). 
38. "We adamantly oppose the Board's differentiati ng between different motivations 
underlying unlawful employer refusals to bargain." Brief for the UA W at 52. 
39. TXD-80-67 at 11. 
40. Brief for the UAW at 15. 
41. TXD-80-67 at 13. 
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standards- a co m pari son of wagc i ncrements successfu lly negotiated 
with the same em ployer at other plants  and a com parison of benefits 
procured from other employers at plants  in  the  s a m e  geograph ic area 
as the respondent employer� rc llcct t he "p roven prospects of the 
part icula r u nion refused re c o g n i t i o n  !'o r ac h i evi ng collective 
bargaining increments for the e m ployees it rep resen t s .  "43 In its brief 
to the Board the UA W appended a su rvey" o f  s i x t y - s ix first contracts 
successfully negotiated by the U J\ W which det a i led the wage and 
fringe increments obtained by
· 
t h e  UJ\ W in fi rst contract situations. 
The survey was offered to dem o n s t rate t hat 
where w orkers have chosen t h e  UA W as col lect ive bargaining 
representat ive, they may fairly a nt icipate t h a t  i f  good faith 
bargaining promptly com me n ces , t hey w i l l each gain $478 .40 
in add i t i onal benefits  t h e  first  year a l o n e ,  w i t h  further 
increases in succeeding y ea r s . 1'; 
As amicus curiae, the A F L -C I O  proposed a th ird standard by 
which t h e  B o a rd cou ld m e a s u r e  t h e  l o s s  t o  e m p loyees- "a 
presentat i on based on t h e  n a t i onal  a verage percentage change in 
straight  t i m e  h ourly wages c o m puted by t h e  B u reau of Labor 
Statistics . "46 The Board is to c o m pare the employees ' wage rates at the 
42. Ex- Cell-O presented the only situation of a multi-plant em ployer. Therefore, only a 
comparison of wage levels with other employers in the same georgraphic area could be made in 
Zin ke 's Foods and Herman Wilson Lu mber Co. I n  Zin ke '.� the u n i o n  suggested that "the 
employer would be liable to each person in the bargaining unit for an a mount of money equal to 
the relative percentage impact of unionism upon ihe wage levels in the industry in issue within 
the jurisdiction of the affected local union . . . .  " Brief for Local 1 40 I, Retail Clerks at 12 .  The 
suggested relevant market was the retail food industry in the Beloit, Wisconsin labor market. Id. 
at 17 .  The comparison suggested in Herman Wilson Lumber Co. was to "the wages and other 
benefits obtained by other employees in the lumber industry in the State of Arkansas . · · ·" 
Charging Party's Brief to the Trial Examiner at 1 3 ,  Herman Wilson Lu mber Co., Case No. 26· 
CA-2536 (N.L.R.B.  T XD-757-66, Dec. 29, 1 966). 
43. Brief for the UAW at 26. 
44. The survey, a result of a study by Professor Philip Ross, c overed a six month period 
in 1966 and provided information for 66 representative situations on the di fferences between wages 
and other working conditions which existed prior to the UA W's certification and those embodi
ed 
· th fi · · d that 10 e irst contract. The study revealed that every contract provided econo mic gains an 
the average increase in wages for the 66 plants was 16.52 cents per hour, on an average percentage 
increase of 7 .9%. The range of wage increments for the first year was from a low of 1 cents per 
hour to a high of 45 cents per hour; this represented percentage increases ranging from J. I% to 
l7.7%. The a verage increase in fringe benefits was 7 cents per hour, or a n  average percentage g
ain 
0� 3.79%. The period elapsed from certification to contract ranged fro m  I month to 9 months, 
with an average of 3 Yi months. Brief for the U A W, App. C at 57-60. 
45. Brief for the UAW at 16. 
. 46· Brief for A F L-C IO as A micus Curiae at 14. The BLS provides two different figu
res: 
First, wage adjustments for the first year of contract settlements and second, wage adjustm
ents 
· d . ' d from negollate
_ 
under curr
_
ent or pnor settlements. For manufacturing the figures are compute a subs�antially all ma1or contracts, i .e. ,  those covering 1 ,000 or m o r e  e m ployees, and fro
m 
stratified s ample of smaller establishments. 'For non-manufacturing the figure is derived 
from 
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ti me of the unfair labor practice with the B LS average percent age 
change figure between the date the employer initially refuse d to 
bargain and the date b argaining actually com mences . This standard is 
to be use d where the p arties introduce no other reliable evidenc e  an d 
is offered as a "prima fa cie ground for awarding back pay t o  the 
injured employees. "H Where, however, any party provides appro priate 
and sta tistically reliable alternative evidence,  i t  should be received.48 
The payment is to be a single, lum p-sum payment49 and the peri o d  o f  
liability i s  to com mence with the initial refusal to bargain followin g  a 
post-certi fic ation barg aining de man d or a request for recognition 
un der t h e  Joy Silk d o c t rine. " 0  .Con t r ary to examiner V o se ' s  
recommendation,51 i t  is  the unions' position t h a t  employer liability 
would end on the day the employer commences to bargain in good 
faith.52 
In accordance with established back pay practice,53 the unions 
major contracts only.  The Bu reau does not break these figures down to regional or industry 
subgroups. Id. Where the period elapsed between initial refusal to bargain and the date when the 
employer commences bargaining,  pursuant to court order for instance, is more than a year, for 
the first year the compensation is to be computed using the B L S  figure for wage adjust ment for 
first year contract settlements ; for each year of violation thereafter the BLS figure for wage 
adjustment negotiated under current settlements is to be used "in order to avoid speculati o n  a s  
to w h e t h e r  t here would h a ve been o n e  set of negotiati ons o r  t w o . "  Id. a t  1 5 .  An exa m ple 
demonstrates the purpose. Suppose that the .4 Manufacturing Co. refuses to bargain following a 
post-certification demand for b argaining on Jan. I .  1 964 and that it begins to bargain  after final 
order by a court of appeals o n  Jan. I ,  1 966. Suppose further that Xones was paid $5000 duri n g  
each of these years by A .  Then Jones would recieve $260 (2.3%-the median average percentage 
increment in  straight time hourly earnings obtained for first contract settlements in  1964-ti mes 
$5000 + 2.9%-the med i a n  a ve r age percentage incremen t  in straight time hourly earn i ngs 
negotiated in  current contract settlements in  1 965-times $5000). Id. at 1 5- 1 6. 
47 .  Brief for the U A W  at 27. 
48 . Id. After the presentation of a prima facie case, an employer "should be allowed to 
attempt to impeach the validity of the Bureau of Labor Statistics figures . . .  and he should, of 
course, he allowed to present data based on an alternative theory of the proper yardstick." Brief 
for the A FL-C I O  as .4 111icus Curiae at 19.  
49 .  Brief for the U A W  at 39 .  
50.  Id. at 5 1 .  And se11 note 36 supra. 
5 1 .  Examiner Vose had reco m mended that the employer's liability continue "until paid . "  
T XD-80-67 a t  1 8 .  See text accompanying note 2 3  supra. 
5 2 .  Brief  for the U A W  a t  5 1 .  U n der the u nion proposal  an employer could tol l  the 
mo n e ta r y  a ward by bargain i n g  in good faith pursuant t o  t h e  Board's decision susta i n i n g  
the § 8 (a )(5) violation. Although a n  employer's duty t o  bargai n  is  not suspended while h e  seeks 
coun review o f  the Board's order, .�ee N L R B  v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 36 1 F.2d 52 1 (5th Cir.)  
cerr. denied, 385 U.S. 935 ( 1 966), i t  i s  unrealistic to believe t h at an employer would bargain and 
nego t i ate a n  agreement with a u n i on which he contend s  i s  not  legally his employee's  
representative. See the Brief for the A FL-CIO as A micus Curiae at 1 2  ("[A) settlement between 
the parties on the issue of how m uch money is due the employees is unlikely to be effectuated 
whi le the em ployer is contest ing the underlying violatio n . ") Hence, there is little difference 
between the union proposal as to termination and that suggested by examiner Vose. 
5 3 .  See .V LR B Rules .4nd Regulations And Statements of Procedures, Ser. 8, as amended. 
§§ 1 02.52-.59, 29 C.F.R.  §§ 105.22-.59 (1967). 
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have suggested that the Board 's  order should merely provide that 
monetary compensation i !'  to  be awarded-determination of the 
amount due is to be left t o  the  parties or ,  i f  the matter is not 
a micably sett led, the  a m ount  due can b e  deter mined at a 
supplementary back pay proceeding.54 
The participating unions are apparently d ivided on the question 
of unilateral increases in wages following certification or recognition 
demand. Should unlawful55 u�ilateral increases i n  wages be deducted 
from any m onetary liability?56 ·One response is that the question is one 
which "might better be left t o  the future. "57 A second response is that 
"the Board should disregard the amount of the uni lateral increase in 
ascertaining the employer's reimbursement obligation.  "58 
THE H O USE T HAT PHI LIP BUILT 
In Ti/dee Products, Inc.59 an employer threatened to "close up its 
p lant  and go fishing" i f  t he union were elected bargaining 
representative. I n  Ex- Cell-O and its companion cases the employer 
position is equally colorful: 
54.  Brief for the UAW at 5 3 .  I f  the parties were unable to agree on the amount due, a 
supplementary proceeding would be held after court enforcement of the Board's order to bargain 
and pay compensation. For the rationale of the supplementary proceeding see Savoy Laundry, 
Inc., 148  N . L . R .  B. 38, 40 (1964): "Compliance procedures are an indispensable element in 
assll1ing that the Board remedies are equitably applied. For it is almost axiomatic that the record 
before the Board concerning the u n fair labor practice is inadequate for the spelling out of a 
precise, detailed remedy." The proceeding is before a trial examiner who hears and decides the 
questions at issue. A supplemental Board order would then issue as to such questions, subject to 
review by a court of appeals. For �n exam ple, see East Texas Steel Castings Co., Inc., 1 1 6 
N.L . R . B. 1 336 (1956), enforced, 255 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1958) (disagreement as to amount due 
at informal negotiations, supplementary proceeding to resolve the question, supplemental Board 
order, court review of the order). 
55. N L R B  v. Katz, 369 U .S. 736 (1962). In each of the four currently pending cases the 
employer had unilaterally increased wages following certification (Ex-Cell-O; Herman Wilson 
Lumber Co.), recognition demand (Zinke's Foods), and the c o mmencement of negotiations 
(Rasco Olympia .. ) 
56. "What effect would a unilateral increase in wages and benefits by the employer after 
an unlawful refusal to bargain have on the calculation of the amount of reimbursement pursuant 
to such an order?" Question 4, N L R B  Notice of Hearing (May 26, 1967). 
57 · Brief for the UAW at 5 1 .  Brief for the AFL-CIO as Arnicus Curiae at 2 1 .  The UA W  
state:� : "We are particularly concerned that if  the Board now provides a make-whole remedy but 
permits the offset by the employer of his unilateral and unlawful increases during the refusal to 
bar
_
gain period, lhe Board would be fostering unilateral increase violations of the statute of a kind 
�hich �re well-nigh incurable after the fact. [I)t may develop that fuller recourse to IO(j) 
Injunctions once the Board has filed an 8(a)(5) complaint could provide protection against unilateral employer changes in pay and benefits." Brief for the U A W  at 52. 
58·  Brief for the Retail Clerks lnt'l Assn'n at 8. As Arnicus Curiae the teamsters were emphatic: "[U]nlawful 
• unilateral increases during the period of violation sh�uld not be an offset to the: back pay award." Brief for Teamsters as A rnicus Curiae at 5 .  59: 1 74 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 1969 CCH NLRB Dec .  20,564 ( 1 969). The case is one i n  which the union requested moneta · · · d f ·th ry compensation for an employer's refusal to bargain in goo ai and the: Board adopted the tr" al · • d . . . 1 examiner s ec1S1on refusing such relief. See note 33 supra. 
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The impossibility of making meaning ful h i storical speculations 
is well known. No one can do more than conjecture about 
what would have happened had Lee won at Gettys burg, had 
Lenin not gone to Russia in 19 17 ,  had Kennedy not been 
assassinated.80 
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Even the vision of a permanent p lant closure has been drawn61 in 
support of management's  position that, as a matter of  law, it i s  
impossible to determine that a contract would have been entered . 
Thus, it is said , no finding of actual loss can be m ade. 
As a matter of statistics, the unions rely upon the · 'house that 
Philip built." Phil ip is  Pro fes s or Phi l i p  Ross .  Pro fessor R oss '  
empirical studies62 are said to demonstrate that " Board certification 
of a union's majority status ordinarily leads to the execution o f  a first 
bargaining contract"13 and that 
one may fairly state that employees who hav e won the right 
to collective bargaining under the statute hav e  an excellent 
expectancy-app roaching a certainty-that i f  g o od faith 
bargaining promptly comm ences a c ollecti v e  bargaining 
agreement will be concluded .u 
As further sup port for the p ro p osit ion that "th e o p p ortun i ty to 
bargain collectively is a valuable right, "65 the A F L-C I O  again relied 
on BLS figures.66 
60. Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Retail Merchants as A micus Curiae al 8 .  
6 1 .  "(l)l cannot be said in any indivjdual case that a contract would have resulted had the 
employer lived up to its statutory duty. Conceivably, bargaining may have resulted in total loss 
of earnings to the employees; an impasse may have resulted from good faith bargaining, followed 
by a legitimate strike lockout or permanent plant closure." McGuiness, ls The A ward of 
Damages for Refusals to Bargain Consistent with National Labor Policy?, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 
1086, 1090 (1968). Mr. McGuiness is counsel for Ex-Cell-O Corp. 
62. In THE GoVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF UNION POWER ( 1965), Professor Ross found 
that contracts were negotiated in 84-90% of post-certification cases in which the employer 
bargained in good faith, at 25 1 .  This conclusion was based upon the study of 67 case histories at 
five NLRB Regional Offices in 1960. Table 2 at 1 84. In THE LABOR LAW IN ACTION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS UNDER THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT (1966), a more 
extensive study, see note 12 supra, Professor Ross concluded that contracts were negotiated in 
86% of the post-certification cases reviewed, at 12. In his special study of U A W  experience, see 
�ote 44 supra, contracts were negotiated in 97% of cases reviewed in whch the employer bargained 
�n good faith. Although Porfessor Ross' studies included only post-certification case histories, it 
is apparent that the findings are to be relied upon to prove actual loss in authorization card cases 
�uch as Zinke's Foods. See Brief for Local 140 1 ,  Retail Clerks at 20. ("From this data alone, it 
is reasonable to infer that the commitment of a majority of Zinke employees to unionism would 
have resulted in the executionof an agreement, but for the employer's interference."). 
63. Brief for the UAW at 1 1 .  
64. Id. at 15.  
65. Bril!f for the AFL-CIO as A micus Curiae at 5.  
66. Id., Tagle I A  at 24. Such data indicated, for example, that in 1963 77% of surveyed 
employees received wage increments, in 1964 89%, in 1965 92%, and in 1966 99% of surveyed 
employees received wage increases. 
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I t  is a pparent that the pa rt ies involved have reached opposite 
conclusio n s .  While management suggests  that an e m p l oyer may very 
well be "out fi shing, " labor argues that the employees have already 
returned h o me with a "fu l l  cree l . "  
LEGAL POSITIONS- DIVERGENT Foc u s  AND OPPOSITE  C O N CLUSIONS 
REITE RATED 
This w riter  has prev i o u s l y  m e n t i oned6' that t here exist  two 
considerat ions  relevant to a dete r m i nation of the a p p ropriateness of a 
monetary remedy in  cases o f  u n l a w ful refusal to b a rgain .  One is the 
question o f  need . The other is the issue of effects .  The d ichotomy is 
manifest i n  the arguments in Ex-Cell- O; and, not u nexpectedly, the 
unions e m p h asize need, w h i le t h e  e m p l oyers focus u p o n  effects.68 The 
unions do focus upon "effects ";  b ut t hose considered- "the corrosive 
effects of denying a compensat o ry remedy "69 are d i fferent in kind from 
the in futuro considerations w h i c h  w orry management-compulsory 
arbitrat i o n ,  for i nstance.70 
One s u c h  corrosive e ffect ,  fi n a nc i a l inju ry  t o  e m p l oyees, has 
already been mentioned.71 H owever,  the unions furth e r  underscore the 
need to redress that injury by d isclosing two allegedly aggravating 
circumstances. The financia l  i nj u ry t o  employees is o n e  "for which 
they now h ave n o  redress."72 F u rt her, "the near certa i n t y  of collective 
relationship becom es highly i m p r obable"1:i fol lowing court  review of 
section 8 ( a)(5) orders . The latter d isclos ure is again a reference to the 
empirical studies of Professor R o s s :  contracts are reached in only 36 
67. See text accompanying notes 2 1 -24, supra. 
68 . The succeeding text only details the points made by the parties in so far as they are 
important to the analysis of the problems raised by Ex-Cell-O which the writer offers. For a 
complete account of the parties' content i o n s  see McGuiness, ls the A ward of Damage:i for 
R efusals to Bargain Consistent with National Labor Polin•?, 14 WAYNE L .  REV. 1086 (1968) 
(employer position); Schlossberg & Silard, The Need for a. Co111pensa1ory Remed r in Re(usal­
To-Bargain Cases, 1 4  WAYNE L. REV. 1059 ( 1 968) (union position). Mr. Schlossberg is General 
Counsel for the U A W. 
69. Brief for the UAW at 8 .  
70. "[fhe remedy] would be a radical change-over to a policy of compulsory arbitration ,  
albeit compulsory arbitration imposed in the n a me of free collective bargaining." Brief for the 
Nat'! Ass'n of Retail Merchants as A micus Curiae at 8. "In effect, the unions are requesting 
the Board to  a d opt, in the guise of a remedial order, a new national policy of governmental 
dictation of the substantive terms and conditi ons of employment, and thus, government dictation 
of the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements." Brief for the Nat'I Ass'n of Mfgrs 
as A micus Curiae at I .  
7 1 .  See note 44 supra and accompanyin g  text. 
. 
72. Brief for the UAW at 1 5 .  This is n o t  simply restating the obvious. Although the write; 
is sure the c o m ment was directed to the l a c k  of such a remedy before the Board, he wil 
intentionally misconstrue it as directed to the unavailability of monetary relief in any other forum. 
See infra. 
73.  Brief for the UA W at 16.  
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per cent of reviewed 8 (a)(5) cases.74 A n d  it is the use of the review 
procedure as a tactic-one designed to "sa p  the union 's vitali t y "75-
whi ch the unions allege is the principal evil .  
This  "dilatory " e m p loyer . . .  i s  k ee n ly aware that the 
ultimate remedy i t  wil l  have to comply with wil l  be 
n o t h ing m ore t h a n  t h e  enforce m e n t  of a teethless a n d  
meani ngless Board order such as . . . bargaining on request 
with a union t h at has been castrated by the employer 's 
"dilatory" tactics .76 
The injury is not only to the employees but also to the union "as an 
institution . "77 
Th ere is a n · e l e m e n t  of  adj u d i c a t i o n  by aph orism i n  t h e  
arguments o f  the unions.  For example, the U A W  opens its brief  with 
the suggestion that the case is already closed. "To decide this case we 
need to look no furt her than the m axim that no man may take 
ad vantage of his own wrong. "78 What the employees lose by the long 
74. Ross, supra note 1 2 ,  at 6 .  
75 .  Brief for the A FL-C IO as A micus Curiae at 8 .  
76. Charging Party's Brief to the Trial Examiner at 4, Herman Wilson Lumber Co., Case 
No.  26-CA-2536 (N . L . R . B. T X D-757-66, Dec. 29, 1966). 
77. Brief for the Teamsters at 7. "The end in view should be to deal with the fact that illegal 
delay weakens the union as an institution and that it is the Board's duty to insure that the union 
has a fair chance to overcome this disability." Brief for the A FL-CI 0 as A micus Curiae at 8 .  
7 8 .  Brief for the UAW, n.9 at 1 7 .  
A strong contention no d o u bt in the light of Board policy. See A.P.W. Prods. C o . ,  Inc., 
137  N . L. R . B. 25, 29-30 (1962)  ("(The argument's) real thrust is in the direction of benefitting 
the wrongdoer at the expense of the wronged-a result antithetical to th fundamental ai m of the 
Board 's remedial authority a n d  powers."). However, there are those who label the maxim 
"decept i vely simple" when a pplied without consideration o f  the effects of its application. 
C o m ment,  Union A u 1horiza tion Cards, 75 YALE L.J.  805, 8 1 7  (1 966). Further, Professor 
Wellington has noted : "From t i me to time conern with freedom of contract allows even a 
wrongdoer to escape without sanctions." Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective 
Bargaining Agreemen t, 1 1 2 U. PENN. L. REV . 467, 476 ( 1964). And freedom of contract, at least 
from management's point of view, is precisely the issue. See note 70 supra. 
The unions also suggest that "in pleading for a compensatory remedy . . .  one might rest 
en t i rely on the ancient princi ple 'no right without a remedy' . . .  " Brief for the U A W  at 8 
(citation omitted). However, there is an equally ancient principle, one enunciated by Mr. Justice 
H olmes :  " [T]he word right is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls. Most rights are qualfied." 
A merican Bank & Trust C o .  v. Federal Res. Bank, 256 U .S. 350, 358 (192 1 ). Compare the 
re marks of Professor Cox: "The word right is often used loosely to imply a privilege. "  Cox, 
Rights Under a Labor A greement,  69 HARV. L. REv. 60 1 ,  624 ( 1956). Professor Cox provided 
an interesting citation: "For example, in . . .  N L R B  v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp .. the Court 
spoke of the right to organiz.e and bargain collectively as a 'fundamental right' which antedated 
statutory recognition." n .  50 at 624 (citation omitted). Although some have come close to a 
H oh feldia n  discussion in t h e i r  analysis of the issue of m o netary compensation, see Note, 
Monetarr Compensation as a Remedy for Employer Refusal to Bargain, 56 GEO. L.J. 474, 5 14 
( 1968) ( " I t  cannot be assumed that such a right, although provided by statute, possesses any 
m o n etary value . "), this w riter has committed himself to  an avoidance of any H o h feldian 
exa mination of the "right" to bargain collectively. See notes 1 -5 supra and text accompanying. 
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postponement of their right t o  col lective barga ini ng is equated with 
what employers gain-an unj ust fi nancial enri c h ment.rn 
The legal contentions o f  the parties rem i nd o ne, once again, of 
Alice's adventures. 
A nd here A lice began to get rather sleep ly,  and went on 
saying to herself; in a dreamy sort of way, · 'Do cats eat 
bats? Do cats eat bats? ' '  and sometimes · ' Do bats eat cats? " 
for, you see, as she couldn 't answer either question, it didn 't 
m uch matter which way she put it. 
The u n i o n s  argue that  t h e  r e m e d y  i s  n e i t h e r conjectural ,86 
contractu al,81 nor punitive.K2 The employers respo n d  t hat the remedy is 
This is not to say, however, that his c o mmitment bars an exa m i n ation of the manner in which 
the remedy, if adopted, would influence the conduct of Warren !'.vans and those like him. See 
text accompanying notes 4 and 17, supra . 
One final word in the world of aphorism. Compare Brief for the A FL-C I O  as Amicus Curiae 
at 5 ("Congress did not leave this right inchoate. . .")  "'ith Local 60, Carpenters v. NLRB, 
365 U.S. 65 1 ,  662 ( 196 1 )  (dissenting opinion ( " It i s  certain that Congress did not intend by the 
Act 'to h o ld out to [employees] an illusory right for which it was denying them a remedy."' 
(citation o mitted)). 
79. The UAW cited an impressive figure of $7 1 ,000 as the a mount of financial gain unjustly 
procured by Ex-Cell-O during the initial year of its refusal to ba rgain ($343-the yearly loss in 
earnings of  Ex-Cell-O employees, w i t h  c o m putation based upon Professor Ross' 1 6 .52 cents 
average h ourly wage increase figu re,  see n ote 44 supra, -- ti mes 208- t he number of unit 
employees). Brief for the U A W  at 1 8 .  Although the figure is certainly i mpressive, it is somewhat 
misleading. Since Ex-Cell-O unilaterally increased wages and fri nge benefits after certification, 
see TXD-80-67 at 1 3, 14, the employer may not have secured any financial gain . At the hearing 
before t h e  trial examiner, Ex-Cell-O refused to produce financial records and as a result it is 
impossible to say whether the employer actually gained financially by its refusal to bargain. 
. A further alleged element of unjust enrichment is that an empl oyer who refuses to bargain 
enjoys a competitive advantage over t hose employers who bargain in good faith. Brief for the 
UAW at 1 8 .  This assumes that wage increases have not eliminated a n y  advantage, and although 
infor
.mation as to amount is unavailable, unilateral increases were granted in each of 
the fou;, 
pending cases. It should also be noted that employers often proffer "legitimate business reasons 
for their unilateral increases as a h o peful defense to an 8 (a)(5 )  charge. See Herman Wilson 
Lumber Co., Case No. 26-CA-2536 (N . L . R. B. TXD-757-66, Dec. 29,  1 966) at 3. One such reason 
is to meet the wage ral�s of competitors in the local labor market in order to µres�rve lhe iabor 
force. Such action would not only eliminate the alleged competitive advantage, but it would also 
make the process of applying any "area standards" for mula for c o m puting the amount of 
c
.ompensation due employees for an e m ployer's refusal to bargain, see note 4 2  supra, a waste of time . 
. 
80· "Statistics available to t h e  Board demonstrate the ver y  high probability of the achievement of a collective bargaining c ontract . . . . " Brief for the U A W at 37.  81  "S' . · · 
. 
·
.
 
mce a contract does n o t  necessarily materialize i n  t h e  c o l lect1ve bargainin
g 
nego�talions, the 
.w�ong which the Board is redressing is not the denial of a contract but 
rather 
the nght to bargain m pursuit of a contract."  Id. at 38 82 "If h d . . . d f 
h 
· t e amages are imposed in order to redress the injured party for the rnisdee 0 � e wrongdoer and their amount is a reasonable reflection o f  t h e  a m ount of loss, then 
the 
amages, as here, are compensatory. Id. at 44. 
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punitive,83 contract u a l ,8� c o njectura l,85 a n d ,  i n  order to a v o i d  any 
spoonerism, violative o f  the sevent h amendment.86 
On the importan t  question o f  the effects of  the remedy o n  the 
parties immediately i nvolved- "the manner i n  which it influences the 
payor and the p ayee"-sh a rp issue is drawn . When the parties return 
to the bargaining table, t he UA W contends that 
the employees' w age rates as of the d ay bargaining beg i n s  
would no t b e  t h e  e m p l oyees ' previ o u s  w age rate p l u s  t h e  
add itional a m o u n t  representing the i mproved benefits t h e  
Board finds they could have won i n  collective bargaining, but 
simply their previous wage rates alone. This makes it  clear 
that the Board i s  n ot being asked to  use its power to set new 
terms and conditions  of employment or to influence future 
settlements, but o n ly to make employees whole for the period 
during which they were wrongfully denied their valuable right 
to collective barg a i n i ng .s1 
Whereas the employers assert : 
It is axiomatic that every collective bargaining agreement 
starts from necessity where the previous agreement left off 
and that it is imp o ssible to rescind a n  employee benefit once 
granted. [T]he dictates of this Board 's order, supposedly a s  
compensation for the past, will be dem anded by the union a s  
the basic given s t arting point fo r  any future concessions .ss 
83 .  "It is a penalty simpl y  because money is taken away from an employer without regard 
to whether or not his employees were damaged by his acts ." Brief for the Nat'! Ass'n of Retail 
Merchants as .4 111icus Curiae at 1 3 . 
84. "[W]hat the trial exam iners are saying is not only that the respondent employers should 
have bargained but that they should have agreed to certain terms in the course of bargaining. 
Thus these trial examiners are placing their view of what a particular collective bargaining 
agreement should contain over the result of free collective bargaining." Id. at 6. 
85 .  'The permutations that can result from a bargaining session are so numerous that they 
prevent meaningful prophecy." Id. at 1 0. 
86. Brief for Zin ke Foods, Inc. at 9. One thing this article shall not discuss is the Seventh 
Amendment. If a traditional back pay award does not violate the amendment, N L R B  v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 30 1  U .S. I ( 1937), the writer cannot see how other monetary relief would violate the amendment. 
87. Brief for the UAW at 39. The Retail Clerks, however, are not as categorical .  "The 
pa rties are legally free to negotiate an initial contract without reference to the amount of compensatory damage, if they so choose. Legal compliance with the remedy does not directly 
affect contract terms. " Brief for Local 140 1 ,  Retail Clerks at 2 1  (emphasis supplied). The 
Teamsters take the most realistic position in terms of the realities of labor relations and suggest 
that the very function of the remedy is that which the U A W  denies. "Conceivably, the employees may choose to negotiate additional contract benefits and, in return, accept less than the fully amount of back pay due to them under the order." Brief for the Teamsters as A micus Curiae at 7 .  
88 .  Brief for the Nat'! Ass'n of Retail Merchants as A micus Curiae at 6, 7.  One employer 
participant goes so far as -to suggest that "if an employer . . .  sought to bargain from 'scratch', 
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Frank McCulloch, Cha i rman o f  the N LR B, was certainly correct 
when he commented, "Th i s  i s  a subject o f  m a n y  d imensions and vast 
co mp lexity, interwoven w ith subtle pro b l e m s  o f  law, economics, 
technology and human relat ions .  "X9 Ex-Cell-O presents no easy case. 
LEGIS LATIVE H I STORY- THE I S S U E  O F  C O N G R E S S I O N A L  I NTENT 
Mr. Justice Black has stated that "it is enough here to 
determine what Congress meant from what it sa i d .  "uo What Congress 
said was that :  
I f  upon a preponderance o f  the testimony taken the Board 
sha l l  be o f  the op i n i o n  that any pers o n  named in the 
complaint has engaged in or is engaging i n  any such unfair 
labor practice, then the Board shal l  state i ts  fi ndings of fact 
and shall issue and cause t o  be served o n  such person an 
order requiring such p e rson to cease and desist from such 
u nfair labor practice, and t o  take such a ffirmative action 
i ncluding reinstatement of employees with or without back 
pay, as will effectuate the pol icies of t h is Act . . . .91 
Mr. Justice Black was in d issent, and, i n  determining whether a 
particular order is with i n  the Board's p ower, the Court has looked to 
leg i s l at ive history .n The d ifficulty l i es w i t h  the breadth of the 
leg islative authorization to  t a ke "affirmative action . " 
I n  Ex-Cell-O the emp loyer particip ants have made much of the 
way i n  which Congress s aid what it said. The legislative history of 
sect ion l O(c) supposedly "shows a clear i ntent by C ongress preventing 
�he Board from granting the remedy here i n  quest ion. "93 The reference 
is  to  certain legislative changes9� i n  the wordin g  o f  w hat is now section 
I O(c). 
or from his employment terms that were in effect prior to the Board's contract terms, the Board 
would find him guilty of an unlawful refusal to bargain." Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfgrs as 
Amicus Curiae at 5 .  
89 .  McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies Under Section 8 ! a  )(5) o(  the N L R A .  
19  LAB. l .J .  1 3 1 ,  14 1  ( 1968). M r .  McCulloch's remarks were n o t  d i rected specifically to the issue 
of monetary compensation for a refusal to bargain. 
90. Republic Steel Corp. v. N L R B, 3 1 1  U.S.  7, 14 ( 1 940) (dissenting opinion). 
9 1 .  29 U .S.C. § 160(c) ( 1 964). 
?2 · .. [U ) pon the challenge of the affirmative part of an order of the Board. we look to 
the 
Act itself, read m the light of its history, to ascertain its policy and to the facts which the Board has found to see wheth th ff . . . 
' . d · an 
. · 
er ey a ord a basis for its Judgment that the action ordere is a
3
ppropnate means of carrying out that policy." N L R B  v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc .
. 
03 u .s.  26 1 ,  265 (1938). 
93. Brief for Zinke Foods, Inc. at 2. 
94. Senate 2926 · l od d b h 
Bo d 
· as in r uce Y Senator Wagner to the 73rd Congress provided that t e ar was to "take affi 1· · 
' 
P f 
trma i ve action, or to pay damages, or to reinstate employees. or 10 er o r m  a n y  other acts th t · 1 1  h . " I a w i  a c  1eve substanti a l  j u s t i ce under the circu msta nces. 
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The s igni ficant change was the  deleti o n  of t h e  reference t o  
"damages" a n d  the inclusion o f  "res t i t u t ion . "  Thus,  t h e  
scope o f  the Board 's power i n  t h i s  rega rd w a s  cha nged by 
legislative process from "d a m ages " t o  "rest i tut ion" t o  t he 
present law as exists today . Bear i n  m i n d t h a t  this  change is 
from the greatest t o  least in tt.:r m s  o f  power,  s i n ce rest i t u t i o n  
was construed as a b l a n k  check a n d  t h e  l a n g u age u l t i mately 
i ncorpor ated w a s  i n t e n d e d  as an e x p r e s s  l i m i t a t i o n o f  
"affirmative act ion .  "9� 
273 
The latter contention t hat t he "reinstate m e n t "  dausc was i n tended t o  
limit "affirmat ive act i o n "  i s  unsound a s  a m a tter o f  law .91; M oreover, 
since the employers ' pos it ion ad mits th at "res t i t u t i o n was construed 
as a b l a n k  chec k , "  it is a r g u a b l e t h a t  i n  1 9 3 5  t h e  B o a r d  w a s  
specifically authori zed t o  take the very act i o n  req uested i n Lx- Cell- 0.  
The writer ma kes t h e  arg u m e n t ,  h o we v e r ,  o n l y  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  h i s  
hesitation with any suggest i o n  o f  a ' \:kar i n t e n t "  o n  t he part o f  t he 
Seventy-fourth Congress . 
A logica l explana t i o n  for t he delet i o n  o f  ' "res t i t ut ion " i s  s i m ply 
that it was v iewed as surpl usage. Why rei terate somet h i ng a l ready 
included i n the conce pt of "a ffi r m a t i ve a c t i o n? "�• I t  is a t  least  
LEGISLATIVE HIST O R Y  O f  nir N .o\TI O S A I .  l . A H<>K K1 1 .A11oss Aer 7 ( 1 935) .  The bill was not 
enacted. The bill which was e ventu al ly enacted. S .  1 9 5 8 .  as i n troduced i n  the 74th Congress, 
empowered the Board "to take such affirmative ai.:tion. i nc l u d i n g  restitution, as will  effectuate 
the policies of t his act ."'  lei. at 1 302.  As reported hy the Com mittee on Ed ucat ion and Labor, 
"restitution·· was struck and the present la nguage "incl u d i n g  reinstatement of employees with 
or without back pay" was added. 1 1  l . t, (;1s1x11 n l l lSTOl\Y 0 1 '  T i ii' N A TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
ACT 2292 ( 1935). 
In i ntroducing S. 1958 . Senator Wagner stated : " " [T]h is  bi ll is an entirely new draft, and 
that it must not be interpreted in the l i ght of whether or n ot it contains provisions that were in 
the bills upon the same subject before Congress last year . " '  lfrarings on S. 195!? Before the Senate 
(0111111. on Ed11ca1iun and /.ahor, 74th Con g .. ! st Sess. 38 ( 1 9 3 5 ). Therefore, reliance on the 
provisions of S. 2926 seems ina ppropriate. The co m pa nies also point to the testimony of James 
Emery before the senate com m i ttee. wherein M r . Emery e xpressed the view that a n y  provision 
for restitution would be in violation of the Seventh A men d ment, see Hearings on S. 1 958 Before 
the Sena1e (0111111. 011 f_-d11 rn1inn & /.abor, 74th Cong.,  ! s t Sess. 847 ( 1 9 3 5 ), and the companies 
urge that these remarks "were persuasive and undou btedly a factor i n  l imit ing the scope of the 
Board's order-making power." Brief for Zinke Foods at 5 .  I t  should be noted, however, that Mr. 
Emery made other const i tut ional  contentions t o  which Senator Wagner replied, "[Y]ou are 
addressing yourself to a question which is not involved here u nless this committee is going to 
decide these constitutional questions rather than have them decided when they come up under the 
act.'" Hearings on S. /95!? &'f(Jre ihe Sena/£' Comm. on Educa1ion & Labor, 74th Cong., ! st Sess. 
254 (1935). It is reasonable bo conclude that Mr.  Emery's remarks were far from persuasive; at 
least the bill's author disregarded them. 
95. Brief for Zinke Foods, I n c. a t  3. 4. 
96. "[The Board's]  power i s  n o t  l i m i ted t o  the i l l u s t r a t i ve e x a m ple �f ?ne type �r · ·b · · 
· 
h "tho t back pay " Virginia Electric perm1ss1 le aflirmal!ve order. n a mely, reinstatement wit or w1 u · 
& Power Co. v. N L R B. 3 1 9 U .S.  5 3 3 .  5 3 9  ( 1 943 ). . . 
97. Compare S. 2926, note 94 supra. "'ilh S. 2926, as reported : "to take affir mal!ve act10n 
. l - . " l L L TIVE H I STORY OF THE or lo perform any other act t h at will achieve s u bstanl!a JUSt1ce. EGIS A 
NATIONAL l�BOR RELATIONS ACT 1 09 1 ( 1 9 3 5 ) . 
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argu able that  senator Wagm:r  so . .  i n temkd. " for i n  an address to the 
ful l  Sena t e  on S .  1 95 8 .  as a111 £'1Uled. he co m m en ted : 
A fter a p p ropr ia t e  hea r i ngs t he Board w i l l  he t.:mpowered to 
i s s u e  o rd ers for bi d d i n g  \' i o l a t i o n s  ll f t he la w and mak ing 
res t i t u t io n  t o  t h o s e  w h o  h a n: b e e n  i nj u rt.: d  t hc rcby .98 
(e m p hasis  added ) 
I f  t he dele t i on o f  "n;st i t u t i on " i n  co m m i t t 1x w e re a ny t h i ng more than 
an e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  s u rp l u s ,  i t  1 s  d i ffi c u l t t o  hdi e\'e t h at such a remark 
would h a ve been made.  
I n  t h e  H o use Repo rtYY m en t i on was made o f  t he orders "for 
app rop riate res t i t u t i o n " w h i c h  t h e old L a b o r  Board'00 had i ssued. 
As s u m i n g  t h a t  " a ffi r m a t i v e a c t i o n " w a s  i n t e n d ed to i nd ude the 
power of rest i t u t ion, t he tes t i m o n y  u f  I ranc is  B i d d k. t hen Chairman 
of the old Labo r Boa rd, s uggest s  t h a t  such res t i t u t ion i nduded the 
very power to redress t h e  i nj u ry a l leged in F\- ( 'el/-0: and.  although 
some m i g h t  debate its me a n i n g,  i t  w o u l d  s u r dy he ag reed that the 
test imony reads l i ke a passage fro m  t he u n i o n s ·  hr ids :1111 
A n other aspect of the p ro h l e m  of en forcement  . . . is the 
d e l a y  i n v o l ve d  in  t h e  p re s e n t  m a c h i n e r y .  A u n i o n ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a n e w l y  e s t a h l i s h e d  u n i o n .  i s  n o t  a s t a t ic 
o rg a n i zat i o n .  I f  a n  e m p l o ye r  ca n s t r i k e a s w i ft h l o w  the 
organ i zat i o n  may disappear e n t i rely ; if he c a n  deny i t  the 
rights gua ran teed by the law for J subs t a n t i a l  per iod o f  t i me 
i t  w i l l  decl ine and disa ppear .  I t  happens con t i n u a l l y i n our 
exp erience .  R es tit u t ion of damage do ne to tl 11 es tab lished 
organization t h rough v i o l a t i o n  of l a w  is o r d i n a r i l y  poss i ble 
only i f  secured prom ptly a fter t h e  damage occurs . I n  perhaps 
the m ajority of situat i o n s  t he case becomes for all practical 
p u r p o ses m o ot at the e n d  of 3 to 6 m o n t h s . 1 02 ( e m ph a s is 
added) 
98. 1 1  LEGIS LATI VE HISTORY OF THE N A T I O N A i. L A B O R  RU. A T I O S S  :\CT 2332 (1935). 
Senator Wagner's statement was made prior to Senate debate on the committee amendments. The 
amendment s t r i k i n g  "res t i t u t i o n "  was agreed to without c o m me n t .  Id. at 2352 .  And see 
Trailmobile v. Whirls, 33 1 U.S. 40, 6 1  ( 1 947)  ("M oreover . . .  the most i m portant committee 
changes relied upon were made without explanation. The interpretation of statutes cannot safely 
be made to test upon mute intermediate legislative maneuvers . " ) .  
99. H . R .  Rep. N o .  969, 74th Cong., 1 st Sess. 4 ( 1 935). 
100. Prior to the enactment of the N L RA, the National Labor Board and the National 
Labor Relations Board (old) had administered § 7 (a )  of the National I ndustrial Recovery Act 
of 1933. For history see Smith, The Evolu1ion of 1he "Duly 1o Bargain " Concepl in A merican 
law, 39 MICH. l. REV. 1 065 ( 194 1 ). 
10 1 .  Co mpare note 77 supra . 
102. Hearings on S. '.958 Before t�e Senate Comm. 011 Educaiion & Labor. 74th Cong., 1st Ses. 95-6 ( 1 935). Mr. Biddle also testified that he had assisted in th t' f th b'll Id. at 75.  e prepara ion o e 1 . 
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It can also be added that both t h e  Board103 and cou rts1 0� have 
characterized exercises of the Boar d ' s  remedial power m terms of 
"restitution . "  
The act i o n s  o f  t he Eightieth C ongress present m or e  d i fficult 
problems. I t  i s  quite clear105 that the legislators in 1 947 took a narrow 
view of the Board 's remedial process.  I n  1947 Congress proposed 
that, among other things, it was to be an unfair labor practice for a 
union to engage in  a secondary boycott . A mendments to s ection 8 of 
the N L R A  w e r e  p r o posed "crea t i n g  remedies fo r u n fa i r  labor 
practices by labo r  organizations . "106 I t  is apparent, h owever, that at 
least Senator Taft thought very little o f  the Board's remedial powers. 
Without provisi o n  for a suit for dam ages caused by the  proposed 
i llegal conduct, "the remedy of dealing with the N L R B  i s  a weak 
reed . "107 Since t here was "no possibility of a suit for damages, "108 
Senator Taft proposed an amendment, eventually adopted,109 in  order 
to "fill up gaps which we feel are serious . '  '1 10 The natural inquiry is  why, 
103. American Fire Apparatus Co., 1 60 N . L . R . B. 1 3 1 8  (1966). And compare, "Congress 
in drafting Section I O (c)  specifically rejected such language as 'substantial justice' and 'restitution 
which would have clearly permitted the award of interest on wages withheld. C ongress chose 
instead the words 'rei nstatement and backpay' with the knowledge that this  u n a m biguous 
language 'necessarily results in narrowing the definition of restitution' . . . .  " Isis Plu m bing & 
Heating Co., 138  N . L. R .  8. 7 1 6, n. 23 at 722 ( 1 962) (dissenling opinion) (citations omitted). 
104. N L R B  v. C i tizens Hotel Co. ,  326 F.2d 50 1 ,  508 (5th Cir. 1 964) (" [T]here are 
circumstances in which, to effectuate the dominant policy of collective bargaining in good faith, 
a restitution order is permissible or required.") 
105. For example, the Senate had amended § IO(c) and provided that where a Board order 
directs reinstatement o f  an e mployee back pay could be required of a labor organization, as well 
as of an employer. The House Conference commented on the amendment: "The language of the 
Senate amendment without which the Board could not require unions to pay back pay when they 
induce an employer to discriminate against an employee is included in the conference agreement." 
H.R.  Conference Rep. No. 5 10, 80th Cong., l st Sess. 54 ( 1947) (emphasis added). It would seem 
that the legislators took a very narrow view of "affirmative action ." 
106. S. Rep. No. 1 05,  80th Cong., !st Sess. 18 (1947). 
107. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 ( 1 947) (supplemental views (Senator Taft). 
108. Under the bill there is a kind of injunctive remedy through the National  Labor 
Relations Board, but there is no possibility of  a suit for damages. I see no reason why 
suits of this sort s h ould not be permitted to be filed. A fter all, it is only to restore the 
people, who lose s omething, because of boycotts and jurisdictional strikes, the money 
which they have lost. 
We considered making it a procedure through the National Labor Relations Board 
also, but it is not felt I think by any of those on the other side of these questions that 
the Labor Board is an effective tribunal for the purpose of trying to assess damages in 
such a case. I d o  n ot think anyone felt that the particular function should be in the 
Board. So, if such remedy is to \le provided at all, if there is to be any recourse for 
financial l osses c aused by unions, i t  m u s t  be by d irect suit as  proposed by the 
amendment. 
I I  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1 3 7 1 ( 1 947) (Senator 
Taft). 
109. Now 29 U.S.C.  § 187 (1964). 
1 10. S. Rep. No. 1 05, 80th Cong., lst Sess. 56 ( 1 947) (supplemental views) (Senator Taft). 
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if the Board possessed a n y  general power t o  redress injuries resulting 
from unfair labor practices, such amendments were necessary. 
I n  Ex-Cell-O this quest ion is raised a n d  said to bar the Board 's 
adoption of the proposed relief. 1 1 1  The contention is substantial; and, 
alth ough one could not rest entirely upon t he a rgument, this writer 
w ould not be surprised t o  see a court , if troubled otherwise with the 
proposed remedy, rely i ng u pon the language o f  Senator Taft and its 
accompanying history. Just such legislative h istory has produced dicta 
to the effect that ' 'the L abor Management Relations Act sets up n o  
general compensatory procedure except in such m i nor supplementary 
ways as the reinstatement of wrongfully d ischarged employees with 
back pay . "1 1 2  Further, w ere the Board to adopt the new remedy, it 
would first have to repudi ate decisions1 1 :i  relying specifically upon the 
same argument now p resented to i t  by the e m p l oyers in Ex-Cell-O .  
I t  i s  appropriate h e re to  mention a n  a d d iti onal desideratum .  
C o nsiderations o f  mutuality o f  remedy may weigh heavily i n  any 
1 1 1 . Brief for Zinke Foods, Inc .  at 7 .  
1 1 2. United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 665 ( 1954); accord 
U A W  v. Russell, 356 U .S. 634 ( 1 9 5 7 ). 
1 1 3.  In National Maritime U nion, 78 N .L . R . B. 97 1 ( 1 948), employers sought monetary 
compensation "making them w hole for the economic consequences of a strike" in violation 
of § 8 (b)(2) of the Act. The Board responded: 
(T]o do so would involve our assuming a power which is a ppropriately a function of the 
courts, rather than admin istrative tribunals. Congress (in § 303 ) thus considered the 
issue of money damages resulting from strikes which are union unfair labor practices. It  
confined the right to obtain money damages to cases i n volving specific kinds of strikes. 
· · . That Congress did not intend thereby to vest in the Board a similar power to assess 
uni0ns with money damages resulting from stri kes i s  m ost clearly indicated in the 
legislative history of Section 303 . 
Id. at 989-90. Although the case is obviously distinguishable as it involved § 8(b)(2) rather than 
8 (a)(5), it would seem its reasoning is equally applicable in  cass of refusal to bargai n, particularly 
in cases of union refusals to bargai n ;  and see the discussion of mutuality in the succeeding text. 
In United Furniture Workers (Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co.), 84 N . L.R .  B. 563 (1949). 
the Board held that it was without power to order a union to reimburse employees for any lost 
wages they may have suffered as a result of the union's unlawful i nterference with the non-striking 
employees' ingress to the plant. "An award of back pay here would be in the nature of damages 
to the employees for an interference with his right of ingress to the plant. as contrasted with 
compensation to him for losses i n  pay suffered by him because of severance of or interfen:ncc 
with the tenure or terms of the e mployment relationship bet ween h im and his employer in th: 
ordinary case in which back pay is awarded . . . .  " Id. at 564-65. Co111par� Local 5 1 3. Int 1 
U n i o n
. of Operat ing Eng ' rs ,  1 45 N . L . R . B . 554 ( 1 963), where  t he Board on t he sa
m.c 
facts - mterference with ingress-stated, "Without now deciding whether wuch a result is or 
is  
not requi
.red by any lack of statutory authority, we nevertheless believe it would not effectu
ate 
�he 
.
pohcie� of t
.
he Act for the Board to award back pay or other compensatory rdief in ,sue� 
. ituations. Id. at SSS. with Hearing.< oil H. R. M l. H. R .  976. H . R .  I ! 34 . H. R /548 .  H. R. _ 1)3.\. lf. R . 3355 II R 4 '78 H R 5910 H R  . h ( th<" . 
· 
· · 
. •  
· 
· · - " · · . 60!!0 Before the Special S11 hco111111. Oil I.a or 0 
�"''.'·"' ( ""'."'· on f.dumtion & l.ahor, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 2  ( 1 966) where the proposal is mad� 'that the ( ommillee might wish to consider giving the Labor Board the authority to 'remedy this type of loss (ingress case)." 
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assessment of  t he proposed rdief. A.e11 1 1econ Copper Corp . . a recen t  
trial exa miner 's decisi on,  provides a n  e xa m ple . I n  t-:e1111eco1t  t h e  t r i a l  
examiner found that t he respondent u n i ons h a d  rdused t o  b a rg a i n  i n  
good faith by i nsist ing upon company-wide.  coordinated b a rg a i n i ng 
and striking i n  support thereo f. The c o m p a ny req uested t h at t h e  t r i a l  
examiner in  h is  order require the unions.  j o i n t ly and several l y ,  t o  p a y  
it "strike dam ages and otha dam ages est a b l i shed a t  a s ubsequent  
hearing before the tr ial  exa m i ner.  ' ' 1 1 1  The t r i a l  e xa mi n e r  den ied  the 
company 's request on the merits .  
There is no warrant for such a remedy . The Boa rd is  not 
empowered to award d a m ages . T he t r a d i t i o n a l  order iss ued 
to remedy a refusa l  to bargain w i l l  p ro v i de adequate · m e a n s  
of remov i ng t he conse q ue nces of  v i o l a t i o n · w h i ch h a ve 
thwarted the p u rposes o f  the Act  i n  t h i s  case . 1 1 "  (c i tat i o n  
omitted) 
Since there is evidence1 1 6  that  "equal  respons i bi l i t y  before t he l a w "  
was the pervas i ve mood of the I i g h t ieth C o ngress.  i t  is d i ffi c u l t  to see 
how the Bo a rd c o u l d  p r o v ide  m o n e t a ry  c o m p e n s a t i o n  f o r  a n  
employer 's viola tion o f  sect i o n  8 (a ) ( 5 ) ,  w h i le at the  same t i me deny i ng 
the relief in such cases as A."en neml l . 1 1 7  A t  least it is certa in  to  t h is 
1 14. United Steel workers. 1·1 u/. ( Kcnnc.:ott Copper Corp. ). Case No. 27-C B-453 ( N . L . R . B. 
TXD-8 -69. Feb. 5 .  1 969 ) at 4 5 .  
I 1 5 .  Id. 
1 1 6 .  Set' H . R . Rep. �o. 24 5. 80th Cong . . 1 st Scss. 8 ( 1947 ) .  Ilcari11g.1 011 .4d111ini.1 tration 
of the Lahor Jfa11ag1•111c11t R<'la1io11.1 . · l t "t hr the .\"l.R H Ht' fore thl' .'i11hco111111. 011 .Vational Labor 
Relations Board of the Jlouw Cu111111 .  rJll  /-.d11rn1io11 & f.ahor. 87th Cong., 1 st Sess. 665 ( 1 96 1 )  
("You believe. then, that it was the intent of Congress i n  passing the act to equalize responsibility 
and to put respons i bility on unions as well as employers and that section IO (c) s hould be read 
against the background of the intent of Congress . " )  (Statement of Representat ive Griffin). 
1 1 7. In Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs. 1 4 1  N . L. R . B. 469 ( 1963), the Board held that a union 
had violated § 8 (b)(3) of the Act by forcing employers by threat of strike to bargain outside of 
the traditional bargaining unit a mult i-employer unit .  The employers had unwillingly negotiated 
individual contracts with the union and pursuant to those contracts had made payments to the 
union's welfare fund. The Board ordered the u n i on t o  cease giving effect to the i n d i vidual 
contracts . The employers then sought "restitution" in  a state court of a lleged over payments to 
the union's welfare fund and payments of wages to  e m pl o yees made pursuant to the unlawful 
contracts. The employers argued that had the union bargained i n  good faith both contributions 
to the welfare fund and payment of wages would have been less than those u nlawfu l l y  negotiated . 
Relief in the state court was denied on grounds of pre-em ption. Corvalis Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
Hoisting &  Portable Eng'rs. 247 Or. 1 58 ,  4 1 9  P.2d 38 ( 1966), cert. denied, 387 U .S.  904 ( 1 967). 
In its memorandum in opposition to  the employer's petition for certiorari, the Board stated: 
Had the issue of recoupment been presented to  the Board, i t  might have been concluded 
that it would be too speculative to attempt to determine the difference between the terms 
that were negotiated i n d i vidually and those that might have been negotiated throu_
gh 
Cascade; or it might have been concluded that a reim bursement order would be excessive 
for the violations found.  or that to impose such a remedy would not be conducive to 
satisfactory bargaining relations between the parties in the future. . 
Memorand u m  for the United States as A micus Curiae Opposing Certiorari at 9, Corvahs Sand 
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writer that any such disparity would add further cries to the mounting 
employer charge of unequa l  treatment.118 
A lthough the legislative h istory of sect ion 303 provides support 
for a contention that the B oard is precluded fro m  remedying refusals 
to bargain with monet a r y  compensation, s u rely it should not be 
regarded as dispositive. I f, as has been argued,1 19  a union seeking 
m onetary relief need not p rove any actual loss ,  the reasons given by 
the legislators120 and even t he Board itselP21 for denying the Board 
power "to assess damages " w ould be inappl icable. The supplemental 
proceeding would not involve difficult factual questions; all that would 
be required would be app lication of a standard formula. This seems 
n o  m ore d i fficult t h a n  q u a rterly c a l c u l a t i o n 1 22 o f  back pay or 
co mputation of interest123 on back pay awa rd s .  I n deed, it might be 
argued that the Boards very decision t o  pay i nterest on back pay 
awards implicitly rejects a n y  broad contention t h at section 303 stands 
as a bar to the suggested remedy. In this posture reliance upon section 
303 as a limitation on the  Board 's remedial  powers resembles the 
attempt which was made i n  Phelps Dodge Corp. 124 to read another 
& Gravel Co. v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs, 387 U.S. 904 ( 1 967). Were the Board to adopt Ex­
Ce/1-0 relief, it would have to repudiate each of its own arguments; further, after adopting the 
new relief, should this be the result in Ex-Cell-O, this writer questions whether, at least as an 
equitable consideration, the Board could raise these arguments to bar employer relief in cases like 
Corvalis and Kennecott. 
1 1 8 .  "A nother disparity demonstrating the Board's pro-union bias . . . is found in the 
differences o f  remedial inventiveness displayed when a union i s  the charging party, and when a 
union is the respondent." Ervin Hearings, note 1 3  supra, at 1 8 2  (Statement of J. Mack Swiger!).  
Although such diatribe should be discounted, political considerations will undoubtedly influence 
the Board's deliberation of Ex-Cell-O. For those who insist upon predictions, were I to make one. 
I might very well have placed it here. I nstead, I offer additional diatri be :  "Mr. Chairman. I have 
concluded that the time has come to abolish the N L R B  . . . .  " Ervin Hearings at 17 (Statement 
of Senator Griffin). 
1 1 9.  N ote, An Assessment of' the Proposed "Make- Whole" Remedr in Re/i1sal-To - Bargain 
Cases, 67 MtcH. L. REV. 374 (1 968 ). The argument suggests that the e�ploye� 's illegal conduct 
should preclude any consideration of whether an actual loss has occurred. Id. at 38 1 .  
1 20. Senator Taft was concerned that the Board would n ot be "an effective tribunal for 
the purposes of trying to assess damages. See note 108 supra. 
1 2 1 .  _ I n  Local 5 1 3 ,  l nt'I Union of Operating Eng'rs, 145 N . L . R . B. 554, 556 ( 1 963). th� 
Board denied monetary relief in an i ngress case on the grounds that, among other things. "the 
n u me rous and complicated factual  questions involved in sett l i n g  such claims are not such 
ques�ions as fall within the Board's special expertise, but do fall within the competence of judge 
and Jury." 
1 22 . . The practice was adopted i n  F.W. Woolworth C o .  90 N . L . R . B. 289 ( 1 950) and 
sustained in N L R B  v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc.,  344 U.S. 344 ( 1953 ). The Seven­
( f' case itself  provides strong su pport for the position of t h e  unions in Ex-Ce//- 0. As i n  
Wool•w1rth. expenence has sho t h  · · · · In . . wn at past practice, here an order to bargain. 1s ineffecll ve. \nw1 - l  p the Court not d th t "Th Bo 
.. 
: · , e . a e ard must draw on enlightment gai ned from experienc
e 
and th�t the Board s power "1s a broad discretionary one." at 346. L 3 .  I s i s  Plumbing & Heating Co .. 1 38 N . L. R . B. 7 16 ( 1962) .  1 24 .  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N L R B. 3 1 3  U .S. 177 ( 1 94 1 ). 
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express section of the Act as limiting secti on I O(c) .  Mr . Justice 
Frankfurter rejected the contention. "The sy llogism is perfect. But 
this is a bit of ver bal  logic  from which the meaning of things h a s  
evaporated.  " 1 25 Even a s su m ing that the Board, were it to provide 
monetary compensation for a refusal to bargain, would label the relief 
"an award of damages for breach of t he obligation to negotiate," a s  
suggested b y  the U A  W, 1 26 a reviewing court could reasonably tak e  the 
same pos ition as was t a ken w hen the legi t i m acy of the Boa rd ' s 
awarding interest was at i ssue: 
The argument on this score is that only Congress could 
authorize such remedial  action and it fai led to do so. So far 
as we can ascertain the h istory of the legislation sheds no 
l ight and we can only assume Congress gave no thought to 
the specific issue of i nterest one way or the other.127 
I n  order to consider the effect that section 303 and its history 
might have on resolution of the question of m onetary compensati on ,  
it has been assumed t h a t  t h e  remedy i s  "in t h e  nature of damages" a s  
ar gued by t h e  em p l oy e r s  in Ex- Cell- O.  The a ssumption i s  n o t  
necessarily correct . Were the relief considered "back pay, " secti on 
303 would be irrelevan t ;  the Board is speci fical ly authorized t o  
pro vide reinstatement with b ack pay and this relief encompasses 
unl awful refusals to b ar g ain . 1 28 Traditi ona l ly ,  back pay has been 
defined as compensation for "time lost " ;129 and it is difficult to see 
how Ex-Cell-O employees would be "reinstated " with compensation 
for "time lost ."  However, it seems safe to say that traditional ism is 
not the touchstone. Just recently the Supreme Court sustained an 
order of the Board requiring an employer, found to have violated 
section 8(a)(5) by refusin g  to sign an agreement previously reached, to 
make those payments to the union's trust fund as welfare benefits due 
under the contract.130 The a rgument that such fringe benefits were not 
compensation for time lost,  back pay in the traditional sense, was 
given onl y  footnote consideration and rejected . 131 By analogy to those 
cases132 in which an emp loyer bargains in bad faith by refusing to sig n  
1 25 .  Id. at 1 9 1 . 
1 26. Brief for the UAW at 42. 
1 27.  lnt'I Br'hd of Operative Potters v. N . L . R . B., 320 F.2d 757, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
1 28 . Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 ( 1 963). 
1 29 .  N L R B  v .  Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 30 1 U.S. I ,  4 9  ( 1937). 
1 30.  N L R B  v.  Strong, 393 U.S.  357, 70 L.R.R.M. 2 100 ( 1969). 
1 3 1 . "The fact that the p a y ments in question here did not constitute direct pay to the 
employee is i rrelevant in our view of the case." Id. n. 4 at 360. Compare Mr. Justice Douglas' 
dissent i ng o p i n io n  at 362-63 (award of  back pay is  an express part of legislative grant o f  
authority, while the award of  fringe benefits is not). . 
1 3 2 .  Coletti Color Prints, I nc., 1 59 N . L . R. B. 1 593 ( 1966), enforced 387 F.2d 298 (2nd Cir. 
1 967). 
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an agreement previ o u s l y  r eached and i s  o rdered t o  make th  . e 
employees whole for any l o st wages. 1t can be argued that the relief 
sought in Ex-Cell-O i s  w ithi n the Board 's  back pay power .133 
F i n a l ly, were the B o a r d  t o  character i ze the remedy  as a 
"make-whole" measure, the  Ex-Cell-O em ployees w ould, indeed, be on 
their way home with a "ful l creel, " since "m a k i ng the workers whole 
for losses suffered on acco u n t.of an unfair l a b or practice is part of the 
vindication of the public pol icy which the Board enforces . "1:14 I n  fact 
there are decisions which indkate that the Board has come very close 
to taking just such a positio n .  I n  M. F. A . M;//ing Ca. 135 an employer 
bargained in bad faith d u r i ng negotiat ions for an initial contract 
followi ng union certificatio n . The remedy adopted by the full Board 
required that the employer reim burse the em p loyee members of the 
uni o n  negotiating committee for wages lost while attending the futile 
bargaining sessi ons. So far, here there is nothi ng u n usual;  the remedy 
required only the payment of com pensation for time lost. Two things, 
however , are noteworthy . First,  as the em p l ayer h ad previously 
rejected a union request that the employee negotiators be paid for 
tim e  s pent i n  bargai ni ng ,  the remedy required ,  i n  effect, that the 
employer retroactively agree to a proposal he had specifically rejected 
at the bargaining table.136 Logically, it can be argued that Ex- Cell-O 
is an easier case; for in Ex-Cell-O the em p loyer had not explicitly 
rejected any of the terms o f  the ' 'make-whole ' '  co ntract to which he 
would otherwise have agreed.137 Second, the l a n guage of the Board's 
decision : 
As a result of Respondent ' s  8(a)(5) conduct, the employee 
members of the negotiating committee did not receive the 
1 33 .  A very important substantive element in refusal to sign cases is that an agreement was 
in fact reached. See Greer Stop Nut, 1 62 N . L . R. B. 626 ( 1967) (employer did not violate § 8(a)(5) 
by refusing to execute agreement since duration remained unsettled); Retail Clerks v. N L R B, 373 
F.2d 655 (D.C .  Cir. 1967) (substantial evidence did not support Board's finding that agreeme�t 
had been reached). In Ex-Cell-O, although no agreement ha s  been reached, it is the union s 
position that had the employer bargained in good faith an agreement would have been concluded. 
See note 64 supra. Therefore, at some point a fter the rejection of a post-certification demand for 
bar�aining or of a demand for recognition in Joy Silk case, the employer has, in effect, refused 
to sign the agreement which he would have signed absent the refusal to bargain; and the analogy 
holds. But see text accompanying note 1 25 supra. 
1 34.  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N L R B, 3 1 3  U.S. 177, 197 ( 1 94 1 ) .  
l 35 .  170 N.L.R . B. No. 1 1 1 , 1 968 CCH NLRB Dec. 22, 3 3 2 ,  68 L . R . R. M. 1077 ( ! 96S). 1 �6'. The Board explicitly Ii m ited the payment to those wages lost while attending past negotiating sessions. "(l]t is inappropraite to apply the remedy at this time, to any future negotiating sessions, since that will require a later determination as t� whether they are conducted m bad faith " 68 L R R M l toll the · · · · · at 080. C o m pare the union's proposals as to when to requested monetary· r l' f · E c II . · tes 47-53 e ie m x- e -0 and companion cases see text accompanying no supra. ' 
1 37 · See note 1 33  supra. 
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compensato ry benefit of good faith bargaining for which t hey 
had sacrificed t h e i r  w ages . Since the R espondent never had a ny 
intention to bargain in good faith , it deliberately deprived t he 
employees o f  their  w ages as well as this anticipated benefit .  
Therefore, we b el ieve i t  i s  appropriate that, in order to m ake 
these employees whole, they be rei m b u rsed for wages lost 
whi le atten d i ng t h ose past  neg o t i a t ing sessions . . . m 
(emphasis added ) 
28 1 
I t  would be b ut a s i m ple step to expand this  order to include al l  unit 
employees, m a king t h e m  whole for the l oss  of the anticipated benefit 
of good faith b a rg a i n i ng- p recisely the rel ief requested in Ex- C  e/1-0. 
SHO ULD THE BO A R D A D O PT THE PR O P OSED R E LIE F'? 
I t  depends. A nd a g a i n ,  the relev a n t  considerations are t hose of 
law, economics,  pol i c y ,  and hum an relat ions .  It depends on h o w  the 
Board resolves certai n anticipated evils _l39 
In a related area Professor Bok has  suggested that "the key 
question is to dete r m i ne how m uch value will  be derived from the 
Government 's e fforts . "110 The inquiry is l ikewise relevant in resolving 
the question of monetary compensation for a refusal to barg a i n .  An 
app ropr iate  p l a c e  t o  b e g i n  is to d e t er m i ne the extent  of t h e  
problem-just h o w  m a ny employees a n d  unions have suffered the 
"corrosi ve e ffe c t s  o f  d enying a c o m pensatory remedy.  "W The 
principal evi l ,  it is a l leged,u2 is  the use of judicial review as a delay 
tactic .  As a result 
the employer m a y  well escape with no contract at all because 
the i n i t i a l  or ga nizing strength h as meanwhile been so far 
er oded t h a t  h e  c a n  outlast  a s t r i ke and brea k u n i  o n  
representat i on c o mp letely .u3 
l .R .�
8
· M . F . A .  M i l l i n g  C o . , 1 70 N_.L: R_. B .. N o .  1 1 , 1968 .CCH N
L R B Dec. 22, 332, 68 
19  
. M .  1077, 1080 ( 1 968 ). A ccord, M1ss1ss1pp1 Wood Preserving Co., 173 N . L. R . B. N o .  2 1 2, 
68-2 CCH N L R B  Dec. 20, 430, 70 L . R . R . M .  102 1 ( 1968 ). l 39. Co111pare S a vo y  L a u n d r y ,  I nc. , 148 N . L . R . B. 38 ( 1964). The Board d i s c u s sed generally its back pay power and made reference to "anticipated evils" raised in the past and shown by · · h · h t h d 
was . 
experience_ t
o h a ve been i maginary. "It was clai med at t e time t a sue a re'.11e Y 
unfair and punitive. But the continued development of a body of backpay law has established reasonable rules for the fair administration of this remedy which have dispelled the fears . "  Id. at 40· I n the succeedi ng text I Ii kewise raise anticipated evils-what lconsider to be the reasonably pr ob bl · · d b · · 
_
a e effects of the proposed remedy on the i mmediate parties involved an on arga1mng �elat1onships generally.  Because those effects are, in my view, contrary to the policies of the Act, 
t 
suggest that the Board should not adopt the remedy. Then, assuming that the Board adopts he relief. I shall consider the problem of judicial review. . 
. 
_ 1 40. Bok.  The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the .\a1tona/ Labor Relations A ct .  78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 48 ( 1964). 
1 4 1 .  Brief for the U A W  a t  8 .  
142 · See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text. 
1 43. Brief for the UAW at 1 9 .  
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I n  fiscal  1 967, of the 1 ,282 cases closed agai nst  emp-loyers in which 
collective bargaining was begun,  bargaining w as begun pursuant to 
court order i n  but 77 cases .' ' '  S ince the u n i ons  suggest that those 
em ployers w h o  exhaust j ud i c i a l  review avoid contracts in 64 per cent 
of 8 ( a ) ( 5 )  cases ,'15 in fi sca l 1 967 only 49 uni o n s  and their members 
suffered as a result of the u n avai labi l ity of t h e  proposed remedy. It 
would see m  that the poble m• o f  need is rather s m a l l .us On the other 
hand, the problem of effec.ts-·-- the anticipated evils-appears quite 
large . 
PRE- EMPTION-- " FOR WHICH THEY Now HA YE No REDRESS " 
I t  has been said that t he Board acts only i n  the public interest, 
enforcing "public" rather t h a n  "private righ t s .  "W I n fact, the Board 
has b e e n  adm onished fo r s u b m erging i n  i t s  d a i l y  operations the 
N L RA 's public aspects .'48 Just w hat all this means is puzzling. If  the 
suggestion means anything more than at t imes inj ury will  go without 
Boa rd red ress. I have my dou bts . ' 49 But, for the mo ment, assume that an 
attorney, having learned o f  a l l  th is ,  decides to seek relief for his client, 
a certified union denied rec ognit ion and bargai n i n g  two years ago, in 
144 .  THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL RE PORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD Table 
4 at 222. 
145 . See notes 74-78 supra and acco mpanying text. 
146. Although the calculation is h ardly dispostt1ve on the issue of  need, it demonstrates two 
points. Contrary to my statistical calculation need may be quite large. I have a like hesitation 
with the statistical demonstrations of the unions in Ex-Cell-O. Compare Murphy, The National 
Labor Rela t ions Board- A n  A ppraisal, 52 MINN .  L . REV. 8 19 ( 1 968). Professor Murphy 
discussed the research inadequacy of the Board and commented, "One source the Board does 
have-feedback from companies and unions-is not always reliable because it too often involves 
mere polemical special pleading." Id. at 844. Secondly, in 1967, 1 ,006 of the cass so closed in 
which bargaining was begun were settled informally. Were the remedy of monetary relief available 
in cases of refusal to bargain, I seriously question whether such a large number of cases could, 
in the future, be informally settled. 
147 . "The proceeding authorized to be taken by the Board under the National Labor 
Relations Act is not for the adjudicat i o n  of private rights."  National Licorice Co. v. NLRB. 3o9 
U.S. 350, 362 ( 1 940). 
148. Note, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section /Ole) of the National Labor 
Relations A ct, 1 1 2 U. PENN. l. REV. 69, 77 (1963). 
149. It is interesting that in Ex-Cell-O itself the Board cast its notice of hearing in terms 
of "returning the employees to the status quo ante." NL RB Notice of Hearing (May 26, 196
7� 
(emphasis added.) Compare S. Doc. No. 8 1 ,  86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 ( 1960) (Cox Advisory Pane 
on Labor- Manage ment Relations Law) (" [A]lthough proceed i n gs before the �L �B �re 
undertake n  in the public interest, since 1947 they have also been concerned with the vmdicauon 
of essen tially private rights. Unions often intervene in N L R B  proceedings in order to press 
complaints of unfair labor practices against employers . Not i nfrequently they carry adver�e 
decisions to the courts."). In Ex-Cell-O the unions have laid the foundation for appeal to
t_ e 
courts by contending that, were the Board to deny such relief, the Board would have abused its 
discretio n .  Brief for the U A W at 1 9 .  Such a contention is likely to meet with little su_ccess. 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. N L R B, 37 1 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1966); Retail Store Umon 
v. 
N L R B, 385 F.2d 30 1 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
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another  foru m . 1 50 T h e  for u m  to w h i c h  h e  turns is  t h e  state of 
Schlossberg, undoubtedly receptive to all  union claims.151 A federal 
court of appeals has just enforced a Board decision findin g  unlawful 
the employer 's refusal to bargain with the union, and upon preli minary 
research the lawyer discovers that Judge Learned Hand has 
characterized the emp loyer's action as a tort.152 Smilingly, he turns to 
Prosser to find "what tort? " and discovers a n  appropriate pigeon­
hole-§ 1 24, Interferen ce with Prospective Advantage.153 Armed with 
statistics, our lawyer confidently draws his complaint. Unfortunately, 
he would fi nd t hat, even m Schlossberg, relief would be 
una vailable.154 
1 50. The writer has selected the state forum for illustrative purposes only. He thinks it  clear 
that relief would be unavailable in any forum other than the Board. For the rationale applicable 
to state forums see succeeding text and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.  
236 (1959). For the bar to relief in federal courts see United Electrical Works v. Int'! Br'hd of 
Electrical Workers, 1 1 5 F.2d 488 (2nd Cir. 1940); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers 
167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1 948 ). But see Delucia, Federal Jurisdiction and a Right to Damages in 
Primary Labor Disputes. 1 4  RUTGERS L. REV. 60 1 ( 1 959). Although it is generally agreed that 
relief in another foru m would be unavailable, some suggest that such a result is an additional 
reason for the adoption of monetary relief. See Comment, Employee Reimbursement for an 
Employer's Refusal to Bargain: the Ex-Cell-O Doctrine, 46 TEX. L. REv. 758 , 762 ( 1 968). The 
writer suggests that the result  cuts in precisely the opposite direction. 
1 5 1 .  Mr.-Schlossberg is General Counsel for the U A W. 
152. N L R B  v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872 (2nd Cir. 1938). But see Comment, 
State Jurisdiction o ver Torts Arising from Federally Cognizable Labor Disputes, 68 YALE L.J. 
308, 3 1 7  (1958) (an employer unfair labor practice which inhibits the union's right to organize 
and bargain collectively breaches no interest recognized by the tort law of most states.) Some 
states, however, have created private causes· of action for damage resulting from unfair labor 
practices (conduct prohibited under state law but generally defined in terms identical with those 
of the Federal act) and conceivably, after the adjudication of an unfair labor practice before the 
Board, suit could be brought in a state forum under such statutes. See Denver Building & Const. 
Trades Council v. Shore, 1 3 2  Col. 1 87,  287 P.2d 267 ( 1955). After an adjudication by the Board 
finding that a �nion had violated § 8(b)(2) of the Act, an employer sued in a state court under 
a local statute which today reads : "Any person who suffers injury because of some act of unfair 
labor practice . . .  shall have a right of action . . .  against all persons participating in such action 
for damages caused to the injured persons thereby." Cow. REV. STAT. ch. 80, art. 4- 1 9 ( 1 )  ( 1 963). 
Relief was granted over a contention of pre-emption. It is submitted that the court erred. The 
court should have dismissed the cause �m the grounds of pre-emption. Compare Corvalis Sand & 
Gravel v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs, 247 Or. 158,  4 19 P.2d 38 (1966), and see note 1 1 7 supra. 
cerr. denied, 387 U.S. 904 ( 1967). "This opinion has treated the suit against the union as one 
for recission and restitution. It was unnecessary to decide whether it might in fact be a tort action 
for damages occasioned to the employers . . . .  If it is in fact a tort action . . .  against the union 
�
�
ause of unfair labor practices, pre-emption would also prevent its prosecution. Id. n. 8 at 168-
1 53.  PROSSER ON TORTS § 124 (3d ed. 1964). "In such cases there is a bacvground of 
business experience on the basis of which it is possible to esti mate with some fair amount of 
success both the value of what has been lost and the likelihood that the plainti ff, would have 
received it if the defendant had not interfered."  Id. at 974-75. Compare the unions' position in 
Ex-Cell-O. see note 44 supra (value of what has been Jost) and text accompanying notes �9-66 
supra Qikelihood that contract would have been entered had not the employer refused to bargain.). 
1 54. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 ( 1959). 
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I t  can be argued t h a t  the rationale or p re-em ption is likewise a 
relevant desideratum i n  c o n sidering whether t he Board should adopt 
the new remedy. Far fro m  being an aggra v a t i ng c i rcumstance,1;;5 the 
fact that Ex-Cell-O employees "now have n o  redress ' '  may weigh 
against adoption of  m o n et a ry relief.1';" The Board itself has expressed 
one o f  the reasons for precluding the tort act i o n :  
. . .  t o  i m pose such a remedy would n ot be conducive to 
satisfactory bargain i ng relations between the parties in the 
future.57 
The fear is that the d a mage act ion m ight  " frustrate the effort of 
C o ngress to st imulate the s mooth fun cti o n i ng of (the bargaining) 
process .  "t5s Pursuant to the enforced order o f  the Board the p arties 
w ou ld have entered negot iations.  The pendency o f  the tort litigation, 
"serving primarily to expand the area of d ispute and prolong the 
co n trovery , "  m ight "s u bvert the nat i o n a l  p o l i c y  for m i n i m izing 
i nd ustr ial  strife. " 1 59 I t  m ight be m a i n t a i n e d ,  ho wever, that the 
rela tionship  of the p a r t i e s  h a s  so far deteri o ra ted beca use of the 
e m ployer 's initial refusal  to bargain that a n y  added disruption would 
have only marginal  i mpact on what are already spoi led relations . This 
m i g h t  i ndeed be the case  where an e m p l o y e r  has used the review 
procedure merely to  frustrate the barga i n i n g  relationship.  But this 
writer wonders whether the s a me is true i n  cases where the employer 
honestly believes that the Board has erred i n  certi fying the union, for 
exam ple, and seeks revi e w  i n  good faith .  t60 Such an e m ployer, returning 
to t he bargaining table o n l y  to be served with process, or even with a 
1 55 .  See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text. 
156 .  In  order to  avoid circuity, I examined only  one of  the  reasons for pre-em ption , 
reserving consideration of other reasons for discussion in connection with the Board's remedial 
power. 
1 57 .  Memorandum for the United States as A 111icus Curiae Opposing Certiorari at 9 ,  
Corvalis Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs,  3 8 7  U . S .  904 ( 1967 ). See note 1 1 7 
supra. I can see no rational distinction between the Board's fea r  as expressed to bar state relief 
and full application of the same argument to the Board's own remedial process. 
158.  Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U . S. 9 5 ,  1 04 ( 1962) .  And see Mr. Chief 
Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in UAW v. Russell, 3 5 6  U.S.  634, 653 ( 1957)  ("[A] damage 
acti.on has an unfavorable effect on the climite of labor relations. Each new step in the proceedin
gs 
rekindles the animosity. Until final  judgment the action is a constant source of friction between 
the parties.") (dissenting opinion). 
! 59. Comment, S1a1e Jurisdiction o ver Tores A rising from Federallr Cognizable Labor Dispules 68 YALE L.J. 308, 3 1 7  ( 1958). 
. 
160· Ex-Cell-O was s u c h  a case. " I  have been a s s u m i ng,  a n d  do assu me, t ha t  the 
R espondents challenge to the Board's decision overruling the Respondent's objections to the election
. is not based upon hostility to the collective-bargaining process but upon a sincere desire t� o bt�in a review of what it regards as an erroneous ruling by the Board." TXD-80-67 at 1 6 . Li�ewise, Herman Wilson Lumber Co. involved a good faith employer desire to obtain judicial review. See TXD-757-66 at 5 .  
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Board back pay specification, might reasonably deci de to t a ke a very 
hard line in any future negotiations.  H ere the fear is real r ather than 
apparent. 
A DMI NISTRAT I O N  OF THE R EMEDIAL PROCESS- BEYOND O UTRIGHT 
REFUSA LS 
In its brief t o  the Board, the A F L-C I O  suggested that t h e  basic 
prudential quest i o n  i n  determining w hether the Board sho u ld change 
its present remedies is "what effect d oes the present system h ave on a 
rational man who is subject to its sanctions? "161 The writer suggests 
that the ratio n a l  m e n  about whom we are talking-those w h o  cause 
all  the difficulties- m ight accomplish their  primary goal, avoidance of 
the union, and d o  so i n  a manner w h i ch,  unless the proposed remedy 
were extended beyo nd outright refusals t o  recognize, would leave them 
none the worse o ff . 
. Here the subject matter is the ration'ill "union buster"-those 
employers who d o  i n  fact use judicial  reviewt as a tactic; one grounded 
in t he psychol o g y  o f  labor- m a n a g e m e n t  warfare .  The refusal  to 
recognize and bargain provides a "devastating blow " t o  the 
" e n t h u s i a s m  o f  o rg a n i zat i o n  a n d t h e  high ho pes of s u cc e s s ful 
negotiat i o n s . ' ' 1 62 I f  t he new r e m e d y  were adop ted,  i t  w o u ld be 
reasonable to assume163 that this very special class of rational men 
would abandon t he tactic in exchange for but another. 
1 6 1 .  Brief for the A FL-C l O  as A 111icus Curiae at 6. The tendered response was that the 
present system tempts the rational man to 'violate the law. One might argue that, if adopted, the 
new remedy would tempt the rational union, the rational weak union, to violate the law. The 
present problem for the type of union which falls victim to the corrosive effects of the current 
remedial scheme is that it "lacks the economic power to use the strike as a weapon for compelling 
the employer to grant it real participation in industrial government." Cox, The Duty to Bargain 
i11 Good Faith. HARV. L .  REV. 1 40 1 ,  1 4 1 3  ( 1 958 ). This 1 think is the type of union we are talking · 
about; for example, i n  Herman Wilson Lumber Co. the union attempted to call a strike after 
the employer had refused a post -cert ification demand for bargaining. After two weeks the 
employees returned to work and the strike was unsuccessful. Official Report of the Proceedings 
Before the N L R B, Docket No. 25-CA-2377 et al. , oral argument, July 1 3 , 1967, at 187.  The new 
remedy, if adopted as proposed, would provide each employee with a lump-sum payment, see text 
accompanying notes 47-53 supra, coincident with the commencement of bargain ing. This I think 
would significantly i mprove the ability of the union and the employees to strike. As a result, the 
more favorable p o s t u r e  for the weak union is one i n  which the employer o u t right refuses 
recognition and bargaining in the first instance-after certification or card show. One way for 
the union to guarantee this result is that it engage in tainted pre-dection conduct or  unlawful 
sol icitation of authorization cards in order to force the employer to seek judicial review. And 
although the union would gain nothing were the employer's claim sustained on review, it has been 
argued, at least in t h e  authorization card area, that the risks for the union are sl ight.  See 
Co mment, Union A u thorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966). 
162.  Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith. 71 HARV. L. REv. 140 1 ,  1408 ( 1958). 
1 63 .  l don't thi n k  that any rational employer of this type would want to begin negotiations 
with the union after his employees have each received a large lump-sum back pay award. See note 
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The bargaining status of a union can be destroyed by going 
through the motions of negotiation al most as easily as by 
bluntly withholding recognition.164 
I f, i n  fact ,  the new remedy were to en c o u r age the motions of 
nego ti ati on rather than t h e  substance, then the Board would be 
required in order to reach such cases in the future to provide a form 
of relief which in prior decisions it has been hesitant to apply. The 
dec i sions invol ve contract signing as a remedial measure;t65 and, 
interestingly enough, in such cases the B oard has rejected a ratio 
decidendi it would be required to embrace were it to adopt Ex-Cell-O 
rel i e f  in the first instance. A hypothetical provides an example. 
Suppose that an e m pl o y e r  commences bargaining with a newly 
certified union and after several sessions he agrees to a ten cent an 
hour wage increase. Although the employer has no intention of 
rea ching an agreement, he makes the tentative agreement on wages in 
order to create expectatio n s  on the part of his employees, expectations 
the e m p l oyer knows h e  c a n  frustrate-t h e  union is weak and the 
emp loyer does not fear a strike. A fter further sessions, one issue 
remains open:  health and welfare benefits. H ere the employer refuses 
to provide financial information, the negotiations b reak down, and the 
union i s  without agreement. A ssume that, in addition to the unlawful 
refusal to provide financial  data,t66 other evidence demonstrates that 
the employer 's mind was c losed against agreement with the union. In 
the actual case,t67  t h e  u n i on requested and the trial examiner 
rec o mm ended that the e m p loyer be ordered to e xecute a con tract 
incorporating the term s  agreed upon and with respect to matters not 
agreed upon to bargain.  T he trial exam iner repudiated the employer's 
contention that no final agreement had been reached : 
I think that such a contention would be without merit. 
Respondent's failure and refusal to reduce to writing and 
execute a contract incorporating matters agreed upon is not 
16 l supra. Although for different reasons, the same assumption is suggested in Comment. Recent 
Developments in the Creation of Effective Remedies Under the National Labor Relatiom . ·let. 
17  Buff. L. REV. 830, 839 ( 1 968).  I t  is there suggested that as an employer "would prefer to 
work out [his] own agreement" bargaining would commence at the outset. The article suggests 
that an employer "would have a choice between having control over the agreement by bargaining 
at the outset on the one hand or  losing his control over the terms by refusing to bargain and 
letting the case go to the Board for decision on the other." I would suggest that there will indeed 
be bargaining from the outset; all bargaining and no bargain, form rather than substance. . 
1 64.  Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith. 7 1  HARV. L. REV. 140 1 ,  14 1 3 ( 1 958). !'or 
an example, see Mac Mill ian R i n g- Free Oil Co., Inc., 160 N. L. R. B. 877 ( 1966) (negotiations 
spanned almost four years and the parties met some thirty times without r eaching an agreement. ) 
1 65 .  See text accompanying notes 1 30·134 supra. 
1 66. N L R B v. Truitt Mfg. C o . ,  3 5 1 U .S. 149 (1 956). 
1 67 .  Feed & Supply Center, Inc. ,  1 27 N . L.R.B. 276 (1 960). 
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attributable to the fact that health and welfare proposals 
were left open at the time Respondent broke off negotiations. 
I think the Respondent may not av oid its obligation t o  
execute a contra ct embodying its w a ge offer as accepted by 
the union, and o ther matters a g reed upon by p leadi n g  
unresolved iss ues ,  when it made agreement on such 
unresolved issues impossible because of its own unfair labor 
practices. 168 (emph a sis added) 
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Although agreeing tha t  the employer had refused to bargain in good 
faith, the Boa rd refused to ado p t  t he trial examine r ' s  
recommendation. The parties had not yet reached "full a nd complete 
agreement . "169 The inj ury, however, was the same as that alleged in 
Ex-Cell-O. The employees had been deprived of the com pensatory 
benefit of good f aith bargaining; the union had suffered a loss of status. 
Nevertheless, the Board refused to provide what would have amounted 
to monet ary relief,' 70 rejecting the very r a tionale tendered by the 
unions111 in Ex-Cefl- 0-that although com plete agreement has not 
been reached , the res p ondent should not  be allowed to plead 
uncertainties he himself created. 
1 68 . Id. at 282. 
169. Id. at 227, A ccord. Greer Stop N ut C o . ,  1 62 N . L . R .  B. 626 ( 1 967). A l t h o u g h  
unexpressed, the rather obvious rationale of the Board's decision is  that the prior agreement on 
wages were tentative only. See C o x, The Duty 10 Bargain in Good Faith. 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 40 1 ,  n .  36 at 1 4 1 0  ("The general u nderstanding in collective bargaining is that agreement on any 
particular point is tentative unti l  t h ere is  apreement upon all  the issues.") More importantly, were the Board to order the employer to execute the agreement, the order would necessarily h a ve to 
supply the incomplete terms and the order would in all  l i kelihood bind the employer to those terms 
i n  the future. This is somethi n g  the Board has been manifestly unwilling to do. See Intercity 
Petroleu m Mar keters, I n c . ,  1 7 3  N . L . R . B. No. 222, 1 968-2 C C H  N L R B  Dec. 20,437, 70 
L . R . R. M . 1036 ( 1968). In Intercity, agreement had been reached between the parties and the e m pl oyer refused to sign the agreement. The agreement contained an unlawful union security clause, although the record made it clear that the partieS intended to incorporate a lawful security 
clause. The trial examiner rec o m mended that the employer be ordered to execute an agreement 
co nta i n i n g a lawful u n i o n  security clause. Although o rdering the em ployer to execute t h e  
previously agreed upon contract t h e  Board refused t o  adopt t h e  trial examiner's recommendation. "This would require the Board t
'
o write a union-security clause the parties ne
ver agreed to. " 1 968-
2 .CC H N LR B  Dec. 20,437 at 25,7 1 1 . The Board ordered the employer to execute the agreement 
;
�
th the unla wful clause dele
.
ted . The Board has, however, ordered
. 
an employ�r t? concede 
eckoff as a remedy for repeated violations of § 8 (a)(5), an action fixmg a term bmdmg on the 
��ployer in the future. See H . K. Porter Co., Inc., 172 N . L. R . B. No. 72, 1968 -2 CC� N L R B  c .  l0,040 (1 968). Nevertheless, the Board's action was extremely reluctant. For the history of the case see H . K. Porter Co.,  Inc., 153 N.L. R . B. 1 370, enforced sub nom. United Steelworkers 
v. N L R B  363 F.2d 272 ( D. C .  C i r. 1 966), 389 F.2d 295 (D.C.  Cir.  1967), on motion fo r reconsideration. 
1 70. Beverage A i r  C o . , 164 N . L . R . B. N o .  156 ,  1 967 C C H  N L R B  Dec. 2 1 ,4 1 6, 65 
l. R . R . M. 1 377 (1967); N L R B  v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969). 
1 7 1 .  "One whose wrongfu l act precludes exact determination of the amount of da mage ca n 
· d b h '  not evade his duty t o  compensate for that damage because o f  the uncertainty cause y i s  own wrongdoing." Brief fol' the U A W  a l  29. 
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Of course, Ex-Cell- O. i t  m ight be said, i s  a d istinguishable case. 
The u nions have argued t h a t  the Board would not be fixing, contrary 
to i ts policy,172 any future contract terms; the Board would only be 
making the employees whole .  When bargaini ng co mmences anew, the 
level of wages would not b e  t he previous wage rates "plus";  the old 
wage rates alone would m ark the starting p o i n t  of negotiation. But 
one can question whether t h e  parties' bargai n i ng relations can be so 
neatly severed-make w h ole for the past , free and unfettered 
bargaining for the future . Experience with compulsory arbitration 
su ggests that the level o f  wage and fringe benefits decreed wil l  
i n  fact s et a floor  for  fu t u re negoti a t i on s , m  as  anticip ated by 
m anagement in Ex- Cell- O. m I ndeed, datam o ffered by the unions to 
demonstrate that the right to bargain is a v a l uable right seem to 
con fi r m  this anticipated "manner of influence . "  
Further, i t  could be argued that in Ex- Cell- O. had the employer 
b a r g a i ned i n  good fa i t h ,  t h e  parties w o u l d h a v e  reached full 
ag reement . Therefore t h e  hypothetical c o n tr a ct-s igning case is an 
imp erfect analogy. The u n i ons  offer a panop l y  of stat istical evidence 
as proof that "if good fa i t h  bargain i ng p romptly  commences a 
collective bargaining agreement will  be concluded. " 1 ;6 But even here 
the Board has required the actual nod of the employer 's head. In  
Un ited A ircraft Corp. 1 77 an em ployer aft e r  some five m onths of 
bargaining withdrew recognition and refused t o  bargain, question ing 
the union 's majority stat u s .  After adjudicat i o n  of the 8 (a)(5) charge, 
the union sought to reopen the record and submit  evidence relating to 
the prior  negot iations w hi ch was offered to p rove that,  but for the 
unlawful refusal to barg a i n ,  the employer w ould have accepted the 
u n i o n 's last contract offe r .  The Board refused the offer of proof: 
" [T ] he ev idence . . .  is d eemed irrelevant t o  a determination o f  
whether the Respondent w ould have accepted the Charging Party 's 
last contract offer. "HK The necessary prerequisite is always that the 
parties themselves m ust have reached actual agreement. 
This requirement could b'e changed . A p lausible argu ment could 
1 7 2 .  See note 1 69 .mpra. 
1 7 3 .  Seminar on Collect i ve Bargaining, conducted a t  the Harvard Law School. Spring 
Term . . 1969. 
1 74 .  See text accompanying n otes 8 1  and 82 supra. 
1 7 5 ·  The BLS data reported the national median increases i n  hourly earnings won through collect 1 ve bargaining and show d th t ... · . h gh . . . e a increases which u nion ized employees have won t rou collcct1vc bargaining have been , II d b · LJ A Vi . ' qua " or e11ered in each successive year." Brief for the at 1 3  (e mphasis added ). 
1 76 .  Brief for the U A W at 1 5 .  
1 77 ·  1 68 N . L. R . 8. No. 66, 1 96 8  C C H  N L R B  Dec. 2 1  944 6 7  L R  R M  I O IO ( 1 967) 1 78 .  Id. at 67 L.R. R . M .  1 0 1 2 .  
' ' · · · · 
1969] REFUSA L TO BA R GA IN 289 
be m ade in s u p p o r t o f  a pos i t i o n  w h i c h  the Board i t s e l f  has  
enunciated : 
[I ]t is reasona b l e  to  believe, as  t h e  Act assumes, t ha t  i f  
pet itioner had  d ea l t  with the U n i on as  the law requires, the 
par t ies w o u ld h a v e  con c l u ded a c o l l ecti ve b a rg a i n i ng 
agreement .m 
The evidence offered by the uni ons in Ex- Cell- O to p ro ve t hat a 
contract would h a ve been entered, evidence of actual injury, might 
now likewise be deemed irrelevant . Were the Board wi l ling, the  Board 
cou ld assume actu a l  i njury , ' 80 although t here is judicia l  opi ni o n  t o  the 
contrary.18 1 The wr i ter, however, bel ieves that the Board 's i nsistence 
1 79. Brief for the N L R B  at 2 1 ,  Fran ks Bros. v. N L R B, 3 2 1  U.S. 702 ( 1 944).  That the 
Board might assume an agreement would have been concluded i n  Ex-Cell-O would not however, 
have anything to do with s omething inherent in the Act itself, as the Board here seems to suggest. 
See note 1 80 infra. In fact, even in 1 944 when the Board made its statement, the Act had been 
interpreted as suggest ing q u ite the contrary. 'The Act does not compel agreements between 
employers and e m pl o yees. I t  does not com pel a n y  agreement whatever." N L R B  v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 30 I U . S. I ,  45 ( 1 937). 
1 80. The argument in support of such an assu m ption is simply that, as the employer has 
made it i mpossi ble to dete r mine whether or not the e m ployees have suffered actual loss, this 
uncertainty is to be resolved against the employer. The principle has been pervasively applied in 
the administration of the Board's back pay orders and has been applied in . cases where the back 
pay order includes compensation for a probable expectancy denied to an employee because of the 
employer's unlawful act. See N L R B  v. Miam i  Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 
1966) (back pay included s a fety award to an employee discriminatorily discharged a fter having 
worked ten months without  an accident although no evidence was adduced to prove actual loss; 
uncertainty resolved against the wrongdoer). Mooney A ircraft, Inc., 156 N.L.R.  B. 32 6  ( 1 965), 
enforced, 375 F.2d 402 (5 t h  Cir. 1967) (employee com pensated at rate applicable to a position to 
which employee would h a ve been promoted in absence of discrimination. Compare Note, A 11 
Assessmem of 1he Proposed "Make- Whole " Re111ed1· in Refusal- To- Bargain Cases, 67 MICH. L .  
RE V. 374, 38 1 ( 1 968 ) (em p loyer's illegal conduct ;hould preclude any consideration o f  such a 
q�estion) wi1h Comment, Employee Reimbursement for an Employer's Refusal to Bargain: 1he 
l:x-Ce//-0 Doctrine, 46 TEX. L. REv. 758, 78 1 ( 1 96 8 )  (complaining union must prove contract 
would have been negotiated). 
That the fact of i nj u r y  m ight be assumed s h o u l d  not, however, be confused with any 
assu mptions about the amount  of compensation to be awarded. For example, the unions in Ex­
Ce//-0 equate the value of what has been lost to what otherwise would have been procured in the 
absence of the refusal to barga i n .  See text acco m panying notes 4 1 -46 supra. Hence a tacit 
ass u m ption is m ade a b o u t  t h e  a mount of com pe n s a t i o n  to be received. Although in  the 
admi n is t ration of its back pay orders the Board has l i kewise made such assum ptions,  the 
distinction should be carefu l l y  noted. 
1 8 1 . In Consolidated Edison Co. v. N L R B, 305 U.S. 197 ( 1938), the Court refused to 
enforce a Board order said to be based upon "an unwarranted and extravagant assu mption." Id. 
at 2
.
38 .  It has been argued t h at the judicial fate of the Board's Brown-Olds remedy, see generally, 
Schiller, The .V. L . R . 8. ·5 Dues Reimbursement Remedy in Perspective. 14 VAND. L. REV. 503 
( 1 96 1 ), in Local 60, Carpenters v. N L R B, 365 U.S. 65 1 ( 1 96 1 )  (Board order requiring union to  
reimburse dues not enforced since no showing of actual coercion) precludes adoption o f  Ex- Cell­
o relief without proof that an agreement would have been negotiated had the employer bargained 
m good faith .  Com ment, Employee Reimbursement for an Employer's Refusal 10 Bargain: rhe 
Ex-Cell-O Doctrine, 46 TEX� L. REV. 758, 766 ( 1 968). 
As is apparent, see n o te 1 80. supra, the sch
olarship has made much of the question whether 
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upon actual agreement, its hesitancy in the absence of mutual agreement 
upon terms to make the su ggested assumption, reflects more than a 
refusal to apply common law r ules of damage. 182 I n  this writer's view, the 
Board's hesitancy reflects a n  unwillingness to s erve other than as um­
pire183 in  the game of labor-management relat ions .  The game itself is 
for the players. 
EFFECTUATING THE POLICIE S OF THE ACT- ' To THE LION BELONGS 
THE Lro N ' s  SHARE " 
The metaphor is Professor  Cox 's.184 In  a p hrase it expresses the 
ground rule of labor-management relations u nder the N L RA. Were 
the Board to order monetary compensation in  cases of refusal to 
bargain, there is a possib i lity that something other than economic 
power would determine the terms and conditions of employment-the 
"shares " o f  labor and m anagement . The p o s s i bi l i ty presents the 
primary anticipated evi l .  
I n  Ex-Cell-O the Board cast its notice o f  hearing185 in terms of 
"returning the employees to the status quo ante. ' '  The principle is the 
basic aim of the Board 's administration of its remedial process : 
E ffectu ati on o f  the p o li c ies of the A c t  i s  achieved by 
an actual agreement can be assu med or must be proved. 1 shall add but two points. First, I think 
it is a mistake to rely upon one particular decision to build a n  argument. Something to the 
contrary is always available. Compare Note, An Assessment of the Proposed "Make- Whole" 
Remed_i• in Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, 67 MtcH. L. REV. 374, 3 8 1 ( 1968") ("(B]y analogy to 
Fibreboard, the make-whole remedy . . . could be approved without proof of whether a contract 
would in fact have resulted . . . .  ") with Local 1 3942 U M W  v. N L R B  358 F.2d 234, 237 (4th 
Cir. 1966) ("The company's position, u pheld by the Board, is that where there has been no proven 
adverse  i m pact on the existing w o r ki n g  conditions, the e mployer's unilateral decision to 
subcontract is not a violation of the Act.") Second, I think the issue which has been created is a 
strawman; it resembles the "bog of logomachy," NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 
Inc., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953), involved in  the debate over whether the proposed relief is punitive 
or remedial. Issue is inappropriately drawn when the question is whether the Board can or cannot 
assume an agreement would have been concluded. The important question is simply what will the 
assu m ption accomplish. The Board assumes when it believes w h a t  is accomplished helps 10 
effectuate the policies of the Act. And here even a wrongdoer sometimes benefits. ··we agree that 
the possi bility is strong that but for the Respondent's unlaw ful c o nduct the Union would 
ultimat�ly have secured the additional support it needed here to achieve majority status. However. 
'" cons
.•d_
eration of the majority principle in Section 9 (a) of the Act, we are not convinced that 
the policies of the Act require or even permit the issuance of a bargaining order where majority 
status has not been attained." H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 1 5 5  N . L. R .  B. 7 14, 7 15 - 16  (1965 ). 
1 82- Certainty as to the fact of i njury (have Ex-Cell-O e mployees actually lost anything) 
and a reasonable basis for calculation of the amount of compensation due (by what standards are the employees to be compensated). See Brief for the U A W  at 29-38 .  1 8 3  ["Th Bo d] . I · · · · e ar is argely an umpire engaged in enforcing established rules first agains one 
_
party and then against the other. "  S. Doc. No. 8 1 ,  86th Cong. , 2d Sess. 5 ( 1960) (Coi Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law). 
1 84 ·  Cox, The Duty o f  Fair Representation. 2 V1LL. L .  REV. 1 5 1 ,  1 63 ( 1957). 1 8 5 .  N L R B  Notice of Hearing ( May 26, 1967). 
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restoration in s o  far as poss ible of the status quo existing 
before the com m ission of  the unfa i r  labor  practice. 1 86 
29 1 
The p art ies are t o  b e  returned to  the  s it uation t hey w o u l d  have 
occ u pied had n o  u n fa i r  l abor p r a c t i c e s  occurred . O n e  l i m it i ng 
doctri ne, relevant  i n  Ex- Cell- O and c o m p a nion cases , h a s  been 
developed . It  has been given various e xpression187 but simply s tated it 
is t hat the Boa rd 's  r emedial measures are not to be used to make 
parties more than w hole. Unfort unately, i n  s ituations analogous to 
that in Ex-Cell-O, the  principle has  been i nconsistently applied .188 
186. Jacob H. Klotz, 1 3  N. L . R .  B. 746, 778 ( 1 939); accord Town & Country Mfg. Co.,  Inc., 
1 36 N . L . R . B. 1022, 1 029 ( 1 96 2 )  ( "to restore the wronged to the position he would have occupied 
but for the action of t h e  w r o ngdoer "), enforced 3 1 6 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963); Schi l l  Steel 
Products, Inc., 1 6 1 N . L . R . B. 939 ( 1 966). 
The Supreme Court has also recognized and e m braced the doctrine. "The pri m a r y  purpose 
of the provision for other a ffi r m ative relief has been held to be to enable the Board to take 
measures designed to recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there 
been no unfair labor p r a c t i c e .  Local 60, C a rpenters v. N L R B, 365 U . S .  65 1 ,  6 5 7  ( 1 96 1 )  
(concurring opinion). 
1 8 7 .  The employees are to be compensated only for "actual losses", Phelps Dodge Corp. 
v. N L R B, 3 1 3  U.S. 1 7 7 ,  1 9 8  ( 1 94 1 ); N L R B  v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 1 70, 1 77 (2d 
Cir.  1965). The Board m us t  give regard "to circ u m s t ances which may make [a remedy's] 
application to a particular situation oppressive and t herefore not calculated to effectuate a policy 
of the Act." N L R B  v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344, 349 ( 19 5 3 ); accord 
Southland Paper Mills, I nc . ,  1 6 1  N. L.R. B. 1 077 ( 1 966). "(E]mployees are not entitled by way 
of a Board remedy to p a y ment of which they were n o t  deprived or which they w ou ld not 
reasonably have received absent the unfair labor practice." New Orleans Bd. of Trade, Ltd., 1 5 2  
N . L . R. B .  1 258 ( 1965). "Restitution is not an automatic o r  inflexible remedy," Leeds & Northrup 
Co., 162 N.L.R. B. No. 87, 1 967 CCH NLRB Dec. 2 1 ,043, 64 L.R .R. M. IOIO ( 196 7 )  (dictum), 
enforced, 39 l F.2d 874 (3rd C i r .  1968). 
188.  The cases are t h ose in which an employer has taken unilateral action in violation 
of § 8 (a)(5) and the question which arises is the amount of compensation which is  a ppropriate 
to remedy the violation. The cases are analogous to Ex-Cell-O in that, because of the e mployer's 
unlawful act, the situation which would have resulted had the employer bargained in good faith 
is unknown. In my own ter ms, the problem is the extent to which the amount of compensation 
must reflect the economic position of the parties. 
The Board itself has given the problem di fferent treatment. In Wonder State Mfg. Co., 147 
N 
· L. R .  B.  1 79 ( 1 964), a n  e m ployer uni laterally discontinued an employee bonus. The Board 
refused to adopt the trial exa miner's recommendation that the employees be made whole, as it  
appeared that the employer's economic situation was such that he would have omitted the bonus 
in any event. The· Board 's review of the economic situation in Wonder State is not the typical 
approach, however. More recently, the Board has determined the amount of compensation due 
by m a k i ng the ass u m pt i o n t h a t  had good fai t h  bargaining taken place the e m p l o yee's 
representative would have resisted any reduction in economic benefits which occurred. Back pay 
is ordered at the rates of pay existing prior to the unlawful unilateral reduction. For exa m ple, in 
Overnight Trans. Co., Inc., 1 5 7  N.L.R.B. 1 1 85 (1 966), enforced 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied. 389 U . S . 838 ( 1967), a n  e m ployer a fter purchasing a plant hired his predecessor's 
employees but reduced thei r wages without prior bargaining with the employee's representative. 
The employer was ordered to make the employees whole for losses suffered as a result of the 
reduction in wages. It was stated: "Had Respondent honored its bargaining obligation . . .  it is 
well within the realm of possibility that as a result of such bargaining the wages, etc., would not 
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As the basic remedial principle, a restoration o f  the status quo 
ante presupposes the antecedent existence of something which has been 
lost . I n  Ex-Cell-O it is said t h at after court review of  8(a)(5) cases, 
after the  long delay involved, the  union returns to t h e  bargaining table 
only to b argain 
from a position of weakness rather tha n the position which 
the union would have b een in h ad the employer promptly 
fol l owing certi fication o f  t h e  union . . .  s a t  d own and 
bargained over the terms o f  a contract. 1�9 (em ph asis added) 
have been changed at all . . . . " 1 5 7  N . L . R . B. at 1 1 90 (TXD adopted by the Board). The Board, 
l ikewise, has expressed the same assumption.  Che mrock Corp., 1 5 1  N .  L. R. B. 1 074, 1082 (1965). 
On review, courts l ikewise have t a ken d ifferent approaches to the problem. In Leeds & 
Northrup Co. v. N L R B, 39 1 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1 968). en(orcing 1 62 N . L. R . B. No. 87, 1967 CCH 
NLRB Dec. 2 1 ,043, 64 L. R.R. M. 1 1 1 0, the court, although recognizing that the Board's order 
might afford the employees a better position than the union's ba rgai n ing mi ght have achieved, 
noted: "[T]he Board can hardly be said to be effectuating the policies beyond the purposes of 
the Act by resolving the doubt against the party who violated the Act . "  39 1 F.2d at 880. See 
also N L R B  v. Beverage-Air Co .. 402 F.2d 4 1 1  (4th Cir. 1 968) (in the absence of proof of a 
com pany 's perilous financial condition, were the court to make the c ontrary assu mption would 
enable the employer to benefit from his own wrong). In N LR B v. Light Boat Storage, Inc., 373 
F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1 967), however, the court limited a Board back p a y  order, after independent 
review of t h e  c o m pany's economic c o n d i t i o n .  " I n  such a si t u a t i o n  there is no reasonable 
probabi l i t y  that had the company respected its statutory duty to bargain with the union, the 
contract taking effect in 1965 would have contained terms si milar to or more favorable to the 
e mployees than those of the old contract." 373 F.2d at 770. I n  Cooper Thermometer Co. v. 
N L R B, 376 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967), denying enforcement in pertinent part. 1 60 N . L.R. B. 1902, 
an e m ployer refused to bargain over the transfer of his plant and a fter expiration of the old 
contract rehi red em ployees at reduced wage rates. The Board ordered back pay at the old contract 
rates . The court refosed to enforce the rei m bursement order. The order was viewed as based upon 
the "unsupportable assumption" that had the employer bargained in good fa ith it would have 
granted the old wage rates. "[B]ack pay at the rate provided in the old contract - would make 
the workers not merely whole but very much more; carrying over the old pay scales is something 
Cooper was demonstrably unwilling to do and the Union rather obviou sly lacked the economic 
power to compel" 376 F.2d at 69 1 .  
A further point should be noted. I n  those cases i n  which the Board has assumed that a union 
would have resisted any reduction in economic benefits, the Board has joined with its assu mption 
the declaration that: "As it is specu lati ve, and cannot be determined what rate or rates of pay 
might have governed their employment had Respondent fulfilled its obligation 10 bargai n  with 
their representative . . .  back pay due them shall be computed at the [pre-reduction] rate.  · · · "  
Chemrock Corp., 1 5 1  N . L. R . B. 1074, 1 08 2  ( 1 965). IL i s  rather apparent t h a t  the Board has thus 
created an effective bar against employer impeachment of the Board's ass u m ption . Sec Note . l.�hor /_aw Prohh•im in Plant Relocation , 77 HARV. L. REV.  1 1 00 ,  1 1 08 ( 1 964). In r.'x-Ccll-O 
this same bar, i ndeed the very language of the Board, has been ra ised i n  opposition to the 
proposed relief. The claim is that any formula for computation due is speculative . Sec note 8 5  
.<upra. T h e  trial examiner i n  Herman Wilson Lumber Co. took this position and refused to 
recom
.mend monetary relief. See TXD-7 5 7 -66 at 5 (citing Che111rock Corp. supra). Without here resolving th� issue, it is i mportant to note that in the exercise of its remedial authority. Ihe Board gives attenuon to "considerations of effective and orderly administration of the Act. " Brief for the N L R B  at 34-5. Franks Bros. v. N L R B, 3 2 1  U.S. 702 ( 1 944). One such consideration might be that with any approval of the new remedy the Board might be precluded from raising what in l he past has served as an f� t. d · . _ · e ec 1ve eterrent to employer unilateral actio n .  See note 1 17, supra. 1 89 ·  Ex-Cell-O Corp .. Case No. 25-CA-2377 (N.L. R . B. T X D  at 1 1 . Mar. 7, 1967). 
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T h us. i n  Exam i ner  Yo s e ' s  v i e w  t h t:  a n t t: c e d e n t  s o m et h i n g is  
"strength ."  But what type of stn:ngth'' The u nions have characterized 
the pre-refusal strength as . .  i n itial o rga niz ing  strength . "190 I t  has been 
lost : monetary compensat ion is rcquestt..:d to restore to the u n i o n  and 
the employees the bargain i ng power that  existt:d at the t i me of the 
violation191 and to ret urn to the union a measure o f  the bargai n ing status 
that likewise existed before the refusal to  barga in }92 There i s  no doubt 
but that the unions have su ffered a loss of prest ige, as a l leged . I t  is  also 
likely that the unions have su ffered as i nst i tut ions .  But the wr iter has 
some hesitation with the request that the Board restore bargai n i ng 
power to the un ions and e m ployt:es . The hard q uest ion in  Ex-Cell-O is 
whether pre-refusal bargain i ng power exi sted at a l l .  
The Board 's  n o t i c e  o f  h e a r i n g  r e fl e c t s  a des i re t o  r e t u r n 
employees to the sratus quo ante.  H owever. i t  may very well be t rue 
that, as a result of interi m uni lateral i ncreases i n  employee wage and 
fringe benetits,193 the empl oyees arc a l ready in the posit ion t hey w ould 
have occupied had there been no refusal  to  recognize and bargain 
with the union . The writer would suggest t h a t  t he real i nj ury in Ex­
Cell-0 .  w hat al l  the s h o u t i ng i s  a b o u t .  i s  n o t  a n y  dep r i va t i o n  o f  
employee expectancy;  rather. the employer h a s  depri ved t h e  u n i o n  of 
the esteem that comes with ret urning from the bargain i ng table and, 
in the name of  the un ion.  present i ng to t he em ployees this package of 
improved benefits }91 I n  such uni lateral i ncrease cases, j ust how an 
order compel ling an employer t o  pay e m p loyees what  i n  a l l  l ikeli hood 
a back pay proceedi n g  w i l l  show he has a l ready paid his employees195 
is designed to restore t h i s  lost esteem is d i fficult to see. But for the 
1 90. Brief for the U A W at 1 9 .  
1 9 1 .  Brief for the Teamsters a s  .·l 111iC11s Curiae a t  8 .  
192. Zinke's Foods, Inc . .  C ase No.  30-CA-372 ( N . L . R . B. T X D  a t  1 7 , Dec. 18 ,  1966). 
Compare note 77, supra. 
193. See note 55,  bsupra. 
194. In  N L R B  v. C&C Plywood, 385 U . S .  42 1 ( 1967), an e mployer unilaterally inaugurated 
a premium pay plan during the term of a bargai ning agreement. I n  sustaining the Board's finding 
of an 8(a)(5) violation, the Court noted that "the real injury in this case is to the union's status 
as bargaining representati ve." 385 U .S. n. 1 5  at 429. The Court also noted that "it would be 
di fficult to translate such da mage into dollars and cents." Id. 
If in Ex-Cell-O one accepts the analogy to contract signing cases, see note 1 3 3  supra, then 
the unions also have been deprived of the prestige that comes with presenting e mployees with a 
written contract incorporating the terms of employment. "Nothing more seriously injures the 
prestige of a union in the eyes of its members or is more effectively designed to undermine a union 
than depriving it of the earned reward of bargai n i n g . "  Ogle Protection Service, I nc . ,  149 
N.L. R . B. 545, 568 ( 1964); accord Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.  N L R B, 324 F.2d 228 (2d 
Cir. 1 963). 
195. The writer makes the assu mption here that interim unilateral wage increases would be 
deducted from any monetary liability. I shall later discuss whether the remedy, if adopted, should 
disallow such deductions. 
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m o me n t ,  h o wever, a s s u m e  t h e  absence o f  a n y  u nilateral  wage 
increases . 
Regardless of whether or not good faith bargaining would have 
resulted in a contract, the unions have suffered an injury to their 
bargaining status-their i mage as representative of employee interests . 
A hard fought election c a mp aign, an elect ion victory, and formal 
cert i fi ca t i o n  produces e m p l oy ee res p ect f o r  t h e  union . More 
importantly,  the election c ampaign develops e m ployee expectations . 
They look to  the union a nticipating successful negotiations and the 
fruition of  campaign promises . When an employer then refuses even 
to meet with the union f o r  neg otiat ion a n d  i n sists rather upon a 
cou r s e  o f  adj udicat i o n  f o r  t h e  next t w o  o r  t hree y ears, these 
expectati ons are frustrated a n d  the u n io n ' s  status  as bargaining 
representative has been severely diminished. T h e  writer would have 
been much happier with the Board had its n otice of hearing given 
exp l ic i t  r ecognition to t h i s  l oss-h ad it e x pressed an interest in 
restoring to the unions this  antecedent bargain i n g  status. 
This loss of  bargain i n g  status, however, may have little to do 
with w hether, after court review of section 8 (a)(5)  orders, a contract is 
eventually negotiated . Here the determinant i s  bargaining power-the 
will ingness of employees to fight to obtain economic benefits.19fi A 
hornbook labor reality w ill  decide the quest i o n : "To put it in a 
phrase, the strike or the fear of a strike is the m otive power that 
makes collective bargain ing operate. "197 I n  Ex- Cell-O the unions 
likewise request a restoration of bargaining p ower. Their request, 
however, is inconsistent with a second labor reality, one which even 
the u n ions acknowledge. The argument made i s  that,  in those cases 
where bargaining commences in good faith, a gree ments are al most 
always reached. After the  d elay of judicial review, h owever, contracts 
are only obtained in a pproximately one third o f  such cases . Therefore, 
s o m e h o w  the del ay r e d uces  barg a i n i n g  p ow e r  w h ich m us t  be 
restored.19M The return of t he union to the bargaining table is to be 
correlated with a compensatory payment to t h e  e mployees in order 
that "the union can start from a fair positio n .  "199 The writer would 
. l 96 .  "'The employees need not strike against their will. And they generally possess s
onic 
innue�ce over �he terms of the bargain, if only because the contract will depend, in the last 
an�lysi�, on
_ 
their
_ 
wiUingness to fight to obtain it." Bok, The Regulation of" Campaign Tactie< 1� 
Ripre.H ntation l:leC11on.1 Under r h e  Narional Labor Relation� 4 cr 78 HARV L. REV. 38.  1 3 ·  
( 1964). 
. . • . 
197 .  A ·  Cox & D. BoK. CASES ON LABOR LAW 905 (6th ed. 1 965) .  
1 9 8  "S" h · h · mce t e basic remedial principle is to restore the status quo, it is essential that 1 c Board restore to the union and the e mployees the bargaining power that existed at the time <Jf the violation." Brief for the Teamsters as .4 micus Curiae al 8 
199. Brief for Local 140 1 ,  Retail Clerks at 26. 
. 
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suggest quite the cont rary; the barga i n i n g  power of the u nion and its 
members is likely to be greatest a fter court  review and the eventual 
commencement of negotiat ions .  The U A W  ag rees : 
O n ce recog n i t i o n  h a s  been e x t e n d e d  t o  t h e  u n i o n  a n d 
economic bargaining has begun.  i t  i s  clear to the employees 
that the issue is no longer whet her they wi l l  have a u nion but 
what  they can win  by sup po rt i ng i t s  e fforts to  g a i n  a n  
optimum result .  By con trast. a t  the stage where e mployers 
like Ex-Cell-O refuse recognit ion in vi o lation of. the statute, 
they are challenging the very status and survival of t he u n i o n .  
I n  contrast to an econ omic stri ke. i n  t h a t  s i tuation it is o ften 
a much more onerous task for the u n i o n  to c a l l  and m a i n t a i n  
a strike . . . .200 
The delay itse lf hard ly dimi nishes barga i n i ng power .  A nd i f  a fter 
review the willingness of employees to str i k e  is g reatest, a n d  yet "the 
employer may well escape with no contract  at  a l 1 "201 i t  would seem 
that had the employer promptly sat down a n d  bargai ned i m m ediately 
following certi fica t i o n  the res u l t  w o u l d  h a ve been the s am e- a l l  
bargaining and n o  b a rga i n .  I t  i s  l i k e l y  t ha t  t h e  a l leged i nj u ry t o  
an tecede nt barga i n i n g  p o w e r  fo r w h i c h  t h e  u n i o n s  r e q u e s t  a 
compensatory payment is no n-existen t .  The pro ffered data suggest 
only that the employees were not  w i l l i n g t o  fi g h t  h ard e no u g h .202 
Curiously enou gh. the empirical studies o f  Professor  Ross support 
such a conclusion : 
How d oes an employer escape the d ut y  t o  bargain a n d  avoid 
permanent u n i on re l a t i ons'? An e xa m i n at i o n  of  our cases  
leads to the b e l i e f  t h a t  u n i o n s  c a n  b e  s o  w e a k  t h a t  n o  
stri ke- unfair labor pract ice str i k e  o r  not - i s  possible. Of 
what value is a strike wh en onlv  a small fraction of the 
employees go ou1.no3 (emphasis added) 
What is suggested here i s  s i m p l y  t h a t  e m p l oyers w h o  do use 
judicial review as a "union bust ing "204 tactic do so w ithout fear o f  an 
200. Brief for the UA W at 4 7-8. 
20 1 .  Id. at 19 .  
202. In Herman Wilson Lu11 1ber Co. the employees a fter striking for two weeks returned 
to their jobs and the strike was bro ken . . s·c·e note 1 6 1 ,  supra. 
203. P. Ross. THE GOVE R S :-.!EST AS SOURCE OF UNION POWER 203 ( 1 965). Professor Ross' 
comment was made after reviewing those cases in his e mpirical study in which meritorious 
refusal 
to bargain charges were filed, the em ployers had been judicially ordered to bargain, 
and yet no 
contracts resulted.  
204. For a discussion o f  unilateral action as a l ike "union busting" technique see Cox & 
Du I R · · . . · · b h ·\: · / Labor Relations Board. 63 HARV. n op, egula11on of ( olil'Clt H' &rga1111ng . 1 ·  r e . a11ona . 
L. REV. 389, 420 ( 1950). I n  addition to an insistence upon judicial review, the employers m
 Ex-
Cell-0 and companion cases unilaterally increased wages. See note 5 5  supra. 
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u n fair  labor practice str i k e .205 They k n o w  q uite well that their 
employees are unwilling t o  abandon their j o b s  a n d  strike the plant. 
This p os ition, no doubt,  i s  a n  unpopular o ne ,  s ince it raises an 
unpopular  inquiry, "\V h y  d i d n 't  the u n i o n  s t r i k e? "  The question 
elicits various responses. I t  is argued that forcing the union to strike 
disparages the union in  the eyes of the employees .206 The argument, 
however, seems to assume t hat a strike w ould h ave been unsuccessful . .. 
Otherwise it is difficult t o  s ee h o w  a successful strike would result in 
any disparagement of the u n io n .  I n  Ex- Cell-O the employers have also 
raised the question a nd t h e  U A W  has provided a second response: 
"[l ]t would make a duty o f  self-help out o f  w h a t  has always been 
viewed only as a right o f  self-help . "207 Here there is  a return to Hohfel­
dia n  legalese; and not only is the contention a departure from strict 
H o hfeldian construction,208 b u t  it also is ' 'a bit of verbal logic" 
which disregards the realities o f  labor-management relations.20' This 
writer would suggest t h a t  the absence o f  a s t r i k e  is the relevant 
desideratum, and perhaps t h i s  is precisely w h a t  Judge Friendly had in 
mind when, on review o f  a b ack pay order, he o bserved that the union 
"rather o bviously " lacked the bargain i ng p o w er to compel the 
205. It is interesting to note that Professor Ross considers an unfair labor practice strike 
the most effective method of enforcing the duty to bargain. In his empirical study the unfair labor 
practice strike, or threat to strike, accounted for employer compliance with the law in cases settled 
prior to formal action. "The bite of the law lies precisely here." P. Ross, THE GOVERNMENT AS 
A SOURCE OF UNION POWER 203 ( 1965). And see note 1 4  supra. I n  Ex-Cell-O the claim is that 
the employer's alleged defense to the refusal to bargain charge is  raised as a ruse, purely in bad 
faith. I f  the employer's action is as egregious as claimed, then the employees would not be 10 
fear of  losing their jobs were t h e y  t o  stri ke, as they are e ntit led to reins tat emen t  u po n 
unconditional application and the e mployer must discharge any replacements hired . See NLR B 
v. Stevenson Bric v & Block Co., 393 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1968); N ote, A Sur vev of Legal Renu:dil'S 
Part I- Board Remedies . 54 VA. L .  REV. 38,  82 (1968). In addition to "initial orga nizi n g 
strength," see text accompanying note 1 95 supra. this employment security would seem to mak
e 
it easier for a union to invoke the sanction of an unfair l a b o r  practice stri ke to meet the 
employer's bad faith action upon post-certification or card demand for bargaining, compare the 
circumstances of an economic strike, N L R B  v. McKacKay Radio & Tel. Co . . 304 U.S .  33J 
(l�38) (employer free to hire permanent replacements for those employees partici pating in the 
strike) .
. Arguably, the agsence of an u n fair labor practice strike would suggest that the emp
loy
_
ees 
were si mply unwilling to strike and that the union was too wea k  to convince them otherwise. 
Again the studies of Professor Ross support such a conclusion: 
But it is important to point out that this kind of compulsion u pon an employer depends 
upon 
_
the existence of a certain a m ount of union strength. I f  the union lacks sufficient 
�o�esivcness to go out on strike at the time of the refusal to bargain, this kind of sancuon 
1s moperallve. 
P. Ross. THE GoVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF UNION POWER 243 ( 1 965).  206· H . K. Porter Co., Inc.,  1 5 3  N . L. R. B. 1 370, 1373 ( 1965) (TXD adopted by the Board ). noted m 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 777 ( 1968). 
207 · Brief for the UAW at 46. 
, . . 
208· Hohfeldians would label the strike as the exercise of a "privilege," s1'<' Cook. The L 1tlu r of Jurisprudence in the Solution of Legal Problems in LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS ( l9Z8 l· 209. See text accompanying notes 197-2()() , supra. 
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concession upon w h i ch t he Board had p red i ca ted the a m o u n t  o f  b ack 
pay to be aw arded .21 0 A lt hough i t  i s  t r u e  t h at the A c t s o u g h t  t o  
obviate the need for stri kes to en force t he d u t y  to barga i n ,2 1 1 i t  is  also 
true that a union, if a ble,  wou ld h a r d l y  hesitate to c l ose down an 
employer 's plant to compel bargai n ing . The citat ion212 of pol icy a lone 
should not be held a bar to considerat i o n  of a n  appropriate,  a l t h o ugh 
unpopular, question . I t  is also ag reed t h at.  e ven a ft e r  1 94 7, t he Act 
sti ll seeks to encourage col lective h a rg a i n i ng .m But the i s s ue i n  Lt­
Cell-0 is collective barga i n i ng o n  w h a t  t e r m s .  The N LR B  reports  are 
filled with cases in  w h i ch a u n i o n  w o n  an elect i on but lacked the 
econo mic power necessary to achieve a n y t h i n g ot her t h a n  pro forma 
bargai ning.2 1 1  A rgua bly, the s i tuat ion i n  Fx- Ce//- 0 a n d  c o m p an ion 
cases is no di ffere n t . A nd if t h i s  i s  c o r rect , rat h e r  t h a n  r es t o r ing 
bargaining power, the req uested m o n e t a ry compens a t i o n ,  i f  ordered, 
would provide bargai n i n g power in t h e  fi rst i n stance.2 1"  U p o n  r eturn 
to the barga ining table.  t he posi t i o n  o f  t he parties w ou ld be quite 
di fferent from that which would have obta i n ed b u t  for the empl oyer's 
refusal to barg a i n .  The mo neta ry l i a b i l i ty could n o w  b e  used by the 
unions as an aid in bargaini ng to proc ure add i t ional  benefits-- benefits 
over and  above t h os e  t h a t  w o u ld h a ve b e e n  n eg o t i a t e d  had the 
employe r  not refused t o  bargain .2 ' i; 
2 10. Coopc:r Thermometer Cu. v .  � I. R B  . . 176 l- .2d 6 8 4 .  69 1 (2d Cir .  1 9 67): see note 1 86, 
<I/fl({/. 
2 1 1 .  29 u . s.c .  § 1 5 1  ( 1 964 ). 
2 1 2. '"The e xpress purpose of the Acl was lo obviat.: the need for stri kes to enforce the 
right lo bargai n." Brief for the U A W  al 47 (citing 29 U . S . C .  � 1 5 1  ). 
2 1 3 .  Co111pa"' Lesnick. Fsrah/ishnll'nt u/ Ba rgaining R ig/11s Without an .V L R  8 Electio11, 
65 MICH. L .  REV.  85 1 ,  865 ( 1 967 ) ( ' ' [ l it is s i m ply not so that prior to 1 947 the act sought to 
encourage collective barga ining but that it does so no more . " )  ll'ith Cox, So111e �spects of' the 
Labor Ma11age111en t Relation..- .-l et. 1 947. 6 1  H A R V. L .  RE V. l ,  44 ( 1 947)  ('The Taft- Hartley 
amendments represent an abandonment of the pol icy of affirmatively encouraging the spread of 
union organization and collective bargaining. " )  
2 1 4 .  Cox. The /)ut 1· to &m�ain in Good Fait h .  7 1  HARV.  L. REV. 1 40 1 ,  1 4 1 3  ( 1 958) .  
2 1 5. In situations
. 
where .an employer not  o n l y  refuses to bargain but also e ngages in 
coercive conduct in violation of the Act, i t  m i g h t  be a r gued that these actions diminish the 
employees' willingness to strike and thus dissi pate bargain i n g  power. Jo r Silk cases, see note 36 
s11pra. provide an example. H o wever, it has be�n a rgued that liability under such circu mstances 
would no longer be founded u pon an employer's wrongful deprivation of collective bargaining 
rights in violatio n of 8 (a ) (5 ), but would more resem ble a penalty exacted i n  reparation of an 
employer's 8 (a ) ( I ), e t c . ,  v iolations.  See Note, Mon etar r Co mpensation as a Re11 1edy for an 
F.mplorer Re/i1sal to Bargain. 56 GEO. L.J 474.  5 1 1  ( 1 9 68).  
It might also be argued that, as the union s have suffered a loss of status, the compensatory 
payment would restore this Joss. Certai nly the payment would improve the u nion's standing with 
its members, but I fail  to see, however, just how c o m pensating the employees for something they 
were unwilling to fight for in the first instance, making them more than whole, is  an ap
.
propriate 
method of restoring a loss to the union.  Furth e r m ore, how one would measure this loss of 
bargaining status, see n o t e  1 94 rnpra . a n d  j u s t  h ow t h i s  loss is related to the a mount o f  
compensation the unions suggest t h e  employees should receive present difficult problems. 
2 16 .  Jn its brief to the Board, the Teamsters suggested that the back pay liability would 
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BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS GENERALLY- BEYOND THE " PAYOR AND 
PA YEE " 
This fear that, if ordered in Ex-Cell- O, the monetary remedy 
would provide bargaining power where none previously existed extends 
beyond the immediate parties involved-beyo n d  the "payor and 
payee . '  '217 This article has suggested218 that  a d o ption of  the new 
remedy w ould encourage those employers who would otherwise use 
judicial review as a tactic t o  turn to pro forma bargaining in the first 
instance. Negotiations w o uld begin im mediately,  but they would 
produce the form rather than the substance of bargaining. In order to 
reach s uch cases the B o a r d  wo uld have t o  p r ovide monetary 
compensation for bad faith bargaining during negotiations for a first 
contract, and the problem which this presents is how, if at all, the 
Board would reach the troublemakers without creating trouble. In 
resolving the question of m onetary compensation,  the Board will have 
to e x a m i n e  the probable  e ffects of the r e m ed y  on bargaining 
relationships generally. I ts range of inquiry can n ot be confined to Ex­
Cel/-0 a lone.219 
Other reasons, quite i ndependent of the p rediction about the 
effects o f  the remedy on the i mmediate parties, support the view that, 
after the adoption of a monetary remedy in cases of outright refusal, 
the issue would immediately arise in cases o f  b ad faith bargaining 
during negotiations for a first contract . There i s ,  first, a notable 
tendency on the part of parties unsatisfied with the bargain as struck 
to seek relief in another forum, namely, before the Board .220 Also, 
persistent attempts are made to compel221 the Board to provide relief in 
enable the employees to negotiate "additional contract benefits" in exchange for less than the 
full a mount of back pay due. Brief for the Teamsters as A m icus Curiae at 7 . Regardless of 
whether my conclusions about the conditions which would have e xisted but for the refusal to 
bargain are correct, it is clear from the position enunciated in the brief of the Teamsters that the 
unions regard the liability, once decreed, a s  an aid to future bargai ning. 
2 1 7 .  See text acco mpanying notes 20-22 supra. 
2 1 8 .  See text accompanying notes 1 62- 164, supra. . 
2 19 .  "The adversary character o f  the proceedings through which the N L R B makes its 
decisions not only curtails the scope of investigation, but during the trial focuses attention on the 
particular case at the expense of broader considerations of policy." Cox & Dunlop. Regulatii//I 
of Collective Bargaining b.r the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389·429 
( 1 950). 
220. See Cox, The Duty to Borgain in Good Faith. 7 1  HARV.  L. REV. 1 40 1 ,  1 439 ( 1 958)  
("If th t · 
· h /11111· . . .
e con ract is too one-sided, the loser may file unfair-labor-practice charges.); Gra am'. .  · s  
f.ffem ve  ls the National Labor Relations Board. 48 MINN. L. REV. 1 009, 1 047 ( 1964 ) ( 
I t  
.1. also true that too many union officials rely to an unwarranted extent on N L R B  intervention in their quarrels with management . . . .  " ). 
22 1 · The reference is to claims that, were the Board not to order the requested relief. the Board would have abused its discretion. See note 149 supra. "(Section l O (c)) co111111and5 the Board to remedy unfair labor practices by affirmative measures which go beyond mere cease and 
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otherw ise  d i s t i ng u i s h a b l e  c a s e s ;  a n d ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  B o a r d  h as 
enunciated a policy o f  m a ki ng such dist inctions ,222 the attempts have 
met with some success .223 
Perhaps it has been m istakenly a s s umed that the Board would 
not w a n t  to m a k e  m on et a ry re l i e f  a va i l ab le o n  a b r o a d  s c a le , 
encompassing all cases of  refusal t o  bargain.  However, there are good 
reasons why such relief should not be available, even in c ases of bad 
faith barga ining during neg otiat ions for an init ial  contract . 
It would generally be a greed t hat m onetary liabi lity, once decreed, 
provides additional leverage at the bar gaining table. Repeatedly, it is  
said that the very purpose of a bac k pay o rder is  to assure " meaningfull 
barga in i ng " when t h e  part ies renew negot i a t i ons .224 O n e  w o nders 
whether the same could not be said for t he potential obligation to pay 
compensat ion- th at w h i c h  would exi s t  were the Board t o  make 
monetary relief available for bad faith b arga ining during negotiations 
desist orders ... Ervin Hearings 569 (statement of Bernard Kleiman, General Counsel, United 
Steelworkers). In Long Lake Lumber Co., 1 60 N . L. R . B. No. 1 23,  1966 CCH N L R B  Dec. 20, 
75 1 .  63 L. R . R . M .  1 1 60 ( 1 966). the Board, although finding a violation of 8 (a)(5), refused relief 
on the ground that the violation was de 111ini111is. The union appealed on the ground that, with 
the finding of an 8 (a )(5) violation, for the Board to refuse relief (cease and desist order) was an 
abuse of discretion. The claim was sustained and the court remanded in order that the Board order 
the requested relief. Local 3 - 1 0, Woodworkers v. N L R B, 380 F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir. 1967). "The 
Act says that the Board . . .  'shall issue . . .  . '  We. think these words mean what they say 
. " 380 l'.2d at 63 1 .  I think it safe to predict that similar claims would be made for monetary 
relief for 8 (a)(5) violations in cases other than outright refusals to bargain. 
222. "The Board may conclude, in ont" case, that no back pay or other a ffirmative relief 
is required. and. in another case, that a bac k  award is necessary, where although the basic 
substantive violat ions are si milar or identical. they occurred in different contexts ." Royal Plating 
& Polishing Co., Inc.,  148 N . L . R . B. 545, 549 ( 1 964). 
I have already referred to one such "different context," namely, where the employer's refusal 
to bargain is not based upon any hostility to the collective bargaining process but upon a sincere 
belief that the Board has erred in its certification of the union, for example. The difficulty arises 
however, of determining when such "different contexts" exist-a question of intent. And the 
problem is compounded by the fact that, not only is it l i kely that demands for monetary relief 
would be made in almost all cases of 8 (a)(5) violations, see note 221  supra. but any demands 
made are likely to be joined with the charge that the employer's refusal was in bad faith. Such a 
charge was made in Herman Wilson Lum ber Co . ; the empl oyer was accused of deliberate 
procrastination. The trial examiner rejected the accusation. See T XD-757-66 at 4,5.  For the extent 
to which a charge of bad faith refusal is pressed, see U nited Ins. Co., 1 54 N . L . R .  B. 38 ( 1 965) 
(General Counsel agreed that there was no quest ion of  deliberate procrastination; the union 
attempted to prove otherwise). The union then carried its case to a court of appeals for review 
on the charge of bad faith. The court rejected the accusation, 360 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
223. "All too frequently  a remedial device, once adopted, continues to be used in a 
rubberstamp fashion regardless o f  factual differences in succeeding cases." Note, A Survey of 
L�ga/ Remedies Part /- Board Remedies. 54 VA. L .  REV. 38,  94 ( 1968); accord Note, The Need 
for Creative Orders Under Section !Ole} of the National Labor Relations A ct .  1 1 2 U.  PENN. L. 
REV. 69, 70 (1963). . 
224. Royal Plating & Polishing Co .. Inc. ,  1 60 N . L. R . B. 990, 998 ( 1 966); Fibreboard 
Paper 
Prods. Corp. v. N L R B, 379 U.S.  203, 2 1 6  ( 1 964). 
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for an intitial contract. A hypothetical presents the  problem . I magine 
that the Weak Union has  j ust been cert i fied a s  the bargaining 
representative at the Exceptional  Company. During the election 
campaign the union promised to "deliver" $3 a n  h our.  The union is 
weak because the employees a re u nwill ing to strik e .  The company is 
exceptional  because it knows the employees are u nwill ing to strike; 
and, although the employer intends to reach an a greement, he is not 
prepared to pay more than $2 an hour. A fter  s e veral months of 
bargaining the union complain s  of bad faith bargaining and files an 
8(a)(5) charge. After several m ore months agreement is reached on all 
issues except wages. Final ly,  the union informs the c o m pany that 
unless the company agrees t o  $ 2 . 5 0  an hour, negotiations wil l  end and 
the u n i o n  w i l l  press its u n fa i r  labor pract i c e  c h a rge seeking  a 
compensatory payment of $3 a n  hour-just what t he union has been 
able to procure from Exceptional 's  competitors i n  the same area. 
Assume that Exceptional i s  n o  troublemaker; were he to refuse the 
union ' s  d emands, an adjudication of the 8 (a) (5)  charge would not 
show bad faith bargaini n g .  T h e  risks involved m i g h t  be great, 
however. For example, the employer realizes that the question of bad 
faith is one of intent, a difficult determination t o  m ake. Certainly the 
union has been vociferous in its charge of bad faith.m And perhaps 
the e m p loyer has heard t h e  charge that tr ial  e x a m i ners are not 
overwhel mingly neutral .226 I n addition, while negotiating the union 
made a point of exhibiting the numerous contracts obtained from 
Excepti o nal 's  competitors;  a n d ,  al though E x ce ptional  has some 
evidence of financial inability,  it hardly m atches the abundance of 
evidence spread before h i m  by the union negotiators.  Exceptional 
decides to agree to $2 .50. 
Ad mittedly, the hypothetical is overdrawn. The i ssue, however, is 
to what e xtent; the writer wou l d  not concede that he has presented an 
i maginary.evil. 
In the hypothetical, the union utilized sect ion  8 (a)(5) to procure 
something it arguably would have been unable t o  o btain otherwise.22i 
225. See note 222 wpra. 
226. "A prevalent criticism of the labor bar is that Examiners have too great a tendency 
10 credit the General Counsel's witnesses and discredit the witnesses for the respondent." Murphy. 
Thi• National Labor Relations Board-- A n  Appraisal. 52 MINN. L . REV.  8 1 9 ,  829 ( 1 9
68). l'or 
an extreme ei1ample, see N LR B  v. Stevenson Brick & Block Co., 393 F. 2d 234. 237 (4th Ci r. 
1 968) ("Wh'I h Bo · · · 1 e t e ard · · · was content t o  accept the conclusion of the Tnal Examiner. we ::: .unable 10 do so because it was de:i ved in .part from a palpable misinterpretation of certai.n llmony and a disregard of other evidence dtrectly bearing thereo n . " ). The i mportant point is 
not whether or not such b. · t b 1 h · 
· · · t . 1as ex1s s ut on y t at employers such as Ei1cept1onal think 11 ex1s s .  227·  C ompare United Steelworkers v. N L R B, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C.  Cir.  1 967 ), notfd ill J S  
U CHI.  L .  REv. 777. 787 ( 1 968) ('The i m position o f  a dues chec k o ff a s  a remedy in a refusa l  
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The tactic is not an unu sual one. Unions frequently file refusal to 
bargain  charges to c om pel recognition228 a n d  the ambiguity of the 
section has been used by u nions otherwise lacking in econo mic power 
to broaden their participation in industrial decision making .229 The 
union also filed what was assu med to be a n on-meritorous eharge. 
This too is nothing unusual .  Sixty-nine per cent of all charges of 
refusal to bargain are d i s mi ssed or withdrawn because the em ployer 
has not engaged in the a l leged misconduct .230 It would seem that the 
conduct of the union was representative rather than atypical .  
I n  the  hypothetical,  the  potential obligation to pay compensation 
also i n fluenced t h e  c o n d uct  o f  the e m p l oyer .231 It restrained h i s  
freedo m  to agree o r  d isagree with the union 's proposal. The threat o f  
pressing t h e  8 (a)(5)  c h arge was used as a weapon of eco n o m ic 
coercion .232 
T h e  concern h e r e  i s  for ot her  e m p l oyers a n d  other  
unions233-those not  party to any bad faith conduct. Once the point o f  
general success o f  the d u ty to bargain has been made explicit,234 the 
effects of any adoption of m onetary relief i n  cases of refusals arising 
during negotiations for an i nitial contract upon what previously have 
been success ful ly estab l i s hed barg a i n i ng relati onships m u s t  b e  
considered . One o f  the p olicies of the N L R A  i s  that the process of 
collective bargaining is  to be free and voluntary .235 The parties are to 
have broad latitude to agree or disagree with each others ' contract 
proposals .236 Were the Board to . redress bad faith bargaining during 
to bargain case, instead of restoring the parties to their original positions, in fact gives the union 
something which, but for the 8 (a ) (5 )  violation, it probably could not have achieved); Note, A 
Survey of Legal Remedies Part /- Board Remedies, 54 VA. L. REV. 38, 65 (1968) (union should 
not be given the windfall of bargaining order it would not have been in a position to demand 
absent employer illegal conduct). 
228.  Ross, supra note 1 2, at 24-29. 
229. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National labor Relations 
Board. 63 HARV. l. REV. 389, 39 1 ( 1 9 50). 
230. Ross, supra note 1 2, at 3 3 .  
23 1 .  'The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method 
of regulating conduct and controlling policy." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, J59 us 236, :?47 ( 1959). 
. 232. That suits may be used as weapons of economic coercion has been recognized. See 
Linn v. Local 1 14, Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 64 ( 1 966). 
233 .  In the administration o f  its remedial powers, the Board has given consideration to the 
effects of the imposition of any particular remedy u pon the interests of "other employers" not 
party to the im mediate suit. See Garwi n  Corp. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
234. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra. 
235 . "The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace. "  
Local 1 74, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour 369 U.S. 95, 1 04 (1962). 
236. "The law does not require employers or employees to agree to each other's contract proposals; it assures them broad latitude to agree or disagree with each other. · · · "  McCulloch, 
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initial  contract negotiations w ith monetary relief, the mere availability 
of the relief may disrupt what should otherwise be free and voluntary 
negotiations. And although one m ight agree that "vehement concern 
for the employer's freedo m  to bargain is rather misdirected "237 in 
cases of actual pro forma bargaining, such a concern would not seem 
inappropriate in cases like that presented in the hypothetical. 
Those instances where previ ously a union ,  although unsatisfied 
with the bargain, rievertheless reached agreement and a successful 
relationship later emerged a l s o  come to mind. Those cases in which 
the union signs despite the employer ' s  u n fairness because 
almost any contract is p referable to a hiatus i n  which the 
u n i o n  can offer its m e m bers nothing except t h e  hope of 
winning an unfair labor practice case.238 
With the adoption of moneta ry relief, the hope of winning an unfair 
labor practice case would become all the m or e  meani ngful . The 
existence of the remedy would place a premium upon making a strong 
record for Board scrutiny; and such a diversion from the "task of 
hammering out a labor agreement . . .  dimini shes the likelihood that 
negotiations wi l l  be success fu l .  "239 Experi e n c e  w ith compulsory 
arbitration suggests that the evil envisioned is a very real one. When 
relief is available elsewhere, a n  unsatisfied party rarely trades out an 
agreement; there is little real  collective bargaining .2w He turns rather 
Past. Present. and Future Remedies Under Section 8!a}(5 } of the N L R A .  19 LAB. L.J. 1 3 1 ,  132 
(1968). And see Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations. 64 HARV. L. REV. 2 1 1 ,  229 
(1950) (basic policy underlying N L R A  is that of free negotiation);  Wellington, Freedom o( 
Contract and the Collective Bargaining A greement. 1 12 U. PENN. L .  REv. 467 ( 1 964). 
237. Note, Forced Concession as a Possible NLR B Remedy. 68 CO LUM. L. REV. 1 192. 
1 200 ( 1968). 
238.  Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith. 71 HARV. l. REV. 140 1 ,  1 439 (1958). 
239 . Id. at 1440. A procedural point should here be noted. It is well settled that the filing 
of an 8 (a)(5) charge does not relieve an employer of his duty to bargain. Kit Mfg. Co., Inc ..  142 
N.L. R . B. 957 (1963); Greer Stop Nut Co., 162 N . L.R.B. 626 (1967). Nor does interim execution 
of an agreement by the charging party waive any right possessed as a result of an employer's 
bad faith conduct antecedent to the execution of the agreement. Henry I .  Segal Co., Inc. v. 
N L R B, 340 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1965). Were monetary relief available, once during the course of 
negotiations a union files an 8 (a)(5) charge, although an employer would have a duty to continue 
negotiations if so requested by the union, he might be hesitant to reach any agreement. He would 
not know whether any agreement so reached would reflect the full  extent of his labor costs, since 
the union might press the 8 (a)(5) charge in an attempt to seek monetary relief for the alleged 
refusal to
_ 
bargain. Also. he could not insist that the union drop its charge as a condition precedent 
to execution �f any agreement which might be reached, as such a demand is itself a violation of 
§ S(a)(5). Heider Mfg. Co., 9 1  N . L. R. B. 1 1 85 (1950); Lion Oil Co.  v. N L R B, 245 F. 2d 376 
(8th Ctr.  1957). 
240· A Cox & D. BoK. CASES ON LABOR LAW 905 (6th ed. 1 965)  ("During the war when the War Labor Board adjudicated disputes there was no real collective bargaining. If  management and labor found themselves at issue, they rarely traded out agreement Why should they? Each side hoped that it might get more favorable terms from the govern ment.''i. 
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to the alternative forum i n  the hope of p rocuring more favorable 
terms, instead of attempting painstakingly to work out a volu ntary 
agreement.20 The adoption of a monetary remedy designed to redress 
pro forma bargaining might serve only to encourage the very evil the 
remedy seeks to eliminate.242 
U N I LATER A L  ACTION- TO R U N  TW ICE AS FAST 
"A slow sort oj country! " said the Queen. "Now, here, 
you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the 
same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run 
at least twice as fast as that! "- Through the Looking- Glass 
I n  Ex-Cell-O, the unions  suggest that a monetary remedy, if 
ordered in cases of outright refusals, might only encourage a second 
evil-interim unilateral wage increases .243 The troublem akers would 
only run twice as fast;  i n  order to avoid the embarassment of h aving 
to pay their employees p ursuant to the Board 's demand, they would 
unilaterally increase w ages prior to the adj udication of the 8 (a)(5) 
charge. A nd the unions invite the Board l ikewise to run twice a s  fast. 
The Board should announce that any such increases are not to be 
deducted from the amount found to be due the employees upon adjudi­
cation of the refusal to bargain charge.244 
The proposal seems to make sense. Certainly, this writer would 
agree with the predication;245 were the Board to permit the deduct i on, 
it is likely that "union-busting" employers would turn to this tactic i n  
order t o  frustrate adm inistration of the proposed remedy. The rule 
w o u l d  serve as an e ffect ive deterrent .246 T here is one pro b l e m ,  
24 1 .  Frey, The Logic of Collective Bargaining and A rbitration. 12 LAW & CONTEM. PRoe. 
246, 273 ( 1947 ). 
242. There is also the problem of the effect of the compensatory remedy, if adopted, upon 
the willingness of parties to settle informally their disagreements. See note 146 supra. 
243. See text accompanying notes 190-195, supra. 
244. See note 58 supra. 
245 .  I would  go o n e  s t e p  further, however. I n  a ddition to the prediction a bo u t  
encouragement o f  unilateral wage increases, with which I agree, I would suggest that the remedy, 
if adopted, would encourage hard core employers to engage in pro forma bargaining fro m  the 
outset. See text accompanying notes 1 62- 1 67, supra. 
246. But see Republic Strei Corp. v. NLR B, 3 1 1  U.S. 7 ( 1940). In Republic the Court 
noted that "it is not enough to justify the Board's requirements to say that they would have the 
effect of deterring persons from violating the Act." 3 1 1  U.S. at 12. The Court's pronouncement 
usually finds its way into judicial opinions when the Board's order is thought by a reviewing c�urt 
to impinge upon other policies of the Act. See Garwin Corp. v. N L R B, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir . ), 
cert. denied. 387 U.S. 942 ( 1967). One such policy is that the employees are not to be made more 
than whole, and, arguably, were deductions for unilateral wage increases disall�wed, the 
employees would be placed in a better position than that which they would have occupied a bsent 
the unfair labor practices (refusal to bargain and unilateral wage increase). The more reasonable 
approach, however, would seem to be that taken by Mr. Justice Harlan in Local 60, Carpenters 
v. N LR B, 365 U.S. 65 1 ,  659 ( 196 1 )  ("Deterrence is certainly a desirable even though not in itself 
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however . Although recogmzmg the tactic for what  it is-an action 
designed t o  undermine the union 's  bargaining statu s247-the Board has 
refused to redress the act u a l  i nj u ry involved . R ather, in cases of 
unilateral wage changes, the Board has confined its remedial action to 
an elimination of any detri ment suffered by the e mplo yees .248 The 
injury to  the u n ion as barg a i n i ng representative,  a n  i njury to its 
status, g oes unredressed. For example, in Indianapolis Grove Co. ,  
/nc.249 an employer unlawfully refused to recognize and bargain with a 
union whi le at the same time placing into effect a w age increase. The 
trial examiner recommended that, in order to restore the status quo, 
the employer be ordered to pay the employees a n  a m ount of money 
equal t o  that which the e m p l oyees had received pursuant to the 
unlawful wage increase. The e xa miner's rationale was that the order 
was necessary to eliminate the unlawful bargaining advantage the 
employer had derived fro m  his  action.  Without expla nation, the 
Board refused to adopt the examiner's recommen d ation.  
The writer would suggest that the examiner  correctly identified 
the problem . His solution, however, is puzzling; and, although one 
can only guess, perhaps his solution is what troubled the Board . The 
injury identified was the disparagement of the u n i o n  resulting from 
the employer's action . In effect, the employer announced to his 
employees that a union was u n necessary to protect t heir interests . The 
payment recommended, however, was one to the employees rather 
than to the union. Although the receipt of the money
. 
might improve 
employee respect for the u n i on ,  it is difficult  t o  see any rational 
relationship between the inj u ry suffered by the union250 and the rather 
arbitrary selection of the amount of compensation recommended to 
redress that injury. The same d ifficulty is presented by the proposal to 
disallow the deduction of any interim wage increases from the amount 
a sufficiently justifying effect of a Board order."). In Local 60 Mr. Justice Harlan was concerned 
with what also is here the real difficulty; namely, the relationship between the injury suffered and 
the amount of compensation issued to redress that injury. See 365 U .S. at 659-60. 
247. I n Crown Tar & Chemical Works, Inc.,  1 54 N . L R . B. 562 ( 1965), an em ployer's 
unilateral wage increase was characteri zed as a tactic designed to chill the union's standing in 
the eyes of the employees. And see text accompanying notes 1 89- 193 ,  supra. 
248. In Herman Sausage Co . . 1 22 N . L R. B. 1 68 ( 1 958), an e m ployer u nilaterally increased 
wages a n d  decreased fringe benefits w h i l e  negotiating with a union over the terms of a new 
contracL The employer's actions were t a ken in disregard to the bargaining status of the union 
and designed
. 
to belittle the union in the eyes of the employees. The Board's concern, however. 
was o n l y  wnh e l i m inating any fi n a n c i a l  detriment su ffered by t h e  e m ployees . See tex t 
accompanying notes 194 and 195, supra. 
249. 1 67 N . L. R . B. No. 6 1 ,  1 968 C C H  N L R B  Dec. 2 1 ,  773, 66 L. R . R. M .  1075 ( 1 967 ) .  
250. See note 194 supra. 
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of any monetary co m pens a t i o n  ordered t o  r em edy a refu s a l  to 
bargain .251 
The more appropriate solut ion w o u ld seem to be that suggested 
by the UA W1IJ2 -- fuller recourse to secti o n  I O(j) i njunctive relief.253 
Indeed, were t he Board t o  res o rt m o re extensi vely to temporary 
restrai n i ng orders i n  cases of egregious refusals t o  b a rgain, the i njuries 
alleged in Ex- Cell-O m ight be avoided a ltoget her . I f  the delay i n  the 
c o m m enceme nt o f  b a rg a i n i n g i n  fa c t  r e s u l t s  i n  a l o s s  o f  b o t h  
bargai n i ng power and ba rgai n i ng status , then a n  appropriate solution 
would be to have the part ies commence negot iat ions  from the outset 
under order of a district court . A s early as 1 960, the Board was urged 
to take such action in cases o f  outright refu s a l  to bargain ,254 but the 
Boa rd 's recourse to interlocutory orders has been q uite li m ited .25s 
THE R I G HT TO " B A R G A I N  I N  P U R S U I T  OF A ( O NT R A CT " -
VALUA!I O N  A N D  T H E  PRO P O S E D  ST A N D A R DS 
There is i n  the pos i t i o n  o f  the unions a tacit assum ption 'about 
the value of w hat has been l ost - the r i ght t o  "bargain co llecti vely in 
pursuit of a co ntract . "256 I t  is assumed t h a t  the value o f  w hat the 
emp loyees ha ve lost i s  e q u i v a l e n t  to the m o ne t a ry v al ue o f  the 
"average agreement" reached in the absence o f  u n l "' wful refusa l s  to 
bargai n .  
25 1 .  S('e note 2 1 5  supra. I n  N L R B  v. Gullet Gin Co. ,  340 U . S .  36 1 ( 1 95 1 ), the Court 
sustained the Board's practice of disallowing deductions of a m ounts received as unempl oyment 
compensation from the back pay duc: to discriminatori ly d i sch arged em ployees. The Court noted 
tha t  t he un e m p loyment c o m pe n sat ion was a "coll ateral benefi t ; "  it was not made to the 
employees by the respondent-e mployer lO discharge any obligation of the employer. 340 U.S.  at 
364. By implication. the deduction of i n teri m wage increases, payments made by the employer t o  
his e m ployees, would seem appropriate. 
252. See note 57 supra. 
253. 29 U . S.C.  § 1 60(j ) ( 1 964 ). The section empo wers the Board in its discretion, after 
issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint. to petition a district court for injunctive relief i n  
a id  of the unfair labor practice proceedi n g  pending before t h e  Board. 
254. "Ordinarily a charge that an employer refused to bargain i n  good fai t h  i n vo l ves subtle 
inquiries which would make an i nterlocutory order inappropriate but the case would be entirely 
di fferent if the union had been recent l y  certified and the e m ployer si mply refused to begin 
negotiating a contract . "  S .  Doc. No. 8 1 ,  86th C o n g  . .  2d Sess. 1 2  { 1 960) (Cox Advisory Panel 
on Labor- Management Relations Law). 
255 .  Although i n  fiscal 1 96 7  interim relief was sought by the Board most frequently in cases 
of unlawful refusal to bargai n ,  injuncti ve relief was obtained against employers in only 1 1  cases 
not all of which involved al leged violati ons of § 8 (a)(5). THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD 1 76-77 ( 1 968). For an example of a case i n volving a 
refusal to bargain where such relief was obtained, see Hoban v. United Aircraft Corp.,  264 F. 
Supp. 645 (D. Conn. 1 966). One d i fficulty the Board has e x perienced in its attempts to procure 
interlocutory aid is the insistence upon a showing that the injunction is necessary to preserve the 
status quo or to prevent irreparable harm.  I wonder whether the Board could not_ 
make the same 
statistical showing the unions have presented in Ex-Cell-O in order t o  meet the required standard. 
256. Brief for the U A W  at 39. 
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I t  seems clear to us that i t  follows, once it is shown that 
bargaining which i s  not  tainted by an illegal refusal to 
recognize the employees' representative normally results in an 
agreement, that the monetary value of the average agreement 
reached is the proper measure of the value o f  the expectancy 
that has been defeated by the employer's violatio n  of the Act.257 
This position fails to recognize that what has. been lost is not the 
"right to  contract"258 but t he probability that absent the employer's 
vfolatio n  an agreement would h ave been reached and benefits would 
then have accrued to the employees. For example, when a contract 
which contains an option to renew is breached, d a m ages for the loss 
of the i n nocent party's interest in that contract include the value of 
the optio n .  But the damages measure the value o f  the option itself, 
not the value of the future contract that an exercise of the option 
might have created.259 In Ex-Cell- O, the probability that an agreement 
would have been reached had the employer not refused to bargain is 
the sum of the probable non-occurrence of all the factors that may 
have prevented agreement . • •The key to any probability system is 
identify i ng these variables a n d  assigning a p r obability value to 
them. "260 I n  the collective bargaining situation identification of all 
factors which might have prevented agreement is an almost impossible 
task. M oreover, 
even if the identification of all releyant factors were possi ble, 
the problem of estimating the probability o f  their occurrence 
seems insoluable.261 
257 . Brief for the AFL-CIO as A micus Curiae at 12- 1 3 .  
258. Brief for the UAW at 38. The U A W  did make the distinction noted. "The Board is 
merely making them whole for the w a ge gains which they rea s o n a bly might or could have 
achieved h a d  their rights been respected. Si nce a contract does not necessarily materialize in 
collective bargaining negotiations, the wrong which the Board is redressing is not the denial of a 
right to contract but rather the right to bargain collectively in pursuit of a contract." Id. at 38-
9 .  
259. Comment, The Labor Management Relationship: Present Damages for Loss of Future 
Contracts. 7 1  YALE L.J. 563, n. 1 2  at 565 (1 962). In the succeeding text I rely heavily upon the 
article in my discussion of the issue of valuation of the employee loss. The case noted in the article 
is Local 1 27, Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F. 2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962). In Brooks. 
an employer removed his plant in breach of contract and a union sued for loss of its expectancy 
in future dues. Recovery was allowed for the loss of future dues. The measure of recovery was 
the amount of dues normally received by the union under prior contracts (the parties had had a 
successful relationship for twenty years prior to the unlawful remova l )  projected twenty years into 
the fut
.
ure. The article is critical of the court's failure to distinguish between the actual injury to 
the union, the loss of the "chance" to make future contracts and the future contracts themselves. 
7 1  YALE L . J. at 57 1 .  
. 260. Comment. The Labor-Management Relationship: Presenr Damages for Loss of Future ( ontract., .  7 1  YALE L.J. 563, 572 ( 1962). 
. 
26 1 .  Id. at 573. 
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What all of this means is s i mply,  first ,  t h at t he m onetary value of the 
average agreement needs to be discounted in some fashi o n .  I f, as h as 
been argued,262 the statistics �ffered_ 
by the uni ons dem onstrate o n ly 
that had the employer ba rgained l ro m  the outset the resu l t  w ould 
likely have been the same as that occu rr ing a fter review , t he n  64 per 
cent of t he ti m e  the e m p l oyee s  w o u l d h a v e  g o n e  w i t h o u t  a n  
agreement; somehow this must b e  "plugged " into the probability 
calculus. A very unsophisticated suggest i o n  is that the value of the 
average agreement be discounted by t w o-third s .  Second, the task i tself 
is a very difficult one. H owever, t hat the task is  di fficult s h ould not 
bar all relief.283 And it should also be n oted t h a t ,  once t he Board were 
to announce the proper valuation techni que, its application w ould be a 
realti vely simple matter. 
The standards offered to prove the a verage agreement,  t h at w hich 
wou ld have been entered had the e m pl oyer bargained, a ls o  p resent 
difficulties .  I ndeed, by way of diet um o n e  cou rt has c h aracterized the 
attempted use of such s t a ndards as  " i nh e rent ly spec u l at i v e .  "264 
262. St•e text accompanying notes 200-204. supra 
263. In A merican Fire A pparatus Co . .  1 60 N . l . . R . B. 1 3 1 � ( 1 966). enj(Jrced 380 F.2d 1 005 
(8th Cir. 1967). an employer unilaterally el i m i nated an e m ployee bonus in violation of § 8(a)(5). 
The trial examiner refused to recommend that the e m ployees be compensated for the lost bonus. 
It was the trial exa miner's view that ascertainment of the amount due presented a "difficult, if 
not impossi ble " task. 160 N . L. R . B. at 1 3 24 ( T X D).  The Board rejected the exami ner's rationale 
and ordered that the employees be reim bursed : "Nor is the difficulty of computing the em ployees' 
loss as a result of Respondent's unfair labor pract ices a legitimate reason for denying them all 
compensation." 160 N . L . R . B. at 1 3 1 9 .  
264. In Montgomery Ward & C o  . .  1 5 4 N . L . R .  B. 1 1 97 ( 1 965), the Board found that while 
engaged in mult i-store barga i n i n g  an employer had reached agreement with a n  international 
union. Prior to entering the negotiations. however. the e m ployer had announced that he was not 
bargaining for several stores where decertification petitions had been filed. The Board further 
found that the employer's action in refusing to bargain on beha l f  of those stores was u nlawful, 
and that but for the refusal a l l  the stores represented by the u nion would have had the opportunity 
to ratify the agreement. The Board ordered the empl oyer to submit the agreement for e mployee 
ratification at those stores for which the empl oyer had refused to bargain and if ratified to sign 
the agreement and give it retroactive effect. Enforce ment of the Board's order was denied sub 
no111 Retail Clerks v. N L R B, 373 F.2d 655 ( D . C .  Cir .  1 967).  The court held that the parties had 
not reached complete agreement, as the agreement reached was si lent on the matter of wages and 
hours. Before the ·court the Board suggested that the order be e n forced and the matter o f  wages 
and hours be left to supplemental proceedings for deter mination based upon an "area survey" 
standard . The court rejected the Board's proposal : 
Reliance on the vague 'area s u r vey' standard in a supplemental proceeding does not 
strike us as an appropri ate su bstitute for evidence proving agree ment.  I n deed, 'so 
inherently speculative a proposition suggests that the Board would have lacked the power 
to com pel concession s  or othe�wise s i t  in judgment u p o n  the s u bstantive ter m s  of 
collective bargaining agreements . '  373 F.2d n. 1 3  at 660 (citing Ins. Workers Int'! Union 
v. N L R B, .see note 3 3  supra). 
. 
Several things should be noted. Although the e m ployer had not viol�ted § 8 (a)(5) by refusi�g 
to sign the agreement, the e m ployer has independent l y  violated the sect10n by ref
usrng to barga1
.
n 
· f · · · d · Ex-Cell-O And compare the court s in act. The s1tuat1on 1s a nalogous to that presente m · 
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Certainly, as has been suggested,265 use of the BLS figures would 
relieve the small or indepen dent union of an o nerous data-gathering 
burden. The problem, however, is that one needs to  k n ow whether the 
collective b argaining experience reflected in  such figures reasonably 
depicts the likely experience of the particular u n i o n  and the particular 
employer involved. The problem i s  one of di vergence. The A FL-C I O  
addressed itself to this problem and remarked : 
I t  s hould be noted first that so far as we are aware there is 
nothing in the theory o f  collective bargaining which suggests 
that such marked divergencies do exist.  The argument thus 
rests on the intuitive hunch that given the different strength 
of various unions, the d iffering attitudes toward unionization 
in various parts of the country ,  the differi ng profit picture of 
various industries and o f  large and s m all com panies or in an 
industry such divergencies m ust exist .266 
U n fortun ately, there a r e  m any bargaining theo rists who would 
disagree. The literature of collective bargaining theory267 seems to 
suggest that, even with i n  the same geog r a p h i c  a rea "markedly 
different types of union-m a n agem ent accommodation , ,  coexist and that 
the primary explanation for such divergencies l ies  i n  the attitudes and 
decisions of the particular parties.268 The statistics offered showing 
how others reacted to si m i la r  circumstances a re o f  limited value.269 
A l t h o u g h  the ' B L S  fig u r e s  a r e  attract ive  i n  their  i m mediate 
availability, the writer is n ot at all convinced that they reasonably 
reflect what seems to be crit ical-the react i o n s  o f  the particular 
parties . 
The U A W has proposed an alternative s t a ndard, one which 
reflects  t he "proven p r os pects of the part icular union refused 
insistence upon a n  actual agreement,  even with the independent refusal to bargain. 11'ith the 
discussion in the text accompanying notes 1 6 5 - 1 69, supra. 
265 . Note, Monetary Compensation as a Re111edy /(Jr £111plorer Refi1sal 111 Bargain. 56 
GEO. L.J .  474, 498 ( 1968). 
266. Brief for the A F L·C IO as A 111icus Curiae at 1 7 .  
267 . For a collection of such theo ries see Mabry, The Pure Theon o( Bargai11i11g. 18 IND . 
& LAB. REL. REV. 479, n . I  at 479 ( 1 965) .  
268 . D u ber, Chal mers & Stagner,  En viron111ental Variables and l 'nion - Managflll<'nl 
A ccom111odatio11.  1 1  IND. & LAB. REL REV. 4 1 3,  427 ( 1 958). See also Marbry. The Pure Theorr 
of' Bargaining. 18 I ND. & LAB. REL. REV. 479, 480 ( 1965 ) (in the final a nalysis decisions made 
by the particular parties are the determining factors); Dunlop, The Economics ol Wage- fJi.1P111'' 
Se1tleme111 .  1 2  LAW & CONTEM . PROB. 28 1 ,  283 ( 1947) ("The principle that wage rates in on� 
b
.
argaining unit should be adjusted to the level of wages in comparable plants has an alluring 
simplicity. However · · . the illusion o f  si mplicity vanishes in t h e  attempt to give meaning to the 
concept of 'comparable' wage rates in any particular dispute situation.") Compare note 42 .wpra. 
. 
269. Comment, The Labor- Manage111e111 Relationship: Present Damages for Los.1 o( Fut11rc 
C ontracts. 7 1  YALE L.J.  563. 573 ( 1 96 2 ). 
. 
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recognit ion .  "270 H ere there would seem to be an answer to any 
objection that the p r oposed standard fai ls  because of its generality . 
Again, however, problems remain.  First, as refusal to bargai n  is a 
s m all firm phenomeno n,271 it is unlikely that data would be available 
il lustrating what t h e  u n i o n  was able to procure (rom the s ame 
em ployer at other plants, a s  was the case in  Ex- Ce/1- 0.272 Therefore, 
the bargaining experience of the union with other �mployers would 
have to be used and this approach possesses the same deficiency as 
that exhibited by the BLS standard. More importantly, a significant 
variable which determ i n es the likely success of a particular union is its 
bargaining power,273 a function of its abil ity to call a strike. This i n  
turn reflects the wil li n gness of a particular group of employee s  to 
strike, and the fact t hat groups A ,  B. and C were willing to d o  so 
does not necessarily mean that group D is s o  willing. 
Exact stand ards,  h owever, are not required. 
[W] hile the d a m ages m ay n o t  be d etermined by m e r e  
speculation o r  guess, i t  will be enough i f  the evidence shows 
the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable 
inference, although the result can only be approximate. The 
wrongdoer is n ot enti tled to complain that they cannot be 
measured with t h e  exactness and precision that would b e  
possible i f  the case, which he alone i s  responsible for making, 
were otherwise.274 
Repeatedly it is s a i d  t h at ,  so l o ng a s  the Board 's for m u l a  i s  
reasonably calculated t o  arrive at the closest approximation o f  the 
a m o u nt of co m p e n s a ti o n  due, the B o a r d ' s  choice m ay n o t be 
rejected .275 Nevertheless ,  s o me doubts remain .276 
270. Brief for the U A W  at 26. 
27 1 .  Ross supra note 1 2, at 4.  
272. See note 42, supra. 
273 .  Duber, C h al me r s ,  & Stagner, Uniformities a n d  Differences in L ocal L 'nio n ­
Manage111e111 Relationship. 1 1  IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 5 6  ( 1957). And see text accompanying notes 
1 96 - 1 99 supra. 
274. Story Parchmen t  C o .  v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 ( 193 1 ). 
275 . NLRB v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 358 F. 2d 94 (5th Cir. 1966); accord F.W. 
Woolworth Co. v. N L R B, 1 2 1  F.2d 658, 663 (2d C i r .  194 1 )  ( Board's formula reflected a 
"common sense" treatment); N L R B  v. Brown & Root, Inc. , 3 1 1 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1 963 ); 
Buncher Co. v. N L R B 405 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1969). 
276. Even assumin g  t h at appropriate standards could be developed, there remai�s the 
pro blem of the acceptability of a Board decision applying those standards by a particular 
respondent employer. This is  particularly important in the case where an employer refused to 
bargain without any anti-un i o n  animus. Experience with compulsory arbitration suggests that 
when one party objects to the standards which are applied regardless of whether such standards 
have been widely utilized, the decision will be rejected despite the sanctions provided by law. See 
Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor A rbitration, 6 1  MICH. L. REV. 1245, 1 255 ( 1 963).
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THE REMEDY AND THE DEGREE OF M ORA L FAULT 
I n  its notice of hearing, the Board inquired whether the proposed 
remedy should apply in c ases of refusals to bargain based upon a 
desire to  p rocure judicial  review, as  dist ingu ished from refusals 
designed solely to frustrate the bargaining process accompanied by 
flagr a n t  violations of other sections o f  the  Act .277 One relevant 
consideration has previously been mentioned-the fear that imposition 
of the remedy in a case where the refusal was only "technical" might 
have a detrimental impact upon the future bargaining relationship of 
the parties.278 Other reasons also seem to support the view that the 
Board should make the dist i n ction. 
It can be argued that Congress, when i t  established the review 
p rocedure, was fully aware o f  the damaging e ffects of the delay 
inherent i n  such a system o f  review .279 Nevertheless, it deliberately280 
chose s uch a system o f  r eview as a safeg u a rd against arbitrary 
administrative action; and that therefore it w ou ld seem, at least as a 
matter of fairness,281 that the proposed remedy should not be applied 
when the employer refuses t o  bargain in the sincere belief that the 
Board has erred. The language of the District o f  Columbia Circuit 
seems particularly appropriate :  
The present case, however, does not serve a s  an appropriate 
vehicle for the creation o f  unprecedented remedies. There was 
only one violation of the Act alleged and found . And that 
violation, the failure to bargain, was not born out of any general 
hostility on the company 's part to the unions or to the policies 
o f  the Act. The company refused to bargain only to obtain 
In the case where an employer has only 
"techn ically" violated § 8 (a ) (5 ), see text accompanyi ng 
notes 27-3 1 supra, there is the danger that an unacceptable application of such standards might 
interfere with the future bargaining relationship of the union and the employer involved. see notes 
1 56- 1 6 1  supra and accompanying text. 
277. N L R B  Notice of Hearing (May 26, 1967). 
278. See notes 156- 16 1 supra and accompanying text; note 276 supra. In N LRB v. Scott's. 
Inc ... 383 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court, in denying enforcement of a Board notic
e reading 
requirement, gave as one of its reasons the fact that the requirement "could have an impact on 
the atmosphere, not only at the time o f  reading, but in the future, for peaceful, fruitful, and 
effective labor bargaining." 383 F.2d at 233.  
279. See H.R. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1 st Sess. 5 ( 1935);  testi mony of  Francis Biddle 
note 95 supra and accompanying text. 
280. "That this indirect method of obtaining judicial review i m poses significant delays upo_
n 
attempts to challenge the validity of Board orders in certification proceedings is obvious.  But it 
•s equally obvious that Congress explicitly intended to i m pose precisely such delays." Boire '" 
Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 478 ( 1964); accord AFL v. N L R B, 308 U.S. 40 1 ( 1940). 
28 1 .  In N L R B  v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U .S. 344 (1953)  the Court 
note
.d t�a t the Board must give regard to "ci rcumstances w h i c h  may make [a remed
y's! 
apphcatton to a particular situation oppressive and therefore not calculated to effectuate a policy 
of the act . "  344 U.S. at 349. 
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judicial review of the Board 's  conclusions i n  the representation 
case . It was the only means of obta in ing such review .2x2 
3 1 1 
In Ex-Cell-O, Examiner Vose suggested that ,  i f  an appellate court 
ultimately were to rule that respondent Ex-Cell-O was right in urging 
that the election should have been set aside because of the UA W's  pre­
election conduct , then no obl igation at a l l  would devolve upon the 
employer. On the other hand, were the court to enforce the Board's  
order, then , queried Examiner Vose, "why should not the Respondent 
be requ ired to pay damages? "211:1 This position see m s .  fai r  enoug h .  But 
the difficu lty is that an employer would be forced to guess w h at a 
court ulti matel y would hold . The risks i nvol ved, 28� particularly for a 
small employer, might cause h im to forego press ing his objecti on i n  
favor o f  recognition and bargaining: and, although i t  i s  true that 
regardless of an employer's motives in  refus ing to barga in  the alleged 
injury to the employees is the same. nevertheless imposition of the 
remedy i n  such a case might be said to  i m p i nge u pon an  employee 's  
section 7 right not to  jo in  a union.285 Th is  w riter is persuaded by  the 
fact that a claim of Board error is legit im ately raised in m any cases. 
Forty per cent of all sect ion 8 (a ) (5 )  cases reviewed by the courts are 
denied enforcemen t .286 
Furthermore. the Fi fth Circuit has noted that "the actual  nature of 
the failure to bargain bears sign i ficantly on the remedy to be i mposed 
by the Board . "2x; Repeated ly,  one finds th i s  pr inciple app lied b ot h  in 
282. Retail Store Union v .  '.' il. R B. 3 8 5  I .2d .10 1 .  3 0 8  ( D.C.  C i r .  1 967). I n  N L R B  v. Air 
Control Prods, Inc . .  335 F.2d 245 (5th Cir  . .  1 964 ) . the court noted, " With 110 criticism of 1he 
e111plorl'r intended. its .:xercise of th.: lawful r ight to take the bold course of a section 8 (a)(5 )  route 
to test the election has resulted in a delay of almost three years . . . .  " 335 F.2d at 2 5 2 (emphasis 
added). Contra. Sore . . .Jn . ·ls.H'ss111e111 of the Proposed . .  Make- Whole" Remedy in Refusal- To­
Bargain Cases. 67 M1cH .  L. Ri: v .  374, 386 ( 1 968 ) ("[A]utomatic application of the remedy 
without regard to the suggested distinction would seem to further the purposes of the N L RA.). 
283. Ex-Cell-O Corp .. Case No. 25-CA-2377 ( N . L. R. B. TX D-80-67 at 16, Mar. 7 ,  1967). 
284. Again. see notes 225 and 226 and accompanyi ng text supra. the questions involved 
would be largely questions of credibility. This would apply both in  cases of union pre-election 
misconduct in certification cases and in cases of a l leged misconduct in the  s o licitation of  
authorization cards. 
285. 29 U.S.C . § 1 57 ( 1 964). The section provides that employees shall have the right to 
refrain from self-organization and from joining a labor organization. The argument would be that 
if an employer refrained from pressing an appeal-worthy case and instead recognized the union, 
his action would be in disregard of  t h e  ri ght of  h i s  e m p loyees n o t  to be represented by the 
particular union involved.  It also has been argued that adoption of the remedy would seriously 
interfere with the effective application of  section 8 (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1 58 (c) ( 1 964), of the Act by 
chi lling legiti mate anti u n i o n  e m pl oyer free speech a n d  t hereby l ikewise interfere wit h  the
 
employee's right not to be represented by a union. Comment, Employee Reimbursement for an 
Employer's Rejiisa/ 10 Bargain: 1he Ex- Cell-O Doctrine. 46 TEXAS L. REV. 758, 776 ( 1 968). 
286. Ross, supra note 1 2 , at 3 5 .  
287. N L R B v. Citizen's H otel C o . ,  326 F .  2d 5 0 1 ,  506 (4th Cir. 1964). 
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Board288 and court289 decisions .  Finally, it should also be noted that 
Professor Ross, in making his  recommendations for the adoption of 
more adequ·ate and rea l i s t i c  r e m edies, rec o m mended that such 
remedies be applied in ' 'clear cut, naked refusal to bargain cases 
which are accompanied by widespread unfair labor practices or in a 
context of repeated violatio n s . ' '290 
JubICIAL REVIEW 
It has been said that '"in the evolution o f  the law of remedies 
some things are bound to happen for the 'first time ' .  "291 If Ex- Cell-O 
proves to be a "first time, ' '  what is the appropriate role of a court in 
reviewing the Board's order? And should the order be enforced? 
In the exercise of its remedial authority, the Board enjoys 
broad discretionary power . Mr. Justice Frankfurter enunciated the 
guiding p rinciple: 
[I]n the nature of things C ongress could not catalogue alt the 
devices and stratagems for circumventing the policies of the 
Act.  Nor could it define the whole gamut o f  remedies to 
effectuate these policies i n  an infinite variety of specific 
s i tuation s .  Congress m et these difficulties by leaving the 
a d a p tation of m ea n s  t o  e n d  to the e m p i r i c  process of 
administration. Because the relation of remedy to policy is 
peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts 
m u s t  not enter the a l l o w able area o f  the Board 's 
discretion . . . . 292 
288 .  Schil l  Steel Prods . ,  I n c . ,  1 6 1  N . L. R . B. 939 (1966) (a mong the circumstances 
considered in formulating the remed y was the respondent's h i s t o r y  of serious unfair labor 
practices and the nature of the violation found); Willock Supply Co.,  1 7 1  N. L. R. B. No. 33. 1968 
CCH N L R B  Dec. 22,437, 68 L.R. R. M. 1043 ( 1968) (employer's unlawful conduct took place in 
an atmosphere permeated with anti-union animus, coupled with several unfair labor practices). 
289. "It may well be that an order such as that proposed here would be appropriate under 
more aggravated circu mstances ."  N L R B v. H . W .  Elson Bottling C o . ,  379 F.2d 223, 227 (6th 
Cir. 1967); N L R B  v. Ben Outhier, Inc . , 395 F.2d 28, 33 (6th Cir .  1968)  (the violations were not 
the nagrantly coercive type that might show a complete rejecti o n  of the collective-bargaining 
principle). 
It might be argued that as it is well settled that an erroneous view of the law, even if held in 
good faith, is no defense to a refusal to bargain charge, set' N L R B  v. Bardahl Oil Co. , 399 F.2d 
365 (8th Cir. 1968), application of  the remedy in cases of good faith refusals to bargain would 
seem appropriate. But it should be n oted that the remedy applied i n  such cases, an order to 
bargain,  is  unlikely to have the same i m pact on the bargaining relationship of the parties. as 
would an order to pay compensation. See n otes 1 56- 1 6 1  and accompa™'ing text and note 1 76 · 
JUpra. 
290. Ross. Jupra note 1 2, at 32 .  I t  has also been argued that the proposed remedy should 
not be apphed at all in authorization card cases, Jee note 36 supra. since authorization card 
procedure 15 speculative and the stand ards followed are generally poorly defined. Comment. 
l:mplo ree Reimbursement for an Emplo_1·er's Refusal to Bargain: the Ex-Cell-O Doctrine. 46 TE\. 
L RF.v. 758, 78 1 ( 1968). And see note 1 6 1  Jupra. 
29 1 . lnt'I Br'hd of Operative Potters v. N LRB, 320 F.2d 757. 76 1 (D.C.  Cir. 1963). 292. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N L R B, 3 1 3  U .S. 1 77,  194 ( 1 94 1  ). 
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The Board is also entitled to draw upon ' 'enlightment gained from 
experience "293 in decid ing whether to adopt ne w remedies; and, as the 
Board is an administrative agency, considerable weight is to be given 
by a court to i ts adm inistrative deter m i nations.294 Further, "it is  for 
the Board, not the courts, to determ i ne how the effect of prior unfair 
labor practices may be expunged. "295 The Board ' s  power, however, is 
not unli mited . At ti mes its orders h a ve been held i n  excess of 
its authority .296 The essential l imitations a re those "which inhere in 
the very policies of the A ct w hich the Board i n voke�. "297 All of these 
principles are very n ice . The difficulty comes in their application.  
1 n Ex-Cell-O the U A W has taken the position that the Board is 
given ' 'wholly unrestricted a uthority " u nder section IO(c)298 of the Act 
to fashion its remedies .299 Further, the U A W  contends that the "as 
will effect uate the policies of this Act" clause of section I O(c) is not a 
rest riction on the Board 's authority .300 I n  order to raise one of the 
issues a reviewing court wil l  have to face and the problems t hat wil l  
confront the court, the writer should l ike to test the U A W's position 
with a hypothetical .  
A ssume that a n  e m p l oyer refuses t o  b argain w i t h  a newly 
certified union, chal lenging the Board's certification . The Board finds 
that the refusal was unlaw fu l  and the Board 's order com m ands that 
the employer "execute the agreement currently i n  force between L ocal 
309 and the department and variety s:tores with which Respondent is 
competing in Olympia .  "301 Such an order, quite obviously,  would 
"impose minimum terms" upon the employer-a result the Board has 
been unwi l l ing to reach.302 What is m ore i m portant, h owever, is the 
193. N L R B  v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc.,  344 U.S .  344, 346 ( 1 953).  
294. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N L R B, 3 1 9  U.S.  533, 540 ( 1 943 ) (" [The Board's 
order] should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other 
than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act."). 
295. Lodge No. 35, I A M  v. N L R B, 3 1 1  U . S. 72, 82 ( 1940); accord N L R B  v. Link Belt 
Co . 3 1 1  U.S. 584, 600 ( 1 94 1 ). 
296. Southern Steamship Co. v. N L R B, 3 1 6 U.S.  3 1  ( 1942 ).  
297. N L R B  v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,  306 U . S. 240, 257 ( 1 939). 
298. 29 U .S.C. § 1 60(c )  ( 1964 ) .  For text see note 9 1  supra and accompanying text. 
299. Brief for the U A W  at 23 .  
300. Id. at 24. The U A W  argues that the clause serves rather as an expansion of  the 
Board's remedial powers beyond the confines of the common law of damages. 
30 I .  The hypothetical order is, in fact, the order requested in the Rasco Olympia case, one 
of the four currently pending before the Board, Charging Party's Brief to the Trial Examiner at 
l S, Rasco Olympia, Inc. Case No. 1 9-CA-3 187  (N .L . R . B. TXD, Dec. 9, 1 966). 
302. In Red Cross Drug Co., 1 74 N.L . R . B. No. 1 7 ,  1 968-2 CCH N L R� Dec. 20,47 � ' .70
 
L R. R. M. 1064 ( 1 969), an employer violated § 8 (a)(5) by closing his store without _
bar�ammg 
with the union. In addition to recommending that the employer be ordered to bargain with the 
union about the effects of the closing, the trial examiner recommended th�t the em?loyer be 
ordered to place the names of the laid-off employees on a preferential hiring hst for hmng at the 
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fact that, were the Board t o  issue the order, a reviewing court would 
be in a position to observe t his effect of the Board 's order and judge it 
accordingly. The point becomes i mportant later. 
An argument can be made that the hypothetical order would be 
beyond the power of the Board, and that, therefore, a reviewing court 
should not enforce the order. Procedurally, the argument is that, as 
the order violates one o f  ihe Act's m ost basic policies, namely 
freedom of contract, it is  the. court 's role to refuse enforcement of the 
order .303 An order of the Board must effectuate the policies of the 
Act-here lies the "central clue" to the Board ' s  powers under section 
lO(c) .304 One such policy is  that the process o f  collective bargaining is 
to be free and voluntary .30i> Agreements are t o  be those of the parties, 
not those dictated by the Board. 
The C o mm ittee w i s he s  to dispel any p ossible false 
assumption that this bill is designed to compel the making of 
agreements or to permit governmental supervision of their 
terms.306 
As the hypothetical order binds the employer to a contract which he 
himself had not negotiated, a reviewing court might conclude that the 
Board's order exceeds i t s  authority-the B o ard dictated contract 
terms contrary to its role under the Act. 
In the argument reference to section 8 (d) o f  the Act, which provides 
that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party 
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession, "307 was 
intentionally omitted. Tne section would also seem to express great 
concern for the autonomy of negotiations ; and, arguably, the hypotheti ­
cal order likewise impinges upon the policy expressed in section 8(d).308 
All is not well with this contention, however. Recentl y, in United Steel-
employer's other stores. The Board refused to adopt the latter recom mendation. The Board noted 
that to do so would improperly i mpose minimum terms on the bargaining the employer was 
required to engage in. See also note 1 69 supra. 
303. Garwin Corp. v. N L R B, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied. 387 U.S. 942 ( 1967 ) .  
And see Co�s�lidated Edison
.
�o. v. N L R B, 305 U.S.  197,  235 ( 1 938)  ("even th?
.
ugh the Boar� 
be of the opamon that the pohc1es o f  the Act might be effectuated by such order, Court was 0 
contrary opinion and enforcement of the Board's order denied). 
304. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N L R B, 3 1 3  U.S. 1 77, 1 9 1  ( 1 94 1 ). 
3o5. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 1 04 ( 1 962). And see note 236 · 
supra. 
306. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong.,  1 st Sess. 1 2  ( 193 5 ). 
307. 29 u.s.c. § 1 58 (d) ( 1 964). 
308. In Hoban v. United A ircraft Corp., 264 F. Supp. 645 (D. Conn. 1966). the Board_ requested and secured a tempo · · · . . . . . . h'I harge ol 
ref . 
rary an1unct1on requmng mtenm barga1mng w 1 e a c usal to b�rgam was pending before the Board. However, the court did not grant the furth
er 
requested rehef that the employer be required to execute the contract which the union had tender
ed 
pnor to the refusal to bargain. 
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workers v. N LR 9°9 the court, although recognizing the importance of 
freedom of contract,31 0 nevertheless held that 
Section 8(d) defines collective bargaining and relates to the 
determination o f  whether a Section 8 (a ) (5)  violation has 
occurred and not to . the scope of the remedy which may be 
necessary to cure violations which have already occurred.31 1 
Section 8 (d) relates to  t h e  wrong itself rather than to the remedy 
ordered to redress that wrong. In the hypothetical it is clear that the. 
employer has violated section 8(a)(5). He refused to bargain in fact. 
Nevertheless, the writer would still be willing to argue that the 
hypothetical order might be denied enforcement by a reviewing court . 
Again, the question is how far does the principle announced in  United 
Steelworkers extend .  I n  Steelworkers an employer was ordered to 
concede check off.312 As in the hypothetica l,  the order bound an 
e m p l oyer to a term to w h �ch he h a d  n o t  a greed . It might  b e  
maintained, however, that i n  the hypothetical the "minimum terms " 
imposed are different i n  k i nd from the concession ordered in United 
Steelworkers. I n the h y p othetical, the order imposed mini m u m  
"economic"313 term s  u p o n  t h e  employer-w ages and hours, t h e  
"heart of collective bargaining contracts.  "314 Thus, were a reviewing 
court to take such a distin ction, it still might deny enforcement of the 
Board 's order. 
In Ex-Cell-O issue is s harply drawn concerning the effects of any 
order that the employer pay compensation. The employers argue �hat 
the Board would be imposing ·minimum wages and hours upon the 
employer . When the parties return to  the b argaining table, the 
employers assert that the level of wages at which negotiations would 
begin would be those d e cr eed by way of the Board's make-whole 
order .3 15  The union s a ss ert quite the c o n trary.311 Unlike t h e  
309. 38 9  F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.  1 967). 
3 iO. 
We recognize that the National Labor Relations Act is grounded on the premise of 
freedom of contract-albei t  collective contract. The substantive terms of the collective 
agreement are to be forged by the parties to it, not by the Board. This ideal of freedom 
of contract is both a noble and a practical one, and remedies which impinge on it are 
not to be casually undertaken. 38 9 F.2d at 300. 
31 1 . 38 9  F.2d at 2 99. 
3 1 2. H . K. Porter Co., Inc., 1 72 N.L. R.B. No. 72, 1 968-2 C C H  NLRB Dec. 20,040 ( 1 968). 
on remand from United Steelworkers v. N LRB, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. ·Cir. 1 967). 
3 1 3 . "A more di fficult pro bl e m  exists, however, when the only contested issues are eco · t h "  be� 
0 
n�mic-eg. , wages, insurance, seniority. It seems that the Board would proper Y esitate _ore 
.
�derrng a specific concession on one of these issues." Note, Forced Concesswn as a Possible ' LR B Remedy, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1 1 92,  n. 47 at 1 199 ( 1 968). 
314·  Retail Clerks v .  NLRB, 373 F.2d 655, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1 967). See note 264 supra. 
3 1 5. See note 88 supra and accompanying text. 
3 1 6. Id. 
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h ypothetical, however, it is not at all clea r  whether such would be 
the result of the Board 's order. The parties m erely assert and counter­
asse�t. The writer has taken the position that  t he employer's fear is a 
real one,317 but the posit i o n  is only an expression of  opinion. The Board 
might be of quite the c o nt ra ry opinion . I f  so ,  then on review of the 
Board 's order in Ex-Cell- O,  although a cour t  m ight fully embrace the 
arguments presented in the hypothetical, a court would not be in a posi­
tion to apply those arguments.  I f  the Board a n n ounces that, as a matter 
of its experience, it believes the envisioned ev il an imaginary one, a 
reviewing court could hardly assert otherwise. 
A l l  o f  these a nd o t h e r  factors out s i d e  o u r  d o main of 
experience may come i nto play. Their relevance is for the 
Board, not for us.318 
On this issue, if the employers are to prevail,  they will have to prevail 
before the 'Board. 
I t  has also been argued that, if in Ex- Cell-O the Board were to 
order the requested relief, the monetary l i a bility would provide 
bargaining power where n o ne previously existed- leverage which could 
then be used to procure more favorable terms than those which would 
have obtained in the absence of the refusal t o  bargain.319 Here, it 
appears, were a court t o  embrace this argument, it should not enforce 
the Board 's order. 
I n  the Textile Workers ( Personal Products) case the Board 
attempted what eventually proved an unsuccessful attempt to curb 
what it deemed an "abuse o f  t h e  Union's  b a rgaining powers .
"320 
Professor Cox reacted as fol lows: 
l "he  N L RA sought to increase the b argai ning power of 
employees by substituting collective bargaining for individual 
bargaining. Many sponsors of the Taft-Hartley amendments 
supposed that they were redressing the balance by outlawing 
specified union tactics.  These are i nt e l l igent legislative 
pol icies. but surely a .  quasi-j udicial agency o ught not t o  engage m an effort to readjust the balance u nder the guise of 
statutory interpretation.a21 
The Supreme Court provided its own reaction : 
And if  the Board could regulate the c ho ice of  econo mic 
weapons that may be· used a s  part of  collective bargaining, it 
3 1 7 .  
3 1 8 .  
3 19 .  
320. 
32 1 .  
See notes 1 70- 1 79 supra and accom panying text. 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N L R B, 3 1 3  U.S. 1 77, 195 ( 1 94 1 ). 
See notes 200-2 16 supra and accompanying text. 
108 N . L. R . B. 743, 746 ( 1 954) .  
Cox. The Duty to  Bargain in Good Faith.7 1 HARV. L .  REV. 1 40 I ,  144 1  ( 1958). 
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would be in a position to exercise considerable influence u p o n  
the substantive terms on which the  p a rties contract.  O u r  
labor pol icy is not presently erected o n  a found a t i o n  o f  
governmental control of the results o f  negot i ations. N or does 
it contain a charter for the National L abor Relations Board 
to act at large in equa lizing disparities of  bargaining power 
between employer and union .322 
3 1 7  
I n  effect, this writer's reaction to the proposed remedy i n  Ex- Cell-O is  
the same. If  the Board cannot curb barg a i n i n g  power by way of 
section 8(a)(5), an attempt to supply bargain ing power by way of  
section I O(c) should also be held beyond i ts  powers . " If  one th ing is 
clear, it is that the Board was not viewed by C ongress as an agency 
which sho uld exer c i se i t s  pow ers to a i d  a p a rty to c o l le ct i ve 
barga in ing  w h ich w a s  i n  a n  e c o n o m i c a l l y  d is a d v a nt a ge o u s  
position . "323 
There are difficulties, however. I t  is quite clear that t he Board 
has made it a pract ice of restoring barg a i ni ng power w h ich,  as a 
result o f  an employer 's unlawful cond uct , has  been lost .324 And it is 
also true that one of the p o l i cies of  the A ct i s  t h at of red ress i ng 
employee injur ies s u ffered on acco u n t  o f  e m p loyer · u n fa i r  labor 
practices .325 Further, because it is aga i n  u nclear i n  Ex-Cell-O that,  
were the Board to order m onetary compensation,  the effect o f  such an 
order would be to provide bargaining power w here none previously 
existed, a reviewing court m ight reaso n a b l y  decide to res o l ve a l l  
uncertainties against the employer a n d  enforce t h e  order.326 The writer 
would h ave no object ion t o  this approach ; h i s  fears, however, extend 
beyond the issue of j udicial review of the Ex- Cell- O case i tself.327 
CO N C L U S I O N  
Professor Summers has noted: "Rela t i ve strength i s  an econo m ic 
fact . The ability of the law to work c h anges i s  l im ited. "328 I n  Ex- Cell­
o. I believe that the Board is being requested to work such a change. 
This article has raised w h at the writer cons iders to be the probable 
322. N L R B  v. Ins. Agent 's Int 'I Union, 36 1 U. S. 477, 490 ( 1 960). 
323. N L R B  v. Woost e r  D iv i s ion  of Bo r g - Wa rner  C o r p . ,  356 U . S .  342, 358 ( 1958) 
(concurring and dissenting in part. M r. Justice Harlan).  
324. "'We cannot assure such meaningful bargain ing without first restoring some measure 
of economic strength to the Union . . . .  " Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., 1 60 N . L . R .  B .  
990, 998 ( 1966). 
325. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N L R B. 3 1 3  U . S.  177 ,  1 97 ( 194 1 ). 
326. See note 1 88, .rnpr�. 
327. See text accompanying notes 2 1 1 -2 1 3, supra. 
328. Sum mers, A Summarr Evaluation o( the Tali-Harrier A er. 1 1  IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 
405, 407 ( 1 958). 
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effects of the issuance of monetary compensation in cases of refusal to 
bargain-the manner of influence of the proposed remedy on both the 
immediate parties involved and  those not directly involved. Because 
adoption of the remedy would carry, or would soon carry the Board 
beyond its proper role in the a djudication of labor disputes, it is 
recom mended that the Board not adopt the new remedy .329 
There remains the problem of the loss of status suffered by the 
union as a result of an employer's  refusal to bargain.  The District of 
Columbia Circuit recently observed : 
I f  t he Board wishes t o  redress the i njury s u ffered by the 
u n i on ,  as such, i t  m ig h t  wel l co n s i d e r ,  for example, 
assessment on the Employer of an amount directed at 
reimbursing the Union for its loss . . . .  330 
Certainly, when an employer in  bad faith forces a union to  litigate the 
validity of its representativ e  status, the Board might order that the 
employer reimburse the unio n · for its litigation expenses .331 Also, the 
Board m ight increase the e fforts begun in H. W. Elson Bottling Co.332 
For example, the employer might be ordered to make available to the 
unio n  at the commencement of negotiations facilities for employee 
meetings in  order that the union could re-establis h  pre-refusal union­
employee rapport. 
329. An alternative proposal which has received much attent ion  is that the Board, upon the 
finding of a refusal to bargain. incorporate in  its bargaining order a requirement that any contract 
eventually reached is to be applied retroactively to the date of the refusal to bargain . See S aks & 
Co., 1 60 N. L. R . B. 682 ( 1966), enforced sub 110111 Retail Store U nion v. N L R B, 385 F.2d 30 1 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (Union requested such an order but its request was denied). If the Board were 
to adopt an expanded remedy for violations of 8 (a)(5), I believe this a pproach would be preferable 
to that su ggested in Ex-Cell-O. The parties themselves would settle the terms to be applied 
retroactively, thus eliminating one of  the difficulties presented in Ex- Ce//-0--namely. the question 
of standards and the measure of the compensatory payment. More importantly, the ret roact iw 
proposal is more likely to provide a measure of relief which reflects the relati ve economic strength 
of the parties. involved, thus eliminating the possibility that employees would be made more tha n 
whole. Further, it is unlikely that potential application of this form o f  relief would exert pressure 
to make concessions upon an employer who is otherwise bargaining  i n  good faith . I would vent ure 
" gue
.
ss
. that most "non-troublemakers" agree to retroactive a ppl ication at any 
rate . One 
JUnsdicnon. Puerto Rico, has adopted this form of relief for violation of local labor law. St'<' 
La�� Board of P. R. v. Ceide, (P. R .  Sup. Ct. 1963) 57 L. R . R . M .  2070. And in order to test the 
cnt1cism of those who oppose this form of relief, namely that agreement would never be reached 
after the  employer is ordered to ma ke a n y  agreement reached retroactive ,  see Note . · 1 "  
A.ue.ument of the Proposed " Make- Whole" Remedy in Refusal- To- Bargain Cases. 67 Mtcll .  I . .  
REv. 374. 390 ( 1 968), this writer requested of the Labor Board of  Puerto Rico any informa t ion 
bearing on this issue. Unfortunately, none was available. 
330. Garwin Corp. v. N L R B, 374 F.2d 295 n. 22 at 304 (D.C.  Cir .  1967). 
3 3 1 .  In Clement Bros. Co., 1 70 N . L . R . B. No. 152, 1968 CCH N L R B  Dec. 2U47. 6� L.  R. R.  M. I086 ( 1968), the Board was requested to order reimbursement of attorney's fees of both the General Counsel and the union but the Board denied the request .  332 . 1 55 N. L .R .B. 7 1 4  ( 1965). 
